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NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING 
 
Budgetteren heeft, als hoeksteen van vele management controle systemen, een 
belangrijke plaats verworven binnen organisaties. Het omvat zowel het budget als zijnde een 
set van cijfers als het budgetteringsproces, wat verwijst naar het interactief proces waarmee 
de uit te voeren activiteiten en te leveren prestaties in kwantitatieve, financiële grootheden 
worden vastgelegd. Omwille van het belang van budgetteren in ondernemingen, is er heel wat 
onderzoek aan gewijd. Dit onderzoek spitste zich voornamelijk toe op de rol die budgetteren 
speelt bij het motiveren en evalueren van managers. Ondanks alle gevoerde onderzoeken zijn 
er nog heel wat losse eindjes. Hoe budgetteren nu precies werkt als motivatie-instrument blijft 
een ‘zwarte doos’. 
Dit doctoraat heeft als doel de zwarte doos te openen door een inzicht te verschaffen in de 
psychologische mechanismen die de werking verklaren van het budgetteringsproces en 
budget-uitkomsten. We hebben er hierbij specifiek voor gekozen om te focussen op twee 
elementen: budget participatie en budget slack. Organisaties besteden immers heel wat 
middelen aan het optimaliseren van hun participatief budgetteringsproces en het managen van 
budget slack. Inzicht in hoe en wanneer budget participatie managers kan motiveren en in de 
antecedenten van budget slack kan ondernemingen helpen hun middelen efficiënt in te zetten.  
Het doel van de eerste studie is om meer inzicht te bieden in hoe en wanneer budget 
participatie managers motiveert om naar hun budget doelstellingen toe te werken. Voorgaande 
studies maakten geen onderscheid tussen verschillende vormen van budget participatie of 
types budget motivatie. Onderzoek in andere disciplines toonde nochtans aan dat noch 
participatie, noch motivatie uni-dimensionele constructen zijn. Om een beter inzicht te 
verkrijgen in de rijkheid van beide budget-concepten alsook hun onderlinge samenhang te 
begrijpen, hebben we een kwalitatieve veldstudie uitgevoerd. De resultaten van 18 
semigestructureerde interviews leren ons dat managers op verschillende manieren kunnen 
participeren in het budgetteringsproces. Participatie omvat immers twee luiken: het houdt in 
dat managers betrokken worden in en invloed kunnen uitoefenen op budgetdoelstellingen. De 
mate waarin managers invloed kunnen uitoefenen varieert al naargelang de vorm van 
participatie. Onze studie wijst erop dat deze vorm kan variëren van ‘geen invloed’ tot 
‘gezamenlijk beslissen’. Op een gelijkaardige manier wijst de eerste studie ook uit dat er 
verschillende types budget motivatie bestaan. Managers kunnen gemotiveerd zijn omdat ze 
het budget interessant en uitdagend vinden (intrinsieke regulatie), omdat ze het belang ervan 
voor zichzelf (geïntegreerde regulatie) of de onderneming (geïdentificeerde regulatie) inzien, 
of omdat ze zich verplicht voelen door externe (externe regulatie) of interne (geïntrojecteerde 
regulatie) factoren. De verschillende vormen van participatie spelen in op de verschillende 
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types motivatie al naargelang de mate waarin er voldaan wordt aan de drie basis 
psychologische noden van de manager: de nood aan autonomie, competentie, en 
verbondenheid. Drie randvoorwaarden bepalen of deze noden voldaan worden, alsook het 
specifieke motivationele effect van budget participatie: oprechte participatie, participatie 
congruentie, en strategisch alignering. Als managers op een consulterende manier kunnen 
participeren in het budgetteringsproces, moet deze consultatie oprecht zijn om hun drie basis 
psychologische noden te vervullen. Oprechte consultatie houdt in dat er echt geluisterd wordt 
naar de manager en dat zijn/haar input in rekening genomen wordt bij het vaststellen van de 
budgetdoelstellingen. Sommige managers blijken geen gefrustreerde noden te hebben, 
ondanks een gebrek aan de mogelijkheid om invloed uit te oefenen op de 
budgetdoelstellingen. Onze resultaten tonen aan dat deze managers geen aspiratie hadden 
om te participeren. Participatiecongruentie kan er dus voor zorgen dat er geen nood-frustratie 
optreedt, ondanks een gebrek aan invloed. Strategische alignering ten slotte vervult een 
dubbele rol. Enerzijds kan het een substituut zijn voor een oprechte vorm van participatie 
waarbij de manager veel invloed kan uitoefenen. Anderzijds is het een noodzakelijke 
voorwaarde opdat de voldane noden van autonomie, competentie, en verbondenheid zich 
zouden vertalen in een autonoom type budget motivatie (i.e., intrinsieke, geïntegreerde, of 
geïdentificeerde regulatie).  
Wanneer we focussen op budgetteren als een motivatie-instrument, is het ook belangrijk 
om budget slack te onderzoeken. Geïnspireerd door de resultaten van de eerste studie die het 
belang van strategie in een budget-context aanduidden, onderzochten we in de tweede studie 
de relatie tussen participatief strategisch plannen (PSP) en budget slack. Waar eerder 
onderzoek het belang van strategie in een budget-context reeds erkende, lag de focus steeds 
op het effect van generieke strategieën en werden kenmerken van het strategisch proces 
genegeerd. In de strategische management literatuur groeide nochtans het besef dat dit 
strategisch proces in toenemende mate participatief moet georganiseerd worden. De tijd dat 
top management alwetend was, ligt ver achter ons. De strategische kennis zit wijdverspreid 
doorheen de onderneming. Vandaar dat middle managers de kans moeten krijgen deel te 
nemen aan het strategisch planningsproces en samen met de C-suite de strategie te co-
creëren. In de tweede studie verruimen we daarom onze en nemen beide elementen van het 
organisatie-brede proces op (i.e., zowel PSP als budget participatie). We namen een 
vragenlijst af van 247 managers in een cross-sectie van West-Europese ondernemingen en 
verwerkten de resultaten met structural equation modeling. Uit deze studie leren we dat 
managers minder budget slack creëren als ze mogen participeren in het strategisch 
planningsproces. PSP zorgt ervoor dat managers een grotere affectieve 
organisatiebetrokkenheid vertonen. Vanuit deze betrokkenheid aanvaarden ze de 
doelstellingen van de organisatie als ware het hun eigen doelstellingen en zijn ze bereid 
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inspanningen te leveren ten voordele van de organisatie. Aangezien budget slack negatieve 
gevolgen kan hebben voor de onderneming, zullen managers met een hoge affectieve 
betrokkenheid minder slack creëren. Verder geven de resultaten van deze studie ook aan dat 
budget participatie leidt tot minder budget slack via het indirect mediërend pad van autonome 
budget motivatie. Autonoom gemotiveerde managers zullen beter hun best doen en creatiever 
uit de hoek komen om de budgetdoelstellingen te realiseren ‘zoals ze zijn’ en minder de 
behoefte voelen om slack in te bouwen. Samenvattend geeft deze studie aan dat het belangrijk 
is om de bredere organisatie-context in acht te nemen om het budget slack proces te begrijpen.  
De derde studie gaat nog een stapje verder en kijkt naar de externe organisatie-context. 
We bestuderen hier meer specifiek de relatie tussen gepercipieerde omgevingsonzekerheid 
en budget slack. Eerder onderzoek stelde herhaaldelijk dat omgevingsonzekerheid één van 
de voornaamste antecedenten van budget slack is. Deze relatie werd tot op heden echter nog 
nooit empirisch getest. Het doel van de derde studie was dan ook om na te gaan of en hoe 
omgevingsonzekerheid gerelateerd is aan budget slack. Steunend op een combinatie van 
economische (i.e., agency theorie en het information-processing raamwerk) en 
psychologische (i.e., rol theorie) theorieën, zetten we een model op poten om deze vaak 
gesuggereerde maar ongetoetste relatie empirisch te testen. Resultaten werden verzameld 
aan de hand van een vragenlijst die door 218 managers werd ingevuld. Opnieuw werden de 
data verwerkt in een structural equation model. De resultaten van deze laatste studie wijzen 
op het belang van individuele psychologische variabelen in het verklaren van budget slack: 
managers creëren budget slack als een reactie op de rol ambiguïteit en spanning die ze 
ervaren naar aanleiding van de hoge omgevingsonzekerheid. De psychologische variabelen 
rol ambiguïteit en job-gerelateerde spanning verklaren meer variatie in budget slack  dan de 
economische verklaring die steunt op het aantal uitzonderingen waarmee een manager 
geconfronteerd wordt. Uit deze studie besluiten we voorzichtig dat managers niet altijd budget 
slack creëren om het zichzelf makkelijk te maken maar ook omdat het op psychologisch vlak 
een geruststellende rol kan spelen.  
De drie studies in dit doctoraat wijzen erop dat budgetteren, het budgetteringsproces, en 
de budget-uitkomsten geen uniforme processen zijn maar dat ze sterk verweven zijn met de 
menselijke complexiteit. De resultaten versterken de idee dat budgetteren gedaan wordt voor 
en door mensen dus het menselijke aspect mag hier zeker niet ontbreken. We wijzen 
ondernemingen dan ook op het belang van deze menselijke factor en stellen dat het managen 
van de psychologische gevolgen van budgetteren belangrijker is dan een technisch perfect 
formeel budgetteringsproces.    
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ENGLISH SUMMARY 
 
Budgeting plays an important role in organizations as it is the cornerstone of the majority 
of management control systems. It refers to both the budget as a set of numbers and the 
budgeting process, which refers to the interactive process in which future activities and 
deliverables are translated into quantitative, financial terms. Given its central role in 
organizations, much research effort has been devoted to budgeting in general and its 
functioning as a motivation and performance evaluation tool in particular. Despite the vast 
amount of research, some loose ends remain. How budgeting exactly can motivate employees 
is still a ‘black box’.  
This dissertation aims to open this black box by clarifying the psychological mechanisms 
underlying the budgeting process and its outcomes. In particular, we focus on budget 
participation and budgetary slack. After all, organizations spend large amounts of money in 
attempts to ‘make their budgeting process work’ and manage the amount of slack created 
within this process. A better understanding of budget participation’s motivational effects and 
budgetary slack’s antecedents will be useful for efficient resource allocation. 
The aim of the first study is to explore how and when budget participation motivates 
managers to work toward budget attainment. Prior studies have not distinguished between 
different forms of budget participation nor types of budget motivation. Research in other 
disciplines, however, has demonstrated that neither participation nor motivation are uni-
dimensional constructs. To gain an insight in the richness of both budgeting concepts as well 
as to understand their relationship, we conducted a qualitative field study. The results of 18 
semi-structured interviews show us that managers can be involved in different ways in the 
budgeting process. In particular, budget participation consists of two parts: it implies that 
managers are involved in and have influence over the determination of their budgetary targets. 
The extent of influence varies along the diverse forms of participation. The results of our study 
show that these forms can vary from ‘no influence’ to ‘joint decision-making’. Similarly, the 
results of this study demonstrate that different types of budget motivation exist.  Managers can 
be motivated to attain the budget because they think the budget is fun and interesting (intrinsic 
regulation), because they understand the importance of budget attainment for themselves 
(integrated regulation) or the organization (identified regulation), or because they feel 
pressured by external (external regulation) or internal (introjected regulation) controlling 
imperatives. The diverse forms of budget participation relate to these different types of budget 
motivation depending on the manager’s degree of basic psychological need satisfaction: the 
need for autonomy, competence, and relatedness. Three boundary conditions determine 
whether these needs are satisfied as well as the specific motivational effects of budget 
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participation: true participation, participation congruence, and strategic alignment. First, when 
managers are allowed a ‘consultation’ form of budget participation, this consultation has to be 
perceived as true for the basic psychological needs to be fulfilled. True consultation holds that 
top management is genuinely interested in subordinate managers’ input and takes this input 
into account when deciding upon the budgetary targets. Second, it seems that some managers 
do not suffer from frustrated needs for autonomy, competence, or relatedness despite having 
no influence on the budgetary targets. Our results show that these managers had no 
participatory aspirations. Participation congruence can thus mitigate the frustrating effect on 
the basic needs for the ‘no influence’ forms of participation. Third, strategic alignment has a 
double function. On the one hand, it can act as a substitute for high influence, true forms of 
budget participation. On the other hand, strategic alignment is a necessary condition for 
satisfied autonomy, competence, and relatedness needs to translate into an autonomous type 
of budget motivation (i.e., intrinsic, integrated, or identified regulation).  
Given our focus on budgeting as a motivation-tool, it is also important to examine budgetary 
slack. Inspired by the results from the first study that illustrated the importance of strategy in a 
budgeting context, we examined in our second study the relationship between participation in 
strategic planning and budgetary slack. Although prior research had recognized the 
importance of strategy in the budgeting context, its focus was on the effect of generic 
strategies, hence neglecting the characteristics of the strategy process itself. In the strategic 
management literature, however, the awareness grew that this strategic process should be 
organized in a participative way. Top management is no longer omniscient; the strategic 
knowledge is spread throughout the entire organization. Therefore, middle managers should 
be able to participate in the strategic planning process and co-create the strategy with the C-
suite. This is why we broaden our horizon in the second study and include both elements of 
the organizational planning process (i.e., both participation in strategic planning and budget 
participation). We gathered survey results from 247 managers in a cross-section of West-
European organizations and analyzed the results with structural equation modeling. Our 
results demonstrate that managers create less budgetary slack when they are allowed to 
participate in the strategic planning process. Participative strategic planning creates a higher 
affective organizational commitment on the manager’s part. Inspired by their affective 
commitment, managers accept the organization’s goals as if these were their own and devote 
their effort to attaining these goals. As budgetary slack can have negative consequences for 
the organization, managers with high affective commitment will be less inclined to create 
budgetary slack. The results of this study also indicate that budget participation decreases 
budgetary slack through the full mediation effect of autonomous budget motivation. 
Autonomously motivated managers will be more willing and more creative to attain the 
budgetary targets ‘as they are’ and hence will be less inclined to create budgetary slack. 
xv 
 
Overall, the second study highlights that it is important to study the broader internal 
organizational context for understanding the budgetary slack process.  
The third study goes another step further and looks at the impact of the external 
organizational context. In particular, we examine the relationship between perceived 
environmental uncertainty and budgetary slack. Prior research repeatedly conjectured 
environmental uncertainty as one of the main antecedents of slack. This relationship, however, 
has never been empirically tested before. Consequently, the aim of the third study is to test 
whether and how environmental uncertainty is related to budgetary slack. Drawing on a 
combination of economics-based (i.e., agency theory and information-processing framework) 
and psychology-based (i.e., role theory) theories, we set up a model to empirically test this 
often suggested but ill-tested relationship. We collected data through a survey that was filled 
in by 218 managers. Data were again analyzed using structural equation modeling. The results 
of this final study pinpoint the importance of individual, psychological variables in explaining 
budgetary slack: managers create budgetary slack in response to role ambiguity and job-
related tension, caused by environmental uncertainty. The psychological variables role 
ambiguity and job-related tension explain a significantly larger proportion of the variance in 
budgetary slack than the economics-based explanation which builds on the number of 
exceptions a manager is confronted with. We tentatively conclude that managers not always 
create budgetary slack to make it themselves easy but also because it may play a 
psychologically comforting role.  
The three studies in this dissertation show that budgeting, its characteristics, and outcomes 
are no uniform processes but are deeply embedded in human complexities. Our results 
strengthen the idea that budgeting is done by people for people so the people-factor can never 
be neglected. We point out the importance of the people-factor to organizations and posit that 
it is more important to manage the psychological consequences of budgeting than to have a 
technically sound formal budgeting process.   
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
 
Budgeting is one of organizations’ most important control systems as virtually every 
aspect of management accounting is implicated in budgeting (e.g., Arnold and Artz, 2015; 
Davila and Wouters, 2005; Hansen et al., 2003; Hansen and Van der Stede, 2004; Luft and 
Shields, 2003; Merchant and Van der Stede, 2011). Budgeting relates, for example, to cost 
accounting, responsibility accounting, performance measurement, and compensation. 
Moreover, budgeting constitutes one of the few processes that cover all areas of organizational 
activity (Otley, 1999) and is deeply ingrained in almost all organization’s fabric (Scapens and 
Roberts, 1993). Therefore, budgeting has long been considered as the pivotal organizational 
control mechanism and continues to attract research attention.    
Despite the critical mass of academic research, scholarly understanding of how 
budgeting exactly works is still limited. As few research has produced insights into the ‘black 
box of budgeting’, recent practitioner and academic research started questioning budgeting’s 
potential (e.g., Ekholm and Wallin, 2000; Hansen et al., 2003; Hope and Fraser, 2003; Jensen, 
2003; Wallander, 1999). As a result, there is a growing need for research on the psychological 
effects underlying the budgeting process and its outcomes.  
In this introductory chapter, I first introduce the concept of budgeting. Second, I point 
out the budgeting research gaps and simultaneously highlight the structure of this dissertation. 
Next, I elaborate on the research methods employed in this dissertation. Finally, I briefly 
discuss the theories that are used in this dissertation to help further our understanding of the 
budgeting process.  
 
1. The concept of budgeting 
‘Budgeting’ can be used to refer to two main topics. First, ‘budgeting’ can refer to the 
budget as a set of numbers. These numbers are an important tool for effective short-term 
planning and control in organizations. In this dissertation, I focus on the operating budget1, 
which normally covers one year and gives an estimate of the revenues and expenses resulting 
from the business operations during that year (Anthony and Govindarajan, 2007). For example, 
a typical operating budget might include anticipated material and labor costs to run the 
business and to manufacture products or produce services. Second, ‘budgeting’ can also refer 
to the process of developing and using a budget. It is the process of setting financial goals, 
                                                          
1 Whereas the operating budget represents those expenditures required for the day-to-day functioning 
of the business, the capital budget encompasses the process of allocating resources for major 
investment expenditures. Capital budgeting falls outside the scope of this dissertation.  
Introduction 
 
2 
 
forecasting future financial resources and needs, monitoring and controlling income and 
expenditures, and evaluating progress toward achieving the financial goals. In line with 
Covaleski et al. (2003), I use ‘budgeting’ to refer to both the set of numbers and the process 
of arriving there. I use ‘budget’ to refer to the set of numbers only, and ‘budgeting process’ to 
refer to the process only.  
Budgeting serves different purposes, including (1) operational planning and control, (2) 
motivation and performance evaluation, and (3) goal communication and strategy formation 
(Atkinson et al., 2011; Hansen and Van der Stede, 2004; Horngren et al., 2008). This 
dissertation focuses on the motivational aspects of budgeting. Inspired by the seminal work of 
Argyris (1952, 1953), a significant majority of budgeting research has focused on 
understanding how budgeting can best serve its motivation and performance evaluation 
objective. In particular, Argyris (1952) was the first to suggest the importance of behavioral 
factors in understanding the effectiveness of budgeting. Milani (1975) also argued that the 
human aspect of budgeting is very important as the budget is a tool that cannot exist without 
people. Indeed, as ‘budgets are made by people for the purpose of guiding their actions and 
measuring their success, budgets cannot be analyzed from an accounting standpoint only’ 
(Cherrington and Cherrington, 1973, p. 225). Budgeting can motivate managers in the sense 
that budgets provide direction: the budget is a quantification of top management’s objectives. 
Additionally, the data in the operational budget may serve as a standard against which a 
manager’s actual performance is compared.  
 
2. Highlighting the structure and budgeting research gaps  
This dissertation aims to open budgeting’s black box by clarifying the psychological 
mechanisms underlying budget participation and budgetary slack (see Figure 1 for a graphical 
overview of the structure of this dissertation). Gaining profound insight into budget participation 
and budgetary slack is important from a practical perspective as organizations spend large 
amounts of money in attempts to ‘make their budgeting process work’ and to manage the 
amount of slack created within this process. A better knowledge of the motivational effects of 
budget participation and a deeper insight into the antecedents of budgetary slack should be 
useful in guiding efforts to enhance the effectiveness of budgeting practices.  
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2.1 The concepts of budget participation and budgetary slack 
One of the most important psychological effects of the budgeting process, is its motivational 
effect, which is mainly impacted by the degree of budget participation allowed to subordinate 
managers. Budget participation is defined as a process in which the subordinate manager is 
involved in and has influence over the setting of his or her budgetary targets (Anthony and 
Govindarajan, 2007; Shields and Shields, 1998).  
Another key concept in the budgeting literature closely connected to budgeting as a 
motivation-tool, is budgetary slack. Budgetary slack is a complex part of the budgeting process. 
Not only does evidence indicate that there is considerable budgetary slack in organizations 
(e.g., Merchant, 1985; Schoute and Wiersma, 2007), it also remains one of the primary 
controversial, unsolved issues in budgeting research (see e.g., Derfuss, 2012; Dunk and Nouri, 
1998). There is substantial literature that discusses possible antecedents of budgetary slack 
(for an overview, see Dunk and Nouri, 1998), but these studies have resulted in contradictory 
findings (Brown et al., 2009). These mixed findings establish a need to identify and test the 
effects of additional explanatory variables (Webb, 2001).  
The notion of budgetary slack has been discussed in the management accounting literature 
since the early 1950s (Lukka, 1988, p. 281). Yet, it has been treated ambiguously and has 
been referred to under a variety of labels (Derfuss, 2012; Merchant, 1985). In experimental 
research, budgetary slack has been defined as the difference between an individual’s best 
estimate of performance and the standard chosen when participating in standard selection 
(Waller, 1988; Young, 1985). Similarly, Douglas and Wier (2000) refer to budgetary slack as 
the difference between planned performance targets and real performance capabilities. 
Managers can create budgetary slack by intentionally underestimating their revenues and 
productive capabilities and/or by overestimating the costs and resources required to complete 
a budgeted task (Dunk and Nouri, 1998). As a result, the budget will contain a certain amount 
of resources that are excess over what is necessary (Merchant, 1985) and hence make the 
budgetary targets easier to attain (Dunk, 1993). Traditionally, budgetary slack is viewed as 
‘bad’ because it can be seen as an analogue for inefficiency and managerial interest that 
detracts value from the firm (e.g., Leibenstein, 1966; Williamson, 1964). But, budgetary slack 
can also be viewed as ‘good’ because it fosters experimentation and innovation, absorbs 
performance shocks, and resolves goal conflict (Cyert and March, 1963; Davila and Wouters, 
2005; Marginson and Ogden, 2005; Van der Stede, 2000, 2001). In this dissertation, I follow 
prior scholars such as Dunk (1993), Van der Stede (2000), and Indjejikian and Matejka (2006) 
in their definition of budgetary slack and focus on the ease with which budgetary targets can 
be achieved. Budgetary slack occurs when managers ‘negotiate highly achievable targets’ 
(Van der Stede, 2000, p. 609), i.e., targets that are lower than their best-guess forecast about 
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the future. Conversely, a budget contains little slack if it requires considerable effort and a high 
degree of efficiency (Simons, 1987). Moreover, we interpret budgetary slack as a neutral 
concept without a positive or negative tone that is only determined by its use (Davila and 
Wouters, 2005).  
2.2 Study 1 – Budget participation and budget motivation: Understanding the 
complexities and underlying mechanisms 
The budgeting process can range from highly authoritative (i.e., top down) to highly 
participative (i.e., bottom up). With top-down budgeting, top management sets the budget 
targets for the lower levels. With bottom-up budgeting there is room for budget participation. 
Argyris’ (1952, 1953) principal recommendation was to use budget participation to avoid low 
budget motivation. Yet, while organizations are still in the process of increasingly allowing 
subordinate managers to participate in the budgeting process to ensure their motivation toward 
the budget goals (Dugdale and Lyne, 2010; Heinle et al., 2014; Shastri and Stout, 2008), these 
positive outcomes are not always achieved. Indeed, although research on the motivational 
effects of budget participation spans several decades (e.g., Argyris, 1952; Brownell and 
McInnes, 1986; Milani, 1975) there is still much to learn about the exact nature of participation 
and motivation in a budgeting context. 
The first study of this dissertation is inspired by the tension between an increased use of 
budget participation for motivational purposes and our current lack of understanding these 
effects as well as the nature of participation and motivation in a budgeting context. In particular, 
we explore whether diverse forms of budget participation and types of budget motivation exist 
and how and when they relate to each other. To obtain a deeper insight into the diversity of 
participation forms, motivation types, and budget participation’s motivational effects and 
boundary conditions, we engage in a field study and draw on self-determination theory (SDT)2 
(Deci and Ryan, 1985) as a theoretical lens to analyze our findings. As such, we provide a 
more realistic view of both participation (i.e., participation can range from ‘no influence’ to ‘joint 
decision-making’) and motivation (i.e., motivation can be either ‘autonomous’ or ‘controlled’) in 
a budgeting context. Moreover, we uncover the conditions under which specific forms of budget 
participation relate to the different types of budget motivation. 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 See section ‘4.1 Self-determination theory’ for a brief explanation of this theory’s background.  
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2.3 Study 2 – The impact of participation in strategic planning on managers’ creation 
of budgetary slack: The mediating role of autonomous motivation and affective 
organizational commitment 
In line with the work by Simons (1995) and Kaplan and Norton (2001, 2008), we seek 
to extend the accounting-based perspective on control to include the wider range of activities 
initially excluded by Anthony (1965)3. Indeed, both the budgeting and strategic planning 
process are an indistinguishable part of an organization’s broader planning process (Frezatti 
et al., 2011; Merchant and Van der Stede, 2011). Prior research on strategy and budgetary 
slack has been confined to the effect of generic strategies on budgetary slack, neglecting the 
characteristics of the strategic planning process itself. In particular, as recent work on strategic 
management (Floyd and Wooldridge, 2000; Kaplan and Norton, 2001, 2008) suggests that 
strategy should be planned in a participative way, this study aims to clarify whether and how 
participation in strategic planning (PSP) relates to budgetary slack. Indeed, PSP positively 
influences organizational commitment and motivation (Freeman, 1989); two key concepts in 
budgetary slack research (Argyris, 1952; Becker and Green, 1962; Nouri and Parker, 1996) 
thus providing the perfect linking pins between budgeting and strategic planning research. By 
using insights from both SDT and organizational commitment theory4, we capture the whole 
planning process and as such further our understanding of the antecedents of budgetary slack.  
2.4 Study 3 – An economics-based and psychology-based perspective on the 
relationship between environmental uncertainty and budgetary slack 
The empirical focus of prior research has mainly been on organizational level variables 
such as budget participation (e.g., Milani, 1975; Onsi, 1973), information asymmetry (e.g., 
Baiman, 1982; Chow et al., 1988), and superior’s ability to detect slack (e.g., Onsi, 1973) as 
explanations for the creation of budgetary slack. Theoretical research, however, has 
recognized that budgetary slack can also be created in response to environmental level factors 
such as environmental uncertainty (e.g., Bourgeois, 1981; Cyert and March, 1963; Davila and 
Wouters, 2005; Kren, 2003). In particular, environmental uncertainty was first raised more than 
50 years ago by Cyert and March (1963) as one of the main contributors of slack. Although 
ample studies since then have conjectured a relationship between environmental uncertainty 
                                                          
3 In his seminal management control framework, Anthony (1965) distinguished management control, of 
which budgeting is a critical element, from strategic planning. He viewed strategic planning as an 
irregular activity that takes place in the higher echelons of an organization, but provides the guiding 
goals and objectives for the management control process. Although Anthony (1965) recognized 
strategic planning as an essential process, he viewed it as a separate field of study. Inspired by this 
work, later research focused on budgeting in isolation from strategic planning which created a gap 
between management control and strategy. 
4 See section ‘4.1 Self-determination theory’ and section 4.2 ‘Organizational commitment theory’, 
respectively for an explanation of these theoretical backgrounds.  
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and budgetary slack (e.g., Bourgeois, 1981; Davila and Wouters, 2005; Merchant, 1985; 
Webb, 2001), we lack adequate theorization and empirical results. 
In the third study, we extend this line of research by theorizing and empirically testing 
whether and how environmental uncertainty relates to budgetary slack. In particular, we draw 
on both economics-based (i.e., information-processing and agency theory) and psychology-
based theories (i.e., role theory5) to create a more complete and valid understanding of the 
budgetary slack process.  
 
3. Research methods 
3.1 Qualitative field research 
The choice of the appropriate research design depends on three elements: (a) the type 
of research questions posed, (b) the extent of control the investigator has over actual 
behavioral events, and (c) the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events 
(Yin, 2003). Since ‘how’ and ‘when’ questions are central to the study in Chapter 2, a qualitative 
multiple-case field study is undertaken. In particular, the qualitative field study methodology is 
used to obtain a deeper understanding of the motivational effects of budget participation. 
Qualitative research can address complex relationships that cannot be easily illustrated 
through simple causal statistical models (Yin, 2003). Another advantage of using the field study 
methodology is that it is easily adaptable to our exploratory aims in Chapter 2. More 
specifically, the empirical evidence in Chapter 2 is gathered through a focused variant of 
qualitative field study research: semi-structured interviews are conducted in which managers 
can provide open-ended answers to capture their perceptions. This technique enables us to 
have direct and in-depth contact with the research participants (Atkinson and Shaffir, 1998). 
Furthermore, semi-structured interviews provide the major advantage of having the possibility 
of ‘probing’ during the interview, which is of particular importance for the purposes of our 
research. Through probing, a qualitative case study provides an opportunity to further 
investigate the conflicting and ambiguous findings (Lillis and Mundy, 2005). Finally, semi-
structured interviews also make it possible to ask follow-up questions if unexpected outcomes 
promise to be interesting (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006; Eisenhardt, 1989b). 
 
                                                          
5 See section ‘4.3 Role theory’, ‘4.4 Agency theory’, and ‘4.5 Information-processing framework’ for more 
information on these respective theories.  
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3.2 Quantitative survey method  
In Chapter 3 and 4, data are collected through an on-line survey questionnaire to 
increase these studies’ comparability with previous research and because we want to study 
managerial behavior in a real-life business context. The target population for both studies are 
managers with budget responsibilities.  
The quantitative data obtained through these questionnaires are analyzed using 
structural equation modeling (SEM). SEM is a statistical method designed to test a theoretical 
model and commonly refers to the combination of two things: (1) a measurement model that 
defines relationships between the observed items and latent constructs, and (2) a structural 
model which represents the relationships between the latent constructs. The major advantage 
of SEM is that it can evaluate the proposed hypotheses while accounting for measurement 
reliability (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988; Hair et al., 2010). 
 
4. Main theories 
4.1 Self-determination theory 
Self-determination theory (SDT) is a macro-theory of human motivation that, in the last 
decade, has gained ample research attention within the field of psychology (Gagné and Deci, 
2005; Van den Broeck et al., 2010; Vansteenkiste et al., 2006; Vansteenkiste et al., 2010; 
Vansteenkiste et al., 2008). Moreover, its rationale has recently been applied in management 
control research (e.g., Adler and Chen, 2011; De Baerdemaeker and Bruggeman, 2015; Kunz 
and Linder, 2012; Wong-On-Wing et al., 2010).  
Research in SDT has revealed that different types of motivation with different 
consequences exist (e.g., Deci et al., 1989; Deci and Ryan, 2004; Ryan and Deci, 2000). In 
particular, motivation theorists distinguish intrinsic from extrinsic motivation (Deci, 1975; Deci 
and Ryan, 1985). More specifically, a person is intrinsically motivated if s/he performs an 
activity for its sheer enjoyment. Conversely, a person is extrinsically motivated if s/he performs 
an activity for an outcome that is operationally separable from that activity.  
More recently, SDT has further differentiated between the types of extrinsic motivation 
depending on their relative degree of self-determination. The focus has shifted from an 
intrinsic-extrinsic distinction to a distinction between autonomous and controlled motivation. 
Under controlled (extrinsic) motivation, a manager’s functioning is, to a large extent, 
determined by external or internal controlling imperatives (Deci, 1975). Controlled motivation 
involves the regulation of behavior with the experience of pressure and coercion to think, feel 
or behave in a particular way. This is the type of motivation implicitly focused on by much of 
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the budgeting literature (e.g., Chow et al., 1988; Covaleski et al., 2003; Waller, 1988). 
Conversely, autonomous motivation involves the regulation of behavior with the experience of 
volition, psychological freedom, and reflective self-endorsement. Autonomously motivated 
managers put effort in their work because they enjoy it (i.e., intrinsic motivation) or because 
they have internalized the goals of their organization (i.e., autonomous extrinsic motivation) 
(Vansteenkiste et al., 2010).  
I build on SDT in both Chapter 2 and 3 of this dissertation. In particular, I use SDT in 
Chapter 2 to gain profound insight into the richness of motivation in a budgeting context and 
further build on these insights in Chapter 3 by studying autonomous budget motivation as a 
mediating mechanism in the relationship between the broader organizational planning process 
and budgetary slack.   
4.2 Organizational commitment theory 
Organizational commitment theory comprises the idea that managers can be motivated 
to pursue organizational goals. Although the approaches to the definition of organizational 
commitment vary across studies (Buchanan, 1974; Hrebiniak and Alutto, 1972; Mathieu and 
Zajac, 1990; Sheldon, 1971), all researchers elaborate to some extent on the psychological 
bond between an employee and the organization s/he is working for. Allen and Meyer (1990) 
made a distinction between three types of organizational commitment. Affective organizational 
commitment refers to employees’ emotional attachment to the organization and is 
characterized by (1) a strong belief in and acceptance of the organizational goals and values 
and (2) a willingness to exert substantial effort on the organization’s behalf (Mowday et al., 
1974; Mowday et al., 1979). Continuance commitment, on the other hand, refers to the 
perceived costs associated with leaving the firm. The third type, normative commitment, 
concerns a perceived obligation to continue employment. Specifically, we use the affective 
commitment conceptualization, as this may be considered the main component of 
organizational commitment (Allen and Meyer, 1990; Van den Broeck et al., 2010), it has 
stronger relationships with positive work outcomes (e.g.,  Mathieu and Zajac, 1990; Meyer et 
al., 1989), it is in line with previous work introducing organizational commitment in budgeting 
(Derfuss, 2009) and budgetary slack research (Nouri, 1994; Nouri and Parker, 1996), and it 
corresponds best to the concept of autonomous motivation (Gagné et al., 2008).  
I use the insights from organizational commitment theory in Chapter 3 when studying 
affective organizational commitment’s mediating effect in the relationship between the broader 
organizational planning process and budgetary slack. 
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4.3 Role theory 
Role theory emphasizes the nature of individuals as social actors whose behavior is 
guided by expectations held both by the individual and by other people (Katz and Kahn, 1978). 
These expectations correspond to the different roles individuals perform or enact in their daily 
lives. A role consists of a set of rules or norms that function as a plan or blueprint to guide 
behavior. Roles specify which goals should be pursued, which tasks must be accomplished, 
and which performances are required in a given scenario or situation. Of particular interest to 
researchers has been the role stress experienced within the organizational role set. More 
specifically, much research effort has been devoted to the extent to which the expectations of 
these roles are unclear (i.e., role ambiguity) or incompatible to one another (i.e., role conflict) 
(e.g., Jackson and Schuler, 1985; Rebele and Michaels, 1990; Van Sell et al., 1981).  
In Chapter 4, I draw on role theory in general and role ambiguity in particular to provide 
insight into the psychology-based path explaining the relationship between perceived 
environmental uncertainty and budgetary slack.  
4.4 Agency theory 
Agency theory deals with the problems that can occur in the economic exchange 
relationship that develops when one individual (the principal) grants decision-making authority 
to another (the agent) to act on her behalf (e.g., Baiman, 1982; Eisenhardt, 1989a; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). The budgeting process is a process that can typically be described in terms 
of an agency relationship. In particular, the superior manager (the principal) engages a 
subordinate manager (the agent) to perform some services within the budgeting process on 
her behalf, which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent. The major 
concern of agency theory is that the welfare of the principal may not be maximized because 
the principal and agent tend to have different goals as well as different predispositions toward 
risk (Baiman, 1982). Specifically, principals are considered risk neutral whereas agents are 
assumed to be risk averse (Wiseman and Gomez-Meija, 1998). Moreover, as agency theory 
is rooted in economic utilitarianism, it also assumes that both the agent and principal are utility 
maximizers (Ross, 1973).  
I borrow agency theory’s risk and utility maximizing assumption in Chapter 4 when 
discussing the economics-based relationship between perceived environmental uncertainty 
and budgetary slack. 
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4.5 Information-processing framework 
In 1973, Galbraith introduced an approach toward the importance of information 
processing in organizations. He developed his information-processing framework in the 
context of businesses facing dynamic changes in their business environment and initially 
described the problem as the ‘design problem of organizations’. He posited (1973, p. 4) that 
the best solution to this design problem ‘is contingent upon the uncertainty […] in the 
organizational unit’. In particular, Galbraith (1973) suggested that as environmental uncertainty 
increases, the number of exceptions a company is confronted with increases as well. In an 
attempt to manage these exceptions, the decision-makers in the organization must process a 
higher amount of information to attain a certain performance level. Processing more 
information requires gathering more data, transforming more data into information, and more 
communication and storage of information in the organization. The primary effect of 
environmental uncertainty is that it becomes more difficult to plan ahead or take decisions 
before actions are executed. As a reaction, organizations can implement three possible 
strategies: (1) increase their ability to plan, (2) be able to adapt flexibly, and (3) lower the 
performance level of the organization.   
I combine the insights from the information-processing framework with those of agency 
theory in Chapter 4 to hypothesize on the economics-based relationship between perceived 
environmental uncertainty and budgetary slack. 
4.6  Psychology as the common background  
Although each study has its own focus, they also share a common element. All three 
studies rely on psychology theories to investigate how the context of budgeting influences 
managers’ motivation or how the broader organizational context influences budgeting 
outcomes. Therefore, we can situate each of these three studies in Covaleski et al.’s (2003) 
psychology-based budgeting research classification scheme. They defined first stage research 
as budgeting studies seeking to answer the question: ‘Do budgeting practices have direct linear 
additive effects on mental states, individual behavior, and individual performance?’ The second 
stage aims to answer the question whether the effects of budgeting on these mental states, 
behavior, and performance are conditional on other variables (e.g., when is a certain form of 
budget participation able to autonomously motivate managers to achieve the budget?) 
whereas third stage research focuses on how mental states mediate the effect of budgeting 
on individual behavior and performance (e.g., how do the diverse forms of budget participation 
relate to the different types of budget motivation?, how is a participative strategy 
process/environmental uncertainty related to budgetary slack?). So whereas the second and 
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third study in this dissertation are situated completely in Covaleski et al.’s (2003) third-stage 
research, the first study is situated on the intersection of stage two and three. 
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents the first 
study that explores the concepts of participation and motivation in a budgeting context as well 
as the relationship between those two elements. Chapter 3 contains the second study that 
tests the relationship between PSP and budgetary slack. Next, chapter 4 details the third study 
that examines the relationship between environmental uncertainty and the presence of 
budgetary slack. To conclude, chapter 5 discusses the main findings, limitations, opportunities 
for future research, and both the academic and practical contributions of this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 2 – BUDGET PARTICIPATION AND BUDGET 
MOTIVATION: UNDERSTANDING THE COMPLEXITIES AND 
UNDERLYING MECHANISMS 
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Although research on the motivational effects of budget participation spans 
several decades, there is still much to learn about the exact nature of 
participation and motivation in a budgeting context. In this paper, we build 
on and add to this prior literature by providing field study evidence of 
diverse forms of budget participation and different types of budget 
motivation. We provide insights into how and when the diverse forms of 
budget participation relate to the different types of budget motivation. 
Regarding how participation and motivation are related, we elaborate on 
the needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness as important 
underlying mechanisms. Regarding the when-question, true participation 
and participation congruence, in combination with strategic alignment, are 
identified as important conditions determining a certain form of budget 
participation’s specific motivational effects. As such, our findings reveal the 
complexities and shed light on the underlying mechanisms of the 
motivational effects of budget participation. 
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1. Introduction 
Medium and large-sized companies increasingly allow subordinate managers to participate 
in the budgeting process to ensure their ownership and motivation to attain the budgetary 
targets6 (Dugdale and Lyne, 2010; Heinle et al., 2014; Shastri and Stout, 2008). While 
companies expect budget motivation when allowing managers budget participation (BP), this 
motivational effect is not always achieved (e.g., Mia, 1988; Shields and Young, 1993). Indeed, 
although research on the motivational effects of BP spans several decades (e.g., Argyris, 1952; 
Brownell and McInnes, 1986; Milani, 1975), there is still much to learn about the exact nature 
of participation and motivation in a budgeting context.  
Prior research on participative decision-making (PDM) recognizes diverse forms of 
participation along the influence continuum but fairly little is known about this typology in a 
budgeting context. Traditional BP research has mainly focused on the motivational effects of 
subordinate managers’ involvement in the budgeting process, hence neglecting differences in 
the extent of influence (Byrne and Damon, 2008; Libby, 1999). In this paper, however, we 
recognize that diverse forms of BP may exist along the influence continuum and that BP’s 
motivational effects may vary from one form to another.  
Similarly, when discussing motivation in a budgeting context, Wong-on-Wing et al. (2010, 
134, emphasis added) recently stated: ‘A review of prior studies in PB [participative budgeting] 
(see, for example, Covaleski et al., 2003; Shields and Shields, 1998) highlights the inadequate 
use of the term ‘motivation’. In particular, research in PB does not differentiate among different 
types of motivation. Distinguishing among various types of motivation is important since they 
have been shown to lead to different consequences. In this paper, we build on self-
determination theory (SDT) (Deci and Ryan, 1985) to gain an understanding of the different 
types of budget motivation that may exist in reality. On these grounds, the research question 
addressed in this paper is: 
Do different forms of BP and types of budget motivation exist and how and when do they 
relate to each other? 
 
To address this research question, we conducted 18 semi-structured interviews with business-
unit, production, project, commercial, team, and finance managers of three West-European 
companies over a three year period. Analyzing the detailed interview data, we were able to 
observe diverse forms of BP ranging from no influence to joint decision-making, and different 
types of budget motivation residing under autonomous or controlled motivation7. Moreover, we 
                                                          
6 We use the terms ‘motivation to attain the budgetary targets’ and ‘budget motivation’ interchangeably.  
7 We elaborate in more detail on these forms of participation and types of motivation in the theoretical 
background section.  
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also find that if a certain BP form satisfies the subordinate manager’s needs for autonomy, 
competence, and relatedness, this manager generally experiences an autonomous type of 
budget motivation. Conversely, if BP frustrates those needs, the subordinate manager 
generally has a controlled form of budget motivation.   
Interestingly, however, our field study evidence also shows that a certain form of BP may 
relate to both autonomous and controlled types of budget motivation, depending on the 
circumstances. More precisely, the ‘no influence’ forms can relate to autonomous types of 
budget motivation despite the basic psychological needs being frustrated and the high 
influence forms (i.e., ‘consultation’ and ‘joint decision-making’) can relate to controlled types of 
budget motivation despite the psychological needs being satisfied. Similarly, under certain 
conditions satisfied basic psychological needs may relate to controlled types of budget 
motivation whereas sometimes frustrated needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness 
may relate to autonomous types of budget motivation. Our field study results indicate that true 
participation and participation congruence, in combination with strategic alignment, are 
important factors determining BP’s specific motivational effects.  
Overall, our detailed insights into the complexities and underlying mechanisms of BP’s 
motivational effects suggest a threefold contribution to the extant budgeting literature. First, we 
enrich the traditional budgeting studies that have implicitly but largely ignored the existence of 
multiple forms of BP and types of budget motivation (e.g., Brownell and McInnes, 1986; Ronen 
and Livingstone, 1975). We broadened the traditional accounting view on budget motivation 
by including insights from SDT and we were able to identify diverse forms of BP by building on 
PDM-literature. In particular, we provide a distinction between autonomous (i.e., intrinsic, 
identified and integrated regulation) and controlled (i.e., external and introjected regulation) 
types of budget motivation and suggest a BP continuum ranging from no influence to joint 
decision-making. Second, by answering calls for research using alternate theories to explore 
the motivational effects of BP (Chong and Chong, 2002; Covaleski et al., 2003), we shed light 
on how the diverse forms of BP influence the different types of budget motivation. In particular, 
if a form of BP satisfies the subordinate manager’s needs for autonomy, competence, and 
relatedness, it generally relates to autonomous types of budget motivation. If, however, the BP 
form frustrates those three basic psychological needs, it generally relates to a controlled type 
of budget motivation. Third, by uncovering when a certain BP form and satisfied or frustrated 
basic psychological needs relate to either autonomous or controlled types of budget 
motivation, this research advances the budgeting literature. The experience of true BP (for the 
‘consultation’ type), participation congruence (for the ‘no influence’ types) and strategic 
alignment (for the needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness) are important contingent 
factors in understanding BP’s motivational effects. From a managerial perspective, this 
presents crucial information for an effective design of the BP process if BP is implemented for 
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motivational purposes as we provide top management a guideline on how to design their 
participatory process. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we review the 
literature on the motivational effects of BP. Section 3 positions the theoretical background. In 
the fourth section, we elaborate on the field study methodology and introduce the field study 
setting while Section 5 develops, analyzes, and discusses the qualitative field study findings. 
Finally, we offer concluding remarks, outline the paper’s limitations and suggest some fruitful 
avenues for further research. 
 
2. The motivational effects of budget participation 
Inspired by Argyris’ (1952) seminal work on the effects of budgets on people, research on 
subordinate BP was pervasive in the 1980s. In particular, ample attention has been paid to the 
motivational effects of BP. Today, companies still increasingly allow subordinate managers to 
participate in the budgeting process expecting, but not always achieving, motivation to attain 
the budgetary targets (Bjornenak, 2014; Dugdale and Lyne, 2010; Heinle et al., 2014; Shastri 
and Stout, 2008).  
Searfoss and Monckza (1973) were among the first to conduct an empirical study on BP’s 
motivational effects. They illustrated that perceived participation in the budgeting process and 
subordinates’ motivation to attain the budgetary targets – in the form of effort expended to 
achieve the targets – were positively related. This result contrasts, however, with the later 
findings of Brownell (1983) and Ivancevich (1976), who were not able to find a significant 
relationship between BP and subordinates’ budget motivation. Additionally, some researchers 
relied on expectancy theory8 to study the relationship between BP and motivation. Relying on 
the same theoretical approach, Ronen and Livingstone (1975) hypothesized a positive effect 
of BP on subordinate’s budget motivation, Mia (1988) found a positive effect between BP and 
work motivation, but Brownell and McInnes (1986) failed to empirically support this positive 
relationship.  
Despite the large amount of research, we still lack a clear understanding of BP’s 
motivational effects (e.g., Shields and Young, 1993), which is supported by Derfuss’ (2009) 
recent meta-analytic review of BP. This lack of understanding contrasts sharply with the 
increasing use of BP for motivational purposes (e.g., Dugdale and Lyne, 2010; Shastri and 
Stout, 2008). What is the practitioner manager to conclude on the basis of this evidence? Does 
                                                          
8 According to expectancy theory, motivation depends on the expectation that the efforts made will result 
in a performance sufficient to trigger the granting of valued rewards (Vroom, 1964).  
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BP motivate or does it not motivate subordinate managers to attain the budgetary targets and 
what are the underlying mechanisms?  
 
3. Theoretical background 
3.1 Diverse forms of budget participation 
 Letting subordinate managers participate in the budgeting process involves them in and 
allows them influence over the determination of their budgetary targets (Anthony and 
Govindarajan, 2007; Shields and Shields, 1998). Although these two dimensions of 
participation are recognized in budgeting research (e.g., Byrne and Damon, 2008; Otley et al., 
1994), prior BP research has mainly focused on the motivational effects of subordinates’ 
degree of involvement, neglecting the possibility of differences in the extent of subordinate 
manager influence. Moreover, experimental budgeting research has traditionally treated BP as 
a dichotomous variable, neglecting the possibility that different forms of BP may exist.  
 Research in PDM, of which BP is a specific example, widely accepts the existence of 
a continuum of subordinate influence along which various decision procedures can be ordered 
(e.g., Cotton et al., 1988; Heller and Yukl, 1969; Hunton and Price, 1994). Indeed, participation 
in practice can range heavy from subordinate managers having no influence to full delegation. 
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the influence continuum and the diverse forms of 
participation that can be present in a budgeting context (based on the work of Heller and Yukl, 
1969).  
 
 
Figure 1. The influence continuum with the diverse forms of budget participation 
 
 
  
Low subordinate influence High subordinate influence 
No influence, no 
explanation 
No influence, with 
explanation 
Consultation Joint decision-
making 
Full delegation 
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The forms of BP are defined in behavioral terms and can be summarized as follows.  
No influence, with or without explanation refers to a budgeting process where the superior 
decides on the budgetary targets without any prior consultation of the subordinate managers. 
After having set the budgetary targets, the superior may (i.e., with explanation) or may not (i.e., 
without explanation) give the subordinate managers a post-decision explanation for the 
reasons of the decision. Consultation refers to a budgeting process where the superior decides 
on the budgetary targets after consulting the subordinate managers. This form of BP was 
studied earlier by Libby (1999) and Byrne and Damon (2008). It reflects a budgeting process 
in which subordinates are involved in the decision process but the superior makes the final 
decision (Vroom, 1983). Joint decision-making refers to a budgeting process in which the 
superior and subordinate managers form a consensus decision about the budgetary targets to 
be set. Full delegation refers to a budgeting process in which the superior allows the 
subordinate managers to set the budgetary targets on their own.  
 As the motivational effects of BP may vary from one form to another, we extend the 
PDM literature and suggest in this study that a continuum of BP forms, ranging from no 
influence to full delegation, exists.  
3.2 Different types of budget motivation: A view from self-determination theory 
When discussing motivation in a budgeting context, Wong-on-Wing et al. (2010, p. 134, 
emphasis added) recently stated: ‘A review of prior studies in PB [participative budgeting] (see, 
for example, Covaleski et al., 2003; Shields and Shields, 1998) highlights the inadequate use 
of the term “motivation”. In particular, research in PB does not differentiate among different 
types of motivation. Distinguishing among various types of motivation is important since they 
have been shown to lead to different consequences.’ Indeed, human motivation can vary not 
only in level but also in type (e.g., Deci and Ryan, 2008; Ryan and Deci, 2000b).  
Prior research on BP’s motivational effects has largely ignored or conflated the different 
types of motivation. Young (1985), for example, studies money as the sole motivation to 
perform well. Searfoss and Monckza (1973) used the effort expended to achieve the budgetary 
targets as a proxy for budget motivation without tapping into the reasons why this effort is 
expended and hence neglecting the possibility of different types of motivation. Other 
researchers recognized the existence of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation by building on 
expectancy theory (e.g., Brownell and McInnes, 1986; Mia, 1988; Ronen and Livingstone, 
1975) but focused on total motivation as the simple sum of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. 
Moreover, by focusing on the outcome instead of the reason for performing a certain activity, 
both types of motivation were conflated. Giving help to others, for example, is classified as an 
intrinsic valence according to expectancy theory (Brownell, 1980) but depending on why 
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people would want to help others, this could represent both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation 
(Deci and Ryan, 2000; Vansteenkiste et al., 2010).  
Given these findings, our attention should shift from the overall motivation level toward the 
different motivation types (Kunz, 2015). Our separation between different motivation types is 
grounded in the theoretical framework provided by SDT (Deci et al., 1989; Deci and Ryan, 
2004; Ryan and Deci, 2000a). In particular, a core aspect of SDT is the differentiation between 
autonomous and controlled motivation9 (Deci, 1975; Deci and Ryan, 1985). Autonomous 
motivation involves the regulation of behavior with the experience of volition, psychological 
freedom and reflective self-endorsement. Autonomously motivated managers put effort in 
attaining the budgetary targets because they enjoy it (i.e., intrinsic motivation) or because they 
have internalized the importance of budget attainment for their organization (i.e., autonomous 
extrinsic motivation) (Vansteenkiste et al., 2010). More specifically, SDT distinguishes two 
types of autonomous extrinsic motivation. First, identified regulation implies that people 
understand and endorse the personal value and significance of behavior (e.g., a manager tries 
to attain the budgetary targets because good budgetary performance is an important goal for 
the organization) (Vansteenkiste et al., 2006). Second, integrated regulation implies that 
people have fully internalized the extrinsic motivation and form a coherent and unified sense 
of self-reflection and self-awareness (e.g., a manager puts effort into attaining the budget 
because it is consistent with other organizational goals, such as strategy implementation) 
(Vansteenkiste et al., 2010). Conversely, under controlled (extrinsic) motivation, a manager’s 
functioning is to a large extent determined by external (external regulation; e.g., a manager is 
working toward budget attainment because s/he fears the financial repercussions of not hitting 
the budget) or internal (introjected regulation; e.g., a manager puts effort into attaining the 
budget because s/he would feel ashamed not realizing the targets) controlling imperatives. 
Controlled motivation involves the regulation of behavior with the experience of pressure and 
coercion to think, feel or behave in a particular way. This is the type of motivation implicitly 
focused on by much of the budgeting literature (e.g., Chow et al., 1988; Covaleski et al., 2003; 
Waller, 1988). Amotivation also exists. This means that people lack any intentionality and are 
not motivated at all which results in people not acting or acting passively.   
This distinction between autonomous and controlled types of motivation is important, since 
research (e.g., Güntert, 2015; Trépanier et al., 2013) provides evidence for positive 
consequences being associated with autonomous types of motivation and negative 
consequences being associated with controlled types of motivation. In particular, autonomous 
                                                          
9 The distinction between autonomous and controlled motivation differs from the distinction between 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. In particular, SDT recognizes different types of extrinsic motivation 
depending on their relative degree of self-determination and therefore the focus shifted from the intrinsic-
extrinsic distinction to the autonomous-controlled distinction.  
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motivation types are associated with ‘greater persistence, more effective performance, higher 
quality relationships, and better social adjustment and well-being’ (Vansteenkiste et al., 2008, 
21). Similarly, Bono and Judge (2003) found that autonomously motivated employees have 
greater affective organizational commitment and greater job satisfaction. Excess controlled 
motivation, on the other hand, gives rise to increased stress and burnout (Deci and Ryan, 
2004). In summary, controlled types of motivation are more likely to produce negative effects, 
while autonomous types of motivation will more likely foster positive outcomes, especially for 
relatively complex tasks (Gagné and Deci, 2005; Vallerand, 1997). Indeed, Wong-on-Wing et 
al. (2010) have recently illustrated the importance of the difference between autonomous and 
controlled types of motivation in the interplay between performance and BP. More specifically, 
they illustrated that autonomous types of motivation for participation in budgeting are positively 
related to performance, whereas controlled motivation types for BP are negatively associated 
with performance.  
In this paper, we recognize both autonomous (i.e., intrinsic, identified, and integrated 
regulation) and controlled (i.e., external and introjected regulation) types of budget motivation. 
We acknowledge that multiple types of budget motivation may be present at any given time 
(Hidi and Harackiewicz, 2000; Järvelä and Salovaara, 2004; Pintrich, 2000) and that their 
relative strength can be influenced by the diverse forms of BP. This approach distinguishes 
our paper from all previous articles that studied the motivational effects of BP, because in this 
previous literature there was no distinction between autonomous and controlled types of 
budget motivation (Wong-On-Wing et al., 2010) nor between the different forms of BP. Since 
we cannot exclude that diverse forms of BP interact differently with the types of budget 
motivation, we will explore how and when the diverse BP forms relate to the different types of 
budget motivation.  
3.3 Basic psychological needs as underlying mechanisms 
SDT proposes that the forms of BP will relate to autonomous or controlled types of budget 
motivation, depending on a differential degree of basic psychological need satisfaction. In 
particular, SDT posits three basic needs innate to all humans: the need for autonomy, 
competence, and relatedness. The need for autonomy refers to the need to feel strong-willed 
and fully endorsing one’s actions (Deci, 1975; Deci and Ryan, 2004). The need for competence 
implies that people want to experience opportunities to exercise and express their capacities 
and hence feel a sense of confidence (Vansteenkiste et al., 2008). The third basic 
psychological need, the need for relatedness, denotes caring for and feeling cared for by others 
(Ryan, 1995). If those three basic needs are satisfied by the form of BP, managers will 
experience an autonomous type of budget motivation. If the three basic psychological needs 
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are frustrated by the form of BP, managers will experience a type of controlled budget 
motivation.   
Adopting the concept of basic need satisfaction to the diverse forms of BP on the influence 
continuum, we expect that the degree of psychological need satisfaction will increase as the 
subordinate manager’s BP form evolves from ‘no influence’ to ‘full delegation’. More 
specifically, in the conditions where the superior decides on the budgetary targets without prior 
consultation of the subordinate managers (both without and with post-decision explanation), 
the subordinate managers’ need for autonomy, competence, and relatedness will not be 
satisfied in the budgeting process. In the condition of consultation, the danger of pseudo-
participation exists (Libby, 1999). Pseudo-participation is defined as a process that leads 
subordinate managers to believe that they will have some influence over the budgetary targets 
set, but in reality, their input is ignored. Only if this consultation form of BP is considered as 
true (i.e., there is a genuine interest of the superior in what the subordinate managers suggest), 
it will satisfy the basic psychological needs within the budgeting context. In the conditions of 
joint decision-making and full delegation, we expect that subordinate managers’ needs will be 
satisfied within the budgeting process. In particular, these two forms of BP provide autonomy 
(Venkatesh and Blaskovich, 2012), give subordinate managers control and hence a feeling of 
competence (Birnberg et al., 2007; Chenhall, 2003; Shields et al., 2000), and induce a friendlier 
atmosphere and trust which satisfies the need for relatedness (Elmassri and Harris, 2011; Lau 
and Buckland, 2001). Consequently, we propose that subordinate managers will have 
relatively more autonomous types of budget motivation when their form of BP evolves from 
no/low to high subordinate influence, given that they perceive their form of BP as true.  
 
4. Research method 
4.1 Choice of the research method 
Since ‘how’ and ‘when’ questions were central to our research, we base this paper on a 
multiple-case field study (Yin, 2003). Moreover, we were particularly interested in studying 
subordinate managers’ perceptions of their form of BP, as motivation is influenced by the 
perceived, rather than the actual, reality (e.g., Link and Oldendick, 2000; Van der Stede et al., 
2005). The use of a field study also seems particularly appropriate, as we want to explore 
diverse forms of participation and different types of motivation in an accounting context. In 
traditional accounting research, participation and motivation have largely been reduced to a 
statistical model, while there have been fewer attempts to realistically understand them. In this 
study, however, we explore BP and budget motivation within people inside their inter-
subjective worlds.  
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Semi-structured interviews were conducted with managers in which they could provide 
open-ended answers to capture their perceptions, as this enabled us to have direct and in-
depth contact with the research participants (Atkinson and Shaffir, 1998). Furthermore, semi-
structured interviews provide the major advantage of having the possibility of ‘probing’ during 
the interview, which is of particular importance for the purposes of our research. Finally, semi-
structured interviews also make it possible to ask follow-up questions if unexpected outcomes 
promise to be interesting (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006; Eisenhardt, 1989). As a result, our 
research setting provided us with a clear and more complete understanding of the answers 
and their context, as the interviews not only provided information on facts, but also shed light 
on subjective views and personal insights (Czarniawska, 2004; Flyvbjerg, 2001).  
4.2 Company selection 
To investigate information-rich settings, we took into account the size of the organization 
in selecting the field study companies. We excluded small companies to avoid not having a 
formal, established budgeting process. Confronted with a plurality of hard-to-reach medium 
and large manufacturing and service organizations, we relied on business relationships 
between one of the authors and key employees within the companies.  
Three companies, out of the four we contacted, agreed to participate in our study10. The 
fourth company was not interested in participating as it had just been restructured. Having 
more than one company was deemed essential for our research and the three companies 
yielded a cross-section of industries, products, and services. Company A11 is a 
telecommunications company that employs about 16,000 people in Belgium. Company B is an 
international technology company serving both business and private customers; the company 
employs approximately 120,000 employees in 14 different countries. Company C is a leading 
consulting and engineering company that employs about 7,500 employees in 10 different 
countries.  
                                                          
10 ‘Companies’ in this context may be fully independent or may be a subunit of a larger firm. They all, 
however, appeared as a separate entry in the Bel-first Directory, which is a database containing financial 
information about two million companies located in Belgium and Luxemburg.  
11 The confidentiality agreement used in our study prevents us from prevailing the identity of the 
organizations. Therefore, detailed information on corporate operations cannot be provided. Publishing 
results anonymously, however, provided us the opportunity to obtain inside information from 
interviewees which would otherwise not have been disclosed (Rubin and Rubin, 1995). 
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4.3 Data collection 
Data collection was mainly based on interviews with 15 managers12. Moreover, we 
collected additional information on the budgeting process by interviewing three accounting staff 
members (one in each organization) and by gathering internal documents, such as 
organization charts and slides presented at budget meetings, whenever possible. Combining 
multiple respondents and multiple data sources reduces the risk of response bias and permits 
triangulation so as to improve the validity and reliability of our data (Gibbert and Ruigrok, 2010; 
Yin, 2003).  
In all three companies, we first interviewed our business contacts. These managers 
provided us with background information on their company. Furthermore, they helped us gain 
access to other employees in their respective companies, as they permitted us to mention their 
name in the contact email seeking an interview with additional managers and accounting staff 
members. In general, business unit, project, as well as production managers were interviewed 
because of their importance for the implementation of budgetary plans and the consequent 
realization of budgetary targets (Van der Stede, 2000). By obtaining viewpoints from multiple 
types of managers, we enriched our analysis and strengthened our findings. An overview of 
these interviewees is provided in Table 1.  
Our interview protocol was informed by the literature (Yin, 2003) and included the following 
topics: the budgeting process, the interviewee’s role in this process and the form of 
participation denoted to the interviewee, his/her type of budget motivation, the dynamics 
between this motivation and the form of BP, and possible other budgeting process 
characteristics. We incrementally developed our set of questions for each interview to capture 
and explore new factors that popped up during the course of the interviews, which is in line 
with prior research (e.g., Schermann et al., 2012). Figure 2 summarizes our protocol 
development. 
The first question on each topic was an open-ended, general question, whereas later 
questions on the same topic were more interview-specific, as the nature of these specific 
questions depended on the interviewee’s answer to the first question (Irvine and Gaffikin, 
2006). All interviews were carried out in independent sessions which lasted approximately 60 
minutes on average. The interviews were conducted by the first author at the interviewee’s 
workplace. Interviews were tape recorded and transcribed within a week after each interview. 
Both authors discussed the interviews based upon these verbatim transcriptions and the first 
author subsequently coded all data.  
 
                                                          
12 All managers were controlled by a corporate budgeting system and had some kind of budget 
responsibility (profit, cost, or revenue). Please see Table 1 for more information on each manager ’s 
budgetary responsibility.  
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Table 1. Overview of the interviewees 
Company Function of the 
interviewee 
Interview duration 
(min) 
Abbreviation Budget 
responsibility 
Company A BU manager  74 BU_A1 Cost 
 BU manager 56 BU_A2 Cost 
 BU manager 62 BU_A3 Profit 
 BU manager 93 BU_A4 Profit 
 BU manager 53 BU_A5 Profit 
 Team manager 45 TM_A Cost 
 Accounting staff 54 ACC_A 
 
 
Company B BU manager 53 BU_B Profit 
 Production manager 71 PRM_B1 Cost 
 Production manager 82 PRM_B2 Cost 
 Project manager 32 PM_B Cost 
 Accounting staff 70 ACC_B 
 
 
Company C BU manager 37 BU_C1 Profit 
 BU manager 72 BU_C2 Profit 
 Commercial manager 78 CM_C Cost 
 Project manager 66 PM_C1 Revenue 
 Project manager 61 PM_C2 Cost 
 Accounting staff 35 ACC_C  
 
Figure 2. Time line for our interview protocol development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Febr. 
2011 
1 Mar. 
2011 
1 Apr. 
2011 
1May 
2011 
1 Jan. 
2014 
1 Jun. 
2014 
Participation 
congruence  
Strategic 
alignment  
True 
participation  
BU_A1 & TM_A 
PM_B 
BU_A2 & BU_B 
BU_A3, BU_A4, BU_A5, PRM_B1, PRM_B2, 
BU_C1, BU_C2, PM_C1, PM_C2, CD_C 
Additional 
interviews 
with 2011-
interviewees 
Chapter 2 
31 
 
4.4 Data analysis 
We analyzed the data as we collected them, working back and forth between our empirical 
data and the extant literature (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006; Eisenhardt, 1989; Englund and 
Gerdin, 2015). However, to avoid any researcher bias, we also used NVivo10 (a qualitative 
analysis program) to conduct a systematic coding and analysis. During the first step of data 
coding, we set up a coding protocol whereby codes were derived from a review of the prior 
literature (Yin, 2003). Before applying this protocol to our data, we read the interview transcripts 
at least two times. Informed by recent research (e.g., Bouten and Hoozée, 2013), we let the 
interview tape running while going through the transcripts. We adapted our initial coding 
protocol to reflect interesting paths and factors identified from the data itself during these in-
depth readings. The final coding protocol was applied to all transcripts using NVivo10, which 
gave us the opportunity to develop a hierarchy of codes and link these codes to text segments. 
Furthermore, the software facilitated building tables containing all of the separate codes, 
supporting quotes linked to each code, and a reference to the interviewee and the company 
s/he was working for at the time of the interview(s). Many paragraphs in the transcripts were 
labeled with multiple codes, indicating that these paragraphs contained an indication about 
how the different themes are related. 
Second, we initiated the data display phase by building data matrices and word clouds 
from these linked and interconnected themes (see Fig. 3). These data matrices and word 
clouds graphically summarize the codes assigned to each transcript and allow us to identify 
emerging themes and patterns in the data (Lillis and Mundy, 2005).  
Third, once we had acquired a preliminary understanding of the complexities and 
underlying mechanisms of BP’s motivational effects per interview, we compared the interviews 
within and across companies to list similarities and differences observed during the data 
analysis phase (Eisenhardt, 1989). Provisional patterns from the individual interviews were 
cross-checked to increase the internal validity of our study. By actively searching for cross-
case patterns and regularities, and probing unexpected or divergent relationships, we aimed 
to enhance the external validity of our research and provide a basis for analytical 
generalization13 (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Gibbert et al., 2008; Yin, 2003).  
Finally, during the quote selection phase, a choice of quotes from the transcripts was made 
to answer our research question. 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 Analytical generalization denotes a process that refers to the generalization from empirical 
observations to theory, rather than a population (Yin, 2003).  
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Figure 3. Example of a word cloud (representing basic psychological need satisfaction 
for autonomous and controlled types of budget motivation)  
Panel A. Word cloud for autonomous types of budget motivation 
 
Panel B. Word cloud for controlled types of budget motivation 
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5. Analysis and discussion 
The first subsection describes each company’s budgeting process, the forms of BP, and 
the types of budget motivation for each interviewee. In the second subsection, we look how 
the diverse forms of BP relate to the different types of budget motivation and highlight the role 
of true participation. In the final subsection, we elaborate on the role of participation 
congruence and strategic alignment to identify when a certain form of BP and satisfied or 
frustrated psychological needs relate to either autonomous or controlled types of budget 
motivation.  
5.1 The budgeting process, budget participation, and budget motivation 
5.1.1 Descriptive characteristics of the budgeting process and forms of budget 
participation 
In the first part of the interview, we asked for descriptive information regarding the 
budgeting process at the interviewee’s company. As the extent of influence allowed in BP can 
vary across and within organizations, we wanted to know how budgetary targets were 
developed, who was involved, and how much influence each interviewee had in this process14 
(for an overview, see Table 2). 
                                                          
14 From our interviews with the accounting staff members, we know that all three organizations used a 
budgeting approach that combines characteristics from incremental and zero-based budgeting. 
However, as this study is interested in differences in the extent of influence when setting the budgetary 
targets, and not so much in the technical design of the budgeting system itself, we did not go into detail 
on the technical characteristics. The remainder of this section therefore focuses on managers’ 
participation in determining the content (i.e., the budgetary targets) of the budgeting system.  
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Table 2. Cross-case comparisons 
Panel A. Overview company A 
 Company A 
 BU_A1 BU_A2 BU_A3 BU_A4 BU_A5 TM_A 
Budget participation Consultation Consultation Consultation Consultation Consultation No influence 
     True participation Yes No Yes Yes Yes - 
Budgetary needs satisfied Yes No Yes Yes Yes - 
Budget motivation Autonomous Controlled Autonomous Autonomous Autonomous Autonomous 
Participation congruence Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Strategic alignment NI No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Panel B. Overview company B 
 Company B 
 PM_B BU_B PRM_B1 PRM_B2 
Budget participation No influence Consultation No influence No influence 
     True participation - No - - 
Budgetary needs satisfied No No - - 
Budget motivation Controlled Controlled Autonomous Autonomous 
Participation congruence No No NI NI 
Strategic alignment No No Yes Yes 
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Panel C. Overview company C 
 Company C 
 BU_C1 BU_C2 PM_C1 PM_C2 CD_C 
Budget participation Joint decision-making Joint decision-making No influence No influence Consultation 
     True participation Yes Yes - - No 
Budgetary needs satisfied Yes Yes - No No 
Budget motivation Autonomous Controlled Controlled Autonomous Controlled 
Participation congruence NI Yes Yes No NI 
Strategic alignment Yes No No Yes NI 
 
 
NI = no information available 
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Company A has a mixed budgeting process, as it consists of a combination of top-down 
and bottom-up practices. The process is initiated top-down, guided by the company’s central 
strategy and finance divisions. Top management sits together with the strategy team to discuss 
the company’s long-term view and the strategy that will be followed to fulfill this. Taking this 
strategy, shareholder expectations, and market evolutions into account, the finance division 
sets some limitations on the total budgetary resources available. Simultaneously, top 
management defines overarching themes (e.g., innovative technologies, cost reducing 
initiatives, customer service projects…) related to the content of the company’s strategy. Next, 
in the bottom-up process, all business unit managers and their direct reporting lines are asked 
which projects they would like to carry out and the resources needed for those projects to be 
implemented successfully. All of these projects are consolidated per overarching theme. A 
specific team, with representatives from each business unit, decides upon the acceptance and 
prioritization of the projects within a certain theme. Finally, the total amount of resources 
available is divided over the different themes by top management (these funded themes are 
called ‘budgetary clusters’) so as to reflect both the company strategy (i.e., the relative amount 
of resources dedicated to each cluster reflects the organization’s strategic focus) and the input 
from the bottom-up process. Hence, the budgetary targets are established through a 
participative process which involves both horizontal collaboration and vertical negotiation. 
Indeed, company A’s business-unit managers recognized being involved in and having 
influence over the budgeting process:  
We are asked what we want to do next year and how much money we need to realize 
those projects. (BU_A1) 
Every business unit can propose the projects it would like to fulfill within each cluster 
[i.e., a funded theme of projects]. Along with these proposals, each business unit must 
give an estimate of its total resources needed for the upcoming fiscal year. (BU_A3)  
 
Noteworthy, this consultation form of BP in company A is confined to higher management 
levels, as evidenced by the team manager: ‘In fact, the whole budgeting process is dominated 
by my business unit manager, I do not play a role in that process’ (TM_A), reflecting a ‘no 
influence’ form of BP. 
A similar budgeting process is present in company B. More specifically, the process 
consists of three phases. In the first phase, top management and the finance division review 
the company strategy. In the second phase, market data are collected from the marketing 
managers. The finance division then combines all the input and provides a market guidance 
about the company’s expected profitability. At the same time, they ask the business unit 
managers to come up with their own proposal. In a third phase, the finance division gathers all 
the proposals and compares them with its own market guidance. If the aggregated proposals 
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are not sufficient to hit the profitability target, proposals are sent back for adjustment. This is 
really a back-and-forth discussion process which ends with a final decision by the general 
manager. One interviewee in company B (i.e., BU_B) indeed recognized being consulted in 
the budgeting process. The other interviewees, however, did not experience any influence over 
the budgetary targets set, again providing evidence of influential BP being confined to the 
higher management level: 
For every business unit in our company, a budgeting round is organized in which top 
management determines the budgetary targets set. I have no influence in this process: it 
are just my superiors that can determine and influence the budget allocation. (PM_B1) 
I get my targets imposed by my superiors. There is no possibility for me to co-decide with 
them upon my annual budgetary target. (PRM_B2) 
 
The structure of the budgeting process in company C starts with a negotiation between 
the business unit managers, the financial director, and the country managing director. Relying 
on these negotiations, this group then jointly proposes a budgetary target for each business 
unit. Once budgetary proposals have been formulated for all business units, the country 
managing director reviews the overall budgetary target with corporate management to ensure 
that the business units’ targets reach the budgetary objectives set for the country. The country 
manager, together with the financial director and the business unit managers, revises the 
budgetary targets if necessary, to include this top-down corporate management information. 
As reflected in the process, the business unit managers recognized being able to jointly decide 
on their budgetary targets:  
The positive thing about the budgeting process in this company, is that the budgetary 
target is really a joint decision. We take the decision together and also bear the joint 
responsibility. (BU_C1) 
 
As in both company A and B, influence in the budgeting process in company C is also confined 
to higher management levels: 
My superiors take all the decisions to come to our budgetary target. They have a 
meeting in the company’s headquarters or in a fancy hotel and come back with some 
number. Sometimes it seems as they just picked a random number and that the target 
could have been just as easy some different number. (PM_C1) 
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5.1.2 The types of budget motivation 
As the stated reasons for behavior (e.g., putting effort into attaining the budgetary target) 
indicate the individual’s motivation for that behavior, we asked the interviewees how they felt 
about achieving the budgetary targets and why they (did not) put effort into attaining them15. 
Our inquiry into managers’ budget motivation leads to quotes that support the existence of 
different types of budget motivation.  
Some managers mentioned focusing their effort on attaining the budgetary targets, 
because they felt pressured by an external force, referring to external regulation. Remember 
that external budget regulation implies that employees put effort in attaining the budgetary 
targets because (they think that) somebody else wants them to do so or because they would 
get some kind of reward, praise or approval or avoid some punishment for it:  
I only put effort into attaining the budgetary targets because I want to prevent having to 
prepare a business case because this is a very time-consuming task. It is just for my own 
convenience: if I stay in line with the budgetary targets, I can save some time and I can 
work more smoothly. (PM_B) 
 
Other managers, however, put effort into attaining the budgetary targets because they feel 
pressured by internal controlling imperatives such as feelings of guilt and shame (i.e., these 
managers report introjected budget regulation): 
I take every opportunity to earn as much revenue as possible because I hate losing. 
And not attaining the target would feel as a lost battle. It would hurt my feeling of honor. 
(PM_C1) 
 
These external and internal forces can also interact to put pressure on the manager:  
The budget is like a game with certain rules. You cannot play the game without accepting 
the rules, even if you do not like these rules. I only accept the rules and play the game 
along because otherwise I would feel like letting down my people. (BU_A2) 
 
Indeed, these interviewees experience a controlled type of budget motivation. Some other 
managers, however, identified with the value of budget attainment, indicating integrated or 
identified budget regulation:    
I put effort into attaining the budgetary targets because it is important for our business. I 
value the long-term well-being of my company and as an employee, I understand my role 
in attaining this well-being as working toward the budgetary targets. (TM_A) 
                                                          
15 We found no evidence of amotivation being present for our interviewees. As suggested above, all 
managers we interviewed had some kind of budget responsibility which may explain the absence of 
amotivation. 
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Trying to respect the budget and do as much as possible with as few resources as possible 
really aligns with my personal values. I flip each coin before I spend it, both at work and 
home. (PRM_B1) 
 
Other managers refer to the fun they have in trying to attain the budgetary targets and how 
putting effort into attaining the targets stimulates their creativity, which points to intrinsic budget 
motivation: 
I put effort into attaining the budget because it is interesting and fascinating. It stimulates 
my creativity and I like to search for less obvious solutions to attain the budgetary targets. 
(BU_A1) 
 
In Table 3, we elaborate further on the different types of budget motivation by providing 
more quotes expressing the interviewees’ motivation to attain the budgetary targets. It should 
be noted that although either an autonomous or controlled type of motivation dominates the 
behavior of each interviewee, multiple interviewees have simultaneously experienced 
autonomous and controlled types of budget motivation. As all interviewees are (partially) 
evaluated on achieving the budgetary targets for monetary incentives or promotion, a 
controlled type of budget motivation (i.e., putting effort into attaining the budgetary targets for 
monetary or promotion purposes) was, to some extent, present for all interviewees. However, 
we focus on the relative strength of the motivation types16.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16 The relative strength of the types of budget motivation is based on a general reading of the interviews, 
taking into account each interviewee’s emotions and body-language. 
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Table 3. Quotes on the interviewees’ relatively strongest type of budget motivation 
Company Interviewee Quote Relatively strongest 
type of motivation 
Company A BU_A1 I put effort into attaining the budgetary 
targets because it is interesting and 
fascinating. It stimulates my creativity and I 
like to search for less obvious solutions to 
attain the budgetary targets. 
Intrinsic motivation 
 BU_A2 The budget is like a game with certain rules. 
You cannot play the game without accepting 
the rules, even if you do not like these rules. 
I only accept the rules and play the game 
along because otherwise I would feel like 
letting down my people. 
Combination of 
external and 
introjected 
regulation 
 BU_A3 By attaining the budgetary target, I can give 
something back to the organization and the 
community. Money and promotion are only 
relative. I am grateful for the opportunity of 
having a say in the budget, so I am really 
committed to attain it. 
Identified regulation 
 BU_A4 The budgetary target is a challenge and I like 
being challenged. 
Intrinsic motivation 
 BU_A5 The budget is fun because it challenges me. 
I am committed to the well-being of our 
organization so I understand that attaining 
the budgetary targets is important. 
Combination of 
intrinsic and 
integrated 
regulation 
 TM_A I put effort into attaining the budgetary 
targets because it is important for our 
business. I value the long-term well-being of 
my company and as an employee, I 
understand my role in attaining this well-
being as working toward the budgetary 
targets.  
 
Identified regulation 
Company B BU_B I only put effort into attaining the budgetary 
targets because I want to prevent having to 
prepare a business case because this is a 
very time-consuming task.  
External regulation 
 PRM_B1 Trying to respect the budget and do as much 
as possible with as few resources as 
possible, being as efficient as possible really 
aligns with my personal values. I flip each 
coin before spending it, both at work and 
home. 
Integrated 
regulation 
 PRM_B2 Attaining the budgetary target is a 
challenging ambition. It is fun trying to 
achieve this ambition. 
Intrinsic motivation 
 PM_B I am not committed to the budget but it is the 
system and I have to accept that. I only try to 
attain the target as much as possible to 
avoid the energy-demanding procedure of 
preparing a business case. 
 
External regulation 
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Company C BU_C1 I understand the importance of the budget 
for the long-term well-being of the 
company.  
 Identified regulation 
 BU_C2 I think we focus too much on the budget. It 
is a necessary evil to be able to run our 
business but I would rather do that without 
the budget as a guideline.  
 External regulation 
 CD_C To be honest, what drives me to attain the 
budgetary target is the fact that I am 
judged upon it. If I did not attain the target 
by the end of the year and overspent… 
There is no formal punishment but still, 
people look at me in a bad way. 
 Combination of 
external regulation 
and introjected 
regulation 
 PM_C1 The budgetary target has no meaning for 
me. It is just a number and it could have 
been just as easy another number. I take 
every opportunity to earn as much 
revenue as possible because I hate losing. 
And not attaining the target would feel as a 
lost battle. It would hurt my feeling of 
honor.  
 Introjected 
regulation 
 PM_C2 I think it is important to be correct toward 
the organization. I value being treated 
correctly so I treat my company correctly 
too by respecting the budgetary targets.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Integrated 
regulation 
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5.2 Basic psychological needs as underlying mechanisms between the diverse forms 
of budget participation and different types of budget motivation 
From our interview data, it appears that the business unit managers from company A 
(except BU_A2) and company C extract satisfied needs for budgetary autonomy, competence, 
and relatedness from being consulted or making a joint decision in the budgeting process, 
respectively (see also Table 2). Words17 in the word cloud such as ‘shared’, ‘jointly’, 
‘consensus’, ‘cluster’, and ‘group(s)’ clearly refer to a satisfied need for relatedness. 
‘Responsibility’, ‘freedom’, and ‘opportunity’ reflect a satisfied need for autonomy and ‘skills’ 
and ‘understand’ give indication of a satisfied need for competence (see Figure 3).  
I can make my own decisions and do not have to ask for everything which provides me 
freedom. I really value the responsibility this participation gives me. In fact, it gives me the 
feeling that I can contribute to my company’s added value and I can further develop my 
skills thanks to this opportunity. […] Being able to participate also makes me better 
understand why a decision has to be taken and within which context this happens. As such, 
it creates better relationships with top management as we are along the same line. 
(BU_A1) 
I am part of the budget committee and we take budgetary decisions jointly. Each budgetary 
decision is substantiated well such that we all understand the underlying rationale. Each 
member of this committee has sufficient opportunities to deliver input for these supporting 
rationales and we provide each other the freedom to voice and defend this input. (BU_C2) 
 
Although BU_A2, BU_B, and CD_C were consulted in the budgeting process before top 
management made a decision on the budgetary targets set, they reported frustrated basic 
psychological needs (see Table 2 for an overview and Table 4 and Table 5, panel A for a 
detailed insight).  
                                                          
17 The more often a word has been used by the interviewees, the bigger the word appears in the word 
cloud. That is, the size of a word is driven by the frequency of its presence in our interview transcriptions. 
For example, the word “cluster” has been used more often than the word “jointly” to refer to a satisfied 
need for relatedness. 
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Table 4. Quotes on the interviewees’ basic psychological need satisfaction 
Company Interviewee Quote Basic needs 
    Autonomy Competence Relatedness 
Company A BU_A1 I can make my own decisions and do not have to ask for 
everything which provides me freedom. I really value the 
responsibility this participation gives me. In fact, it gives 
me the feeling that I can contribute to my company’s 
added value and I can further develop my skills thanks to 
this opportunity. […] Being able to participate also makes 
me better understand why a decision has to be taken and 
within which context this happens. As such, it creates 
better relationships with top management as we are along 
the same line. 
Satisfied Satisfied Satisfied 
 BU_A2 I have the feeling that budgetary issues are not under my 
control. This frustrates me and sometimes gives rise to 
discussions and problems with my colleagues.  
NI Frustrated Frustrated 
 BU_A3 Being consulted in the budgeting process, makes me feel 
engaged and committed. Being in a cluster, gives me the 
opportunity to fully understand decisions and have impact 
on them. […] This process is a friendly way of working.  
Satisfied Satisfied Satisfied 
 BU_A4 I appreciate the responsibility that budgetary participation 
gives me. Moreover, I think that budget participation is 
necessary as my unit has the appropriate skills and 
competences to make good budgetary decisions.  
Satisfied Satisfied NI 
 BU_A5 We are free to provide input for the budgeting process. 
We know we can make a difference, we know that we 
have control over the budgetary decisions as we are able 
to influence the process through the input we deliver.  
 
 
Satisfied Satisfied NI 
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Company B BU_B Being excluded makes me feel helpless. It would be better 
to give more autonomy to the product groups because 
now the instability is frustrating as the budgetary decisions 
are made unilaterally. I have the feeling that the budgeting 
process is out of my control. Another point of frustration is 
that the people deciding about my budgetary targets do 
not have sufficient insight in my products. This may lead 
to internal discussions and conflicts with my colleagues. 
Frustrated Frustrated Frustrated 
 PM_B The fact that I am confronted with the budget instead of 
having an influence over it gives me stress. I can feel that 
it gives my whole team more stress which leads to 
conflicts and discussions. Because I do not have an 
insight in the ‘why’ of the budgetary decisions, I have the 
feeling that the budgeting process is out of my control. We 
have more experience and product knowledge so it would 
be better to let us have some influence over the budgetary 
targets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Frustrated Frustrated Frustrated 
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Company C BU_C1 I have ample opportunities to deliver input for the 
budgeting process. Being able to deliver this input and 
making decisions jointly, I commit to the budget. Decisions 
are taken in consensus so we are all owners of the budget.  
Satisfied NI Satisfied 
 BU_C2 I am part of the budget committee and we take budgetary 
decisions jointly. Each budgetary decision is substantiated 
well such that we all understand the underlying rationale. 
Each member of this committee has sufficient 
opportunities to deliver input for these supporting 
rationales and we provide each other the freedom to voice 
and defend this input.  
Satisfied Satisfied Satisfied 
 CD_C I can deliver input for the budgeting process but it is 
finance that gets to decide. Each year, they say that I have 
to cut in the demanded resources. Moreover, I do not have 
the power to decide which costs will be cut as I deliver 
services to the business units. So the business unit 
managers have to approve before I can cut certain costs. 
I can defend, hope, think… But in the end, they decide 
and sometimes this is frustrating. […] It becomes an 
internal joke. Each time when we have to economize, they 
all point in my direction. But I do not think it is funny. My 
budget is important as well you know… It seems that 
some people treat my budget as the bin. ‘Oh, we forgot 
about that dinner we had over there. Let shift it to 
marketing!’  
Frustrated NI Frustrated 
 PM_C2 The budgeting process is like a black box to me. Both the 
content of the box and how the box is assembled are 
unclear to me. All decisions are taken at the level of the 
budget committee and my input is not solicited.  
Frustrated Frustrated NI 
 
NI = no information available 
Chapter 2 
46 
 
Table 5. Representative quotations from the interviews 
Themes Interviewee Exemplary quotations 
Panel A 
 
True participation 
(‘consultation’ form of BP) 
 
 
BU_A3 
 
 
BU_A5 
 
BU_C1 
 
 
 
I really feel free to speak up in the budgetary 
clusters. We are valued for our input so we do not 
have to be afraid to say something wrong. 
The budgeting process is truly an open 
conversation with ample opportunities for debate. 
You can trust me when I say that we dare to 
speak up in this [budgeting] process. We do not 
mince words and bring up whatever we feel 
should be discussed.  
 
Panel B 
 
Participation 
congruence/incongruence 
(‘no influence’ forms of 
BP) 
 
 
TM_A 
 
BU_C1 
 
 
 
I do not care whether I can participate in the 
budgeting process or not.  
I feel it is rather normal that we can provide input 
and make budgetary decisions. In the end, 
finance has no market knowledge so they cannot 
ignore us if they want to have a realistic budgetary 
target.  
 
Panel C 
 
Strategic alignment 
(needs for autonomy, 
competence, and 
relatedness) 
 
 
 
BU_A4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BU_A5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PM_C2 
 
 
 
I identify myself with my company’s strategy. 
Each year, we have a week full of strategy 
workshops. It is important that we do not only 
understand the strategy but also internalize it and 
act upon it. To make this happen, we have an 
active policy of cascading down the strategy from 
the highest to the lowest level. We want to make 
sure that everybody understands the strategy, 
believes in it, and is aligned with it. So we actively 
try to map each individual’s daily job into the 
broader strategy so as to make sure that people 
buy in.  
I am aligned to this company’s strategy because 
I am actively involved in the strategy process. 
Together with my team, I can formulate bottom-
up suggestions and communicate them to our 
strategy division. They will further elaborate on it 
and if it seems worthwhile, they will transmit it 
further to top management to take into account for 
the following update of the strategic plan.  
We build strategy in an interactive and 
cooperative process with a broad group of 
managers.  
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In line with earlier warnings by Libby (1999) and Byrne and Damon (2008), we found 
evidence that these managers saw their consultation form of BP as pseudo-participative. They 
recognized the opportunity of being able to deliver input for the budgetary targets, but they had 
the feeling that their superiors did not seriously take into account their concerns: 
I have no influence in the real decision-making process. Our needs are not really taken into 
account. It seems that top management does not really understand our needs or does not 
want to understand them. (BU_A2) 
 
Conversely, the other business unit managers in company A considered their consultation 
to be a form of true participation. BU_A1, for example, told us she was allowed to formulate 
the amount of resources needed to carry out the strategic projects for her business unit. Her 
superior genuinely took her demands in concern when deciding upon the final allocation of 
resources. Both BU_A3 and BU_A5 also valued the process of open interaction and joint 
evaluation. This does not imply that subordinate managers can make the final budgetary 
decision, nor that their input is always completely reflected in the final budget allocation. The 
process of true consultation, however, provides subordinate managers a rationale for their 
apparent lack of influence over the final budget. As such, transparent communication when the 
final budgetary targets are not affected by subordinates’ communicated preferences avoids 
the perception of the consultative budgeting process to be pseudo-participative. In conclusion, 
managers must perceive their consultation form of BP as true to benefit from psychological 
need satisfaction. Once an individual is asked to provide input for the budgeting process, s/he 
expects that her/his contribution will be used or an explanation will be given if not. Otherwise, 
the consultation form of BP may relate to psychological need frustration and controlled types 
of budget motivation.  
PM_B and PM_C2, who had no influence in the budgeting process, reported frustrated 
basic psychological needs as reflected in words such as ‘conflicts’ and ‘frustrations’ for 
frustrated relatedness, ‘unilaterally’ and ‘confronted’ for frustrated autonomy, and ‘helpless’ 
and ‘stress’ for frustrated competence (see Figure 3).  
The fact that I am confronted with the budget instead of having an influence over it gives 
me more stress. Because I do not have an insight in the ‘why’ of the budgetary decisions, 
I have the feeling that the budgeting process is out of my control. (PM_B) 
Hence, in line with the expectations discussed above, it may be argued that if 
managers’ form of BP evolves from no/low to high subordinate influence and they perceive 
their BP as true (i.e., for the ‘consultation’ type of BP), they experience more satisfied needs 
for autonomy, competence, and relatedness which generally stirs autonomous types of budget 
motivation. Conversely, a ‘no influence’ form of BP in general seems to frustrate the 
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interviewees’ basic needs and increases the relative strength of controlled types of budget 
motivation.  
5.3 Exploring the conditions determining budget participation’s motivational effects 
From our results, it seems that a certain form of BP and satisfied or frustrated 
psychological needs can relate to both autonomous and controlled types of budget motivation, 
depending on the circumstances. Indeed, budgeting is not a uniform, mechanistic tool but is it 
deeply embedded in human complexities (Bryer, 2014). Besides true participation, other 
contextual and personal variables may determine BP’s exact motivational effects. In the next 
section, we elaborate on two such factors that determine BP’s real-life motivational effects 
(exemplary quotations substantiating our analyses are provided in panel B and C from Table 
5).  
5.3.1 Participation Congruence  
Preliminary results. Just as a high influence form of BP does not automatically relate to 
budgetary need satisfaction (see above, true participation), a ‘no influence’ form of BP does 
not necessarily imply frustrated psychological needs, as can be seen from Table 2. More 
specifically, TM_A, PRM_B1, PRM_B2, and PM_C1 do not suffer from frustrated needs for 
autonomy, competence, and relatedness whereas PM_B and PM_C2 reported frustrated 
psychological needs due to a ‘no influence’ form of BP.  
Going back to the literature. The discrepancy model of participation holds that 
participation’s motivational effects are dependent on the relative congruence between a 
managers’ desired and actual level of participation (Doll and Torkzadeh, 1989; Hunton and 
Price, 1994). If the desired level of participation substantially exceeds the actual level of 
participation, deprivation occurs (Alutto and Acito, 1974; Doll and Torkzadeh, 1989), which is 
expected to have adversarial motivational effects (Hunton and Price, 1994). 
Our field study revisited. Applying this discrepancy model to our budgeting context, it 
appeared that TM_A and PM_C1 had no participatory aspirations: 
It does not matter to me whether I can participate in the budget or not. (TM_A) 
I do not like numbers so I am happy that I am not bothered by them. (PM_C1) 
 
The balance between TM_A’s and PM_C1’s actual and desired level of BP may, at 
least partly, explain why a ‘no influence’ form of BP did not frustrate their basic psychological 
needs. Conversely, the project manager from company B and PM_C2 experienced high 
deprivation: 
My budget is imposed top-down; it does not match the needs of my business unit. I can 
communicate any preoccupations concerning the budget allocation to the financial staff 
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but my remarks are not taken into account by them. I think it would be better to ask the 
business units for their own estimate and combine these estimates with accounting 
considerations and as such reach a compromise. I do not say that I can foresee every 
opportunity that will come up but my business unit has more hands-on experience than 
my superiors to build on. (PM_B) 
 
In summary, it seems that the effect of a ‘no influence’ form of BP on the managers’ 
basic psychological needs is contingent on participation congruence. More specifically, if 
managers are not allowed influence in the budgeting process, this will have no frustrating effect 
on their basic psychological needs if those managers had no participatory aspirations. Based 
on these grounds, we propose that the ‘no influence’ forms of BP will only relate to frustrated 
psychological needs if the subordinate manager experiences participation deprivation.  
5.3.2 Strategic alignment 
Preliminary results. Although true participation explains why the consultative form of 
BP can relate to both satisfied and frustrated needs for autonomy, competence, and 
relatedness and participation congruence gives insight into when ‘no influence’ forms of BP 
create frustrated or satisfied needs, they do not explain why TM_A, PRM_B1, PRM_B2, and 
PM_C2 experience autonomous types of budget motivation while PM_C1 reports a controlled 
type of budget motivation. Moreover, our results also show that, contrary to our expectations, 
satisfied needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness do not always result in 
autonomous types of budget motivation (BU_C2) and that frustrated psychological needs do 
not always generate controlled types of budget motivation (PM_C2).  
Going back to the literature. An important role of budgeting is to help managers 
successfully implement their organization’s strategy. Indeed, budgets are used as a means of 
coordinating and communicating strategic priorities (Abernethy and Brownell, 1999) and can 
as such be part of the strategic management process of an organization (Shastri and Stout, 
2008). A company’s strategy not only includes the goals of the organization, but also the means 
it takes to achieve these goals (Chandler, 1962). If managers share a clear understanding of 
the strategic priorities, we call them strategically aligned.  
Our field study revisited.  
You can compare strategy versus budgeting with a car. It is when planning the trip that 
you determine the direction your car will be heading, not when you stop at the gasoline 
station and decide upon the amount of gas to fuel. (PM_C2) 
 
Informal controls, such as the continuous communication of the company’s values (for example 
respect, simplicity, and customer service in company A) are important in ensuring strategic 
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alignment but are not enough. We found that it is solely through participation in the strategy 
process that internalization may occur. In particular, this strategic participation contributes to a 
shared vision and consequent strategic alignment: 
I am involved in brain-storm sessions about how to implement the business unit 
strategy. My superior tells us what the strategy is and I can help in formulating ideas to 
on how best implement it. (TM_A) 
 
The team manager from company A and the production managers from company B had 
no influence over their budgetary targets, but they did not suffer from frustrated psychological 
needs (due to their participation congruence) nor had controlled types of budget motivation 
(due to their strategic alignment). The project manager from company B, however, reported 
frustrated budgetary autonomy, competence, and relatedness needs, as he experienced 
participation deprivation and had a controlled form of budget motivation as he lacked strategic 
alignment. Conversely, PM_C1 was not strategically aligned, which may explain his controlled 
type of budget motivation notwithstanding that his basic psychological needs were not 
frustrated due to his participation congruence. Scrutinizing the verbatim transcripts, it appeared 
that TM_A, PRM_B1, and PRM_B2 derived their autonomous types of budget motivation from 
being aligned with their respective company’s strategy.  
Similarly, strategic alignment is a contingent factor in the relationship between the basic 
psychological needs and budget motivation. In particular, BU_C2 enjoys a joint decision-
making form of BP, experiences satisfied needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness 
but has a controlled type of budget motivation as he is not strategically aligned. Conversely, 
notwithstanding frustrated psychological needs due to participation deprivation, PM_C2 has 
an autonomous type of budget motivation as he is strategically aligned. Therefore, we expect 
that if managers comply with the organization’s strategic plans and targets (Cäker and Siverbo, 
2013), such that they are strategically aligned, autonomous types of budget motivation may 
become stronger, even if these managers cannot influence the budgetary targets. More 
specifically, strategically aligned managers will identify with and internalize the goals and 
means needed to achieve these goals. Therefore, we propose that strategic alignment can act 
as a substitute for high influence BP. If managers understand and comply with the 
organizational strategic goals, they will also understand and comply with the means needed 
for their implementation (i.e., the budgetary targets). If managers understand ‘the broader 
picture’ and know where the organization is heading to, they will have autonomous types of 
budget motivation, regardless of their form of BP. Conversely, if subordinate managers are 
allowed a form of BP with high influence (i.e., true consultation or joint decision-making) but 
do not know where the budget stands for (i.e., are not strategically aligned), we expect that 
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their satisfied basic psychological needs will not translate into autonomous types of budget 
motivation.  
6. Conclusions 
Organizations allow employees to participate in the budgeting process expecting, but not 
always achieving, positive outcomes such as budget motivation. The aim of this paper was to 
explore the complexities and underlying mechanisms of BP’s motivational effects. More 
specifically, we focused on the following research question: do different forms of BP and types 
of budget motivation exist and how and when do they relate to each other? To answer this 
research question, we conducted 18 semi-structured interviews with a cross-section of 
managers in three companies.  
If we start out from the question of whether different forms of BP and types of budget 
motivation exist, our findings largely corroborate previous research on PDM and SDT. In 
particular, forms of BP can range from ‘no influence’ to ‘joint decision-making’. We found no 
evidence of ‘full delegation’ being present in a real-life budgeting context. This finding 
constitutes an important implication for current experimental BP research as a setting in which 
subordinate managers can unilaterally decide on the budgetary targets may not be the most 
suitable representation of a real-life budgeting process. Our study adds to this also the insight 
that the high influence forms of BP seem to be reserved for higher management levels. 
Moreover, we found evidence of different types of motivation in a budgeting context, ranging 
from external regulation to intrinsic motivation. Hence, we are able to enrich the current 
budgeting studies that have largely neglected the richness of budget motivation.  
Second, using an alternate theory to explore the motivational effects of BP (as suggested 
by Chong and Chong, 2002; Covaleski et al., 2003) we are able to shed light on its underlying 
mechanisms. In general, it appears that if managers are allowed a high influence, true form of 
BP, their needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness are satisfied within the budgeting 
context which can foster autonomous types of budget motivation. Conversely, if managers 
have no influence in the budgeting process, their basic psychological needs are generally 
frustrated within the budgeting process, which can create controlled types of budget 
motivation.  
A third insight is that the ‘no influence’ and ‘consultation’ form of BP may relate to both 
satisfied and frustrated psychological needs, depending on the circumstances. Similarly, 
satisfied and frustrated psychological needs may result in both autonomous and controlled 
types of budget motivation. In particular, we identified a constellation of three factors 
determining BP’s specific motivational effects: true participation, participation congruence, and 
strategic alignment. For the ‘consultation’ form of BP to foster psychological need satisfaction, 
it is important that managers perceive their consultation as true, which holds subordinate 
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managers as being free to engage in discussions and being able to actively influence the 
budgetary decisions (Argyris, 1953; Miles, 1999). If top management is not genuinely taking 
into account the suggestions of subordinate managers, consultative BP will relate to frustrated 
psychological needs. In summary, these results imply that solely offering voice in settings 
where the subordinate manager’s preferences are not taken into account for the budget set, 
nor will this manager receive an adequate explanation (i.e., the perception of pseudo-
participation), may be somewhat costly, as pseudo-participation has adversarial motivational 
effects.  
Furthermore, managers who have a ‘no influence’ form of BP only suffer from basic 
psychological need frustration, if in fact they desired to participate in the process. Participation 
deprivation may leverage the detrimental effects of a lack of influence on the satisfaction of 
managers’ needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness within the budgeting context. 
However, if managers did not have participatory aspirations, ‘no influence’ BP does not 
frustrate their basic psychological needs, as these managers are in an equilibrium situation. 
This finding implies that the relationship between ‘no influence’ forms of BP and need 
frustration is contingent upon participation congruence.  
In addition, the results of our field study also highlight the importance of strategic alignment. 
Frustrated psychological needs can relate to autonomous types of budget motivation and 
satisfied needs only translate into autonomous types of budget motivation if the subordinate 
manager is strategically aligned. Strategic alignment can strengthen the managers’ 
autonomous types of budget motivation, disregarding their form of BP. Strategic alignment 
ensures a positive identification and internalization process, whereby subordinate managers 
invest their effort into compliance with strategic plans and targets. The criticism that budgets 
are not linked to strategy is thus unfounded for the organizations in our study. Indeed, we 
propose that strategic alignment and high influence forms of BP can be used interchangeably. 
Managers have an autonomous type of budget motivation when they have a clear 
understanding of the strategy, the methods and means necessary for its implementation, 
disregarding their form of BP. Strategic alignment, for example through participation in the 
strategy implementation process, can hence act as an alternative for high influence and true 
forms of BP. Conversely, for satisfied needs to result in autonomous types of budget 
motivation, we propose that it is important that managers know what the budget stands for. If 
managers have influence over setting their budgetary targets, but do not understand where 
those means are heading to, their satisfied needs do not relate to autonomous types of budget 
motivation. These findings tie in with the growing amount of management control research 
recognizing that management control systems are part of packages and are structurally related 
and integrated (Grabner and Moers, 2013; Malmi and Brown, 2008; Mundy, 2010).  
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In fact, we argue that organizations have a significant degree of control over the 
antecedents of both the autonomous and controlled types of budget motivation by designing 
their BP process in a specific way. Research should further tease out the effects of different 
management control systems on the different types of motivation. Taken together, our results 
highlight the importance of distinguishing among various forms of BP and different types of 
budget motivation and suggest that the motivational effects of BP may be more complex than 
assumed. 
The findings reported here should be interpreted in light of some potential limitations. One 
important limitation of this study is that we cannot guarantee that managers’ perceptions of BP 
are equivocal to the objective reality. However, we do know that people act on perceptions 
(Collier et al., 2004, 76). Thus, even if these perceptions do not correspond with reality, 
managers act as if they were true. It is the perceived form of BP that can trigger satisfied needs 
and autonomous types of budget motivation, not the actual form of BP granted to the 
subordinate manager. Second, in terms of the field study design, we acknowledge that this 
research cannot be generalized to other companies, due to a lack of statistical control (Yin, 
2003). However, given the purpose of our research, a field study design was the most 
appropriate research method. Moreover, both multiple and nested interviews were undertaken 
to allow for analytical generalization (Gibbert and Ruigrok, 2010). Another limitation of field 
research is the potential for interviewer bias (Atkinson and Shaffir, 1998). We actively aimed 
at minimizing this bias by maintaining a disciplined, systematic protocol. Moreover, the results 
of all of the independent interviews were compared to minimize interviewer bias, and as such, 
the reliability of the research results was enhanced.  
Within its confines, this study sheds new light on the complexities and underlying 
mechanisms underlying the motivational effects of BP. As this is an exploratory study drawing 
on data collected from a small sample of managers, future research could enhance the external 
validity of the research by increasing the sample size of the companies interviewed. The next 
step could be to test our ex-post propositions more formally (Keating, 1995), such as in the 
form of a survey questionnaire. Another avenue future research could explore is the multi-
dimensionality of the BP construct (Shields and Shields, 1998). Although BP has many 
definitions, dimensions, and organizational contexts (Durocher et al., 2007), in this study we 
focused on superior-subordinate participation, which is in line with previous research. Future 
research could develop a multi-item measure that copes with all BP’s dimensions and test 
whether all dimensions impact the same type of budget motivation. Furthermore, it is unclear 
from our research whether pseudo-participative ‘consultation’ is worse than ‘no influence’ 
forms of BP for managers’ autonomous types of budget motivation. As it is accepted practice 
that managers should participate in the budget, it seems that some organizations feel 
pressured to do this, which results in pseudo-participation. However, pseudo-participation 
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does not reap autonomous motivational benefits. In this situation, it may be better to set the 
budget without subordinate influence and explain its rationale. Indeed, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that managers would rather be given a budget to work with than spend hours 
researching, deciding upon, and drawing together plans and projects with an accompanying 
budget, only to have it rejected. Future research could explore this possibility. Finally, given 
that the academic evidence on the usefulness of SDT in budgeting is still sparse, we encourage 
further using SDT, as it provides a richer view on motivation and may explain mixed results in 
current research (Birnberg et al., 2007).   
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CHAPTER 3 – THE IMPACT OF PARTICIPATION IN STRATEGIC 
PLANNING ON MANAGERS’ CREATION OF BUDGETARY SLACK: 
THE MEDIATING ROLE OF AUTONOMOUS MOTIVATION AND 
AFFECTIVE ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITMENT18 
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This study investigates the impact of participative strategic planning on 
managers’ creation of budgetary slack. Specifically, we draw on self-
determination and organizational commitment theory to examine whether 
and how the degree of managerial participation in strategic planning relates 
to the creation of budgetary slack. The hypotheses are empirically tested 
with survey data obtained from 247 managers in a cross-section of West-
European organizations. The results from a structural equation model, with 
controls for budget participation and slack detection, suggest that increased 
participation in strategic planning leads to lower budgetary slack creation 
through the suggested path of heightened affective organizational 
commitment. In addition, the results indicate that budget participation 
decreases the creation of budgetary slack through the mediating effect of 
autonomous budget motivation, suggesting that both elements of the 
organizational planning process are related to the creation of budgetary 
slack. Our study contributes to the growing research exploring the interface 
between accounting and strategy by recognizing the importance of 
participative strategic planning for understanding managers’ creation of 
budgetary slack.  
 
                                                          
18 De Baerdemaeker, J., Bruggeman, W., The impact of participation in strategic planning on managers’ 
creation of budgetary slack: The mediating role of autonomous motivation and affective organisational 
commitment. Management Accounting Research (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mar.2015.06.002 
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1. Introduction 
Budgetary slack, defined as the deliberate incorporation of excess resources in the budget 
that make the budget easier to attain (Merchant, 1985), is one of the most investigated 
budgeting outcomes. Not only does evidence indicate that there is considerable budgetary 
slack in organizations (e.g.,  Merchant, 1985; Schoute and Wiersma, 2007), it also remains 
one of the primary controversial, unsolved issues in budgetary control. There is a considerable 
literature that discusses possible antecedents of budgetary slack (for an overview, see 
Derfuss, 2012; Dunk and Nouri, 1998). The majority of this prior literature investigated the 
effect of budget participation (BP) on the creation of budgetary slack. These empirical studies, 
however, have resulted in contradictory findings. BP seems a necessary but not sufficient 
explanation for budgetary slack creation, which establishes a need to identify and test the 
effect of additional explanatory variables (Webb, 2001).  
This study focuses on managers’ participation in strategic planning (PSP) as an 
additional explanation for the creation of budgetary slack. The identification of PSP as a 
possible antecedent of budgetary slack creation is based on the fact that the budget is an 
indistinguishable part of an organization’s planning process (e.g., Covaleski et al., 2003; 
Hansen et al., 2003; Merchant and Van der Stede, 2011). This planning process not only 
includes budgeting but also strategic planning (e.g., Frezatti et al., 2011). Focus in extant 
research on a manager’s immediate budget setting and BP has neglected the possible effect 
of strategic planning on budgetary slack creation. This omission may be significant as it may, 
at least partially, explain the inconsistencies in the research findings concerning the effect of 
BP on managers’ budgetary slack creation. This research aims to extend prior research’s focus 
by studying the effect of strategic planning on budgetary slack creation, over and beyond BP’s 
effect in order to capture the whole planning process and as such further our understanding of 
the antecedents of budgetary slack creation. In particular, as recent work on strategic 
management (e.g., Floyd and Wooldridge, 2000; Kaplan and Norton, 2001) suggests that 
strategy should be planned in a participative way, this study aims to clarify whether and how 
PSP relates to the creation of budgetary slack.  
As understanding managerial behavior requires insights from both psychology-based 
and economic-based theories, we follow Covaleski et al.’s (2003) suggestion and adopt a 
psychology-based management accounting research approach. More specifically, we use 
insights from organizational commitment and self-determination theory (SDT) to broaden our 
understanding of whether and how PSP relates to budgetary slack. To test our hypotheses, 
we conducted a survey which was completed by 247 managers from a cross-section of West-
European organizations.  
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The contribution of this paper to management accounting research is threefold. First, 
our study results contribute to the budgetary slack literature by demonstrating that PSP 
reduces the amount of budgetary slack created through enhanced affective organizational 
commitment, after controlling for the effect of BP and slack detection. As such, we deepen our 
understanding of the factors that drive budgetary slack. Second, we show that BP also 
decreases the creation of budgetary slack through heightened autonomous budget motivation. 
Taken together, in order to understand the creation of budgetary slack in a specific situation, 
we should take into account both the level of BP and PSP. Both elements are part of an 
organization’s planning process and are related to budgetary slack creation, albeit through a 
different path. Third, our study extends the line of research on the interface between 
accounting and strategy (Dent, 1990; Langfield-Smith, 1997) by focusing on the relationship 
between the level of PSP and the creation of budgetary slack. Surprisingly, few management 
accounting research has been published on PSP despite it being of interest in the academic 
and professional literature in recent years (Kaplan and Norton, 2008; Wooldridge et al., 2008). 
In addition to the contributions to management accounting research, this study also has the 
potential to inform the practice of management accounting. In particular, our results 
demonstrate the importance of personal variables such as affective organizational commitment 
and autonomous motivation to understand managers’ budgeting behavior. Indeed, it are not 
the formal management control systems in itself but it are their effects on these personal 
variables that are primordial to understand managers’ budgetary slack creation. Moreover, our 
study gives practitioners an understanding of how budgeting and strategy may interact. 
Specifically, we show that the way managers are involved in the strategy process determines 
their budgetary slack creation. When trying to influence subordinate managers’ budgeting 
behavior, top management should hence take a holistic approach and consider both elements 
of the planning process.       
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical 
background of the constructs used in our research model and develops the hypotheses. 
Section 3 describes our research method, and section 4 presents the results of the analysis of 
our survey data. In section 5, we summarize the conclusions of our research, discuss the 
limitations, and suggest some fruitful directions for future research.   
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2. Theoretical background and hypothesis development 
2.1 Managers’ creation of budgetary slack 
The traditional concern is that managers have an incentive to create budgetary slack by 
withholding or misrepresenting their private information in an attempt to control for resources, 
to achieve personal aspirations, or in order to maximize the expected rewards dependent upon 
budget attainment (Dunk, 1993a; Nouri, 1994). Consequently, a manager’s budget demand 
not necessarily reflects real organizational necessities (Hopwood, 1974).19  
The majority of slack-related studies have focused on BP as the main explanation for 
the creation of budgetary slack (e.g., Merchant, 1985; Nouri and Parker, 1996; Onsi, 1973). 
BP refers to ‘a process in which the subordinate is involved in, and has influence over, the 
determination of his budget’ (Anthony and Govindarajan, 2007, p. 380). There is, however, 
little consistent evidence on the effect of BP on the creation of budgetary slack. While some 
studies report that the relationship is negative (Dunk, 1993a; Merchant, 1985; Onsi, 1973), 
others report a positive relationship (Lowe and Shaw, 1968; Lukka, 1988) or an insignificant 
one (Collins, 1978).  
These mixed results have led to the use of other approaches such as agency models 
(e.g., Young, 1985) and the use of contingency factors to predict the creation of budgetary 
slack (for an overview, see Derfuss, 2012; Dunk and Nouri, 1998). Although these approaches 
have helped gain insight into the creation of budgetary slack, much remains unexplained, 
establishing the need to identify and test the effect of additional explanatory variables (Webb, 
2001; Yuen, 2004). Such an additional explanation suggested by prior budgeting research is 
the organization’s strategy (e.g., Merchant and Manzoni, 1989; Van der Stede, 2000, 2001) as 
research increasingly acknowledges both budgeting and strategy as parts of the organizational 
planning process (e.g., Cadez and Guilding, 2008; Frezatti et al., 2011). Whereas prior 
empirical studies incorporating strategy in budgetary slack research have focused on the effect 
of generic strategies20 (Derfuss, 2012; Van der Stede, 2000, 2001), we focus on the effect of 
PSP.  
 
 
 
                                                          
19 We recognize that the creation of budgetary slack in itself is not undesirable per se (e.g., Davila and 
Wouters, 2005; Marginson and Ogden, 2005; Van der Stede, 2000) and that it is only detrimental to the 
organization to the extent that it results in the expropriation of resources (Church et al., 2012). Judging 
the (un)desirability of budgetary slack, however, goes beyond the scope of this paper.  
20 We use the phrase ‘generic strategies’ to refer to Porter’s distinction between three types of strategies: 
low cost, differentiation, and focus. In particular, ‘generic’ reflects the choices companies make 
regarding both the type of competitive advantage (low cost or differentiation) and the scope (narrow or 
industry-wide focus).  
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2.2 Participation in strategic planning and its relationship with budgetary slack 
Strategy, defined as ‘the determination of the basic long-term goals and objectives of an 
enterprise, and the adoption of courses of action […] necessary for carrying out these goals’ 
(Chandler, 1962, p. 13) was traditionally treated as a dichotomy: strategy planning was the 
sole responsibility of top management and strategy implementation the task of all other 
managerial levels (e.g., Ansoff, 1965; Anthony, 1965). This traditional division of work was 
challenged as environmental uncertainty increased in recent decades: we have observed a 
shift in focus in the strategic management literature from top management to other managerial 
levels in the organization. We may even say that there is currently a widespread feeling that 
top management is no longer in a position to make strategic decisions on its own. Recent work 
on strategic management (e.g., Floyd and Wooldridge, 2000; Kaplan and Norton, 2001, 2008) 
therefore suggests that in today’s business environment, strategy should be planned in a 
participative way.  
Although there is strong theoretical and empirical support for a positive relationship 
between PSP and organizational performance (Bourgeois and Brodwin, 1984; Wooldridge and 
Floyd, 1990), prior literature is less clear on the potential impact of PSP on budgetary slack. 
First, PSP can be argued to decrease budgetary slack creation. One of the main reasons why 
managers create slack is to protect themselves and the organization’s core from uncertainty 
(Cyert and March, 1963). PSP can lower the uncertainty experienced (and, ceteris paribus, the 
need for and the creation of budgetary slack) in several ways. First, if managers are allowed 
PSP internal communication will be enhanced as it permits both vertical and horizontal 
information sharing (Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst, 2006). Second, the integration of 
different capabilities through PSP can evoke a cognitive effect on the managers’ part (Hall, 
2008). The provision of more and better information allows managers to make better informed 
choices and positively influences the decision quality (Raes et al., 2011), which can result in 
improved resource allocations (i.e., a lower amount of budgetary slack) (e.g., Cadez and 
Guilding, 2008). Third, as managers are allowed PSP, transparency is accomplished and 
managers will better understand their organization’s strategy (Chapman and Kihn, 2009; 
Wooldridge and Floyd, 1990). As goals and directions become more clear, uncertainty 
decreases and accordingly the need and the creation of budgetary slack (Yuen, 2004). 
Conversely, PSP can also increase budgetary slack creation. The propensity of managers to 
let their behavior be influenced by their preferences is called ‘motivated reasoning’21 (Kunda, 
1990). Recent research by Tayler (2010) has illustrated the importance of motivated reasoning 
in a balanced scorecard setting. Expanding it to the strategy-accounting context, we can expect 
                                                          
21 We are greatly indebted to one of the anonymous reviewers for pointing out this interesting 
suggestion.  
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that if managers are allowed PSP, they will be more involved and committed to the 
organization’s strategy (Allen and Meyer, 1990) and therefore will safeguard the 
implementation of the strategy they co-developed. As budgetary slack can provide a buffer 
against unforeseen circumstances (Cyert and March, 1963), its existence may help managers 
in ensuring a smooth strategy implementation. Therefore, we recognize that managers allowed 
PSP may create budgetary slack with this noble intention in mind. 
Given that it is unclear whether PSP will be positively or negatively related to the creation 
of budgetary slack, we incorporate motivation and organizational commitment as mediating 
variables to examine whether and how PSP and budgetary slack are related. We chose these 
two variables as mediating mechanisms because both motivation and organizational 
commitment are important variables in the strategic management and budgetary slack 
literature. More specifically, Gerbing, Hamilton and Freeman (1994) reported that PSP 
positively influences organizational commitment and motivation and earlier budgetary slack 
research has also recognized the role of motivation (e.g., Becker and Green, 1962) and 
organizational commitment (Nouri and Parker, 1996). Therefore, we combine these two lines 
of research. The full theoretical model appears in Figure 1. Each link in the model represents 
a hypothesis and will be discussed below.  
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Figure 1: Theoretical model 
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2.3 The relationship between participation in strategic planning and autonomous 
motivation 
Hansen and Van der Stede (2004) recognize that budgeting can ex-ante translate the long-
term strategic plans of the firm into a short-term operating budget. Indeed, a fundamental 
purpose of the budget is to provide a means by which managers can grapple with the abstract 
and complex strategy (Anthony and Govindarajan, 2007). As a financial translation of the 
strategy, the budget communicates the strategy to the employees and enables the strategic 
plan to meet its goals. Moreover, strategic planning guides the deployment of resources so 
that organizations can achieve their competitive advantage (Ketokivi and Castañer, 2004). As 
managers can participate in strategic planning, they will internalize the strategic goals of the 
organization and consequentially the means (i.e., the budget) needed to achieve those goals22. 
PSP can thus be seen to engender managers’ motivation not only for the organization’s 
strategic goals but also for the budgetary targets.  
When studying motivation, motivation theorists (Deci, 1975; Ryan and Deci, 2000b) have 
illustrated the importance of distinguishing between autonomous and controlled motivation. 
Whereas autonomous motivation is characterized by underlying feelings of freedom and 
volition, controlled motivation is characterized by an overarching feeling of pressure 
(Vansteenkiste et al., 2009). This distinction between autonomous and controlled motivation is 
important, as ample research in the field of psychology has provided evidence of positive 
outcomes for autonomous motivation and negative outcomes associated with controlled 
motivation (e.g.,  Ryan and Deci, 2000b; Vansteenkiste et al., 2009). Moreover, the usefulness 
of this contrast is not confined to psychology research but has also been demonstrated in 
recent budgeting research. More specifically, Wong-on-Wing et al. (2010) introduced a 
motivation-based model of participative budgeting to explain the mixed evidence concerning 
the relationship between BP and performance.  
Within SDT, it is maintained that autonomous motivation can be fostered through a 
need-supportive environment (Vansteenkiste et al., 2010). A need-supportive environment 
sustains the three basic psychological needs innate to all humans: the need for autonomy, the 
need for competence, and the need for relatedness. The need for autonomy refers to feeling 
strong-willed and fully endorsing one’s actions. People want to experience choice in their 
behavior (Vansteenkiste et al., 2010) and be the initiators of their own actions (Deci, 1975). As 
a specific instance of participative decision-making, PSP can provide managers with a sense 
of willpower and choice (Deci et al., 1989) and thereby satisfy their need for autonomy. The 
                                                          
22 The assumption of a strong link between budget and strategy was tested by a four-item scale 
developed specifically for this study (see Appendix A). The strength of the link received an average 
score of five out of seven, implying that our assumption is appropriate in this particular sample.  
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second basic need, competence, concerns feeling effective in one’s interactions with the social 
and physical environment (Deci, 1975). People have a natural tendency to explore, 
manipulate, and master their environment (Vansteenkiste et al., 2010). Therefore, they feel 
competent if they experience opportunities to exercise and express their capacities (Deci and 
Ryan, 2004). PSP can give managers the feeling that they are better able to control their 
environment (Chenhall, 2003; Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst, 2006), their work (Shields and 
Shields, 1998), and the decision-making process (Locke and Latham, 1990). Being invited to 
participate in strategic planning hence signals trust in the manager’s competence. Lastly, the 
need for relatedness denotes caring for and feeling cared for by others. People search for 
close relationships and want to feel as though they belong to a social group (Baumeister and 
Leary, 1995). Allowing managers PSP increases the level of consensus among managers, 
enhances internal communication, and creates a climate of shared effort (Papadakis et al., 
1998), which all satisfy the need for relatedness. Based upon these findings, we expect that 
the satisfaction of the three basic needs through PSP will encourage internalization of both the 
organizational goals and the resources needed to implement those goals, such that the 
manager experiences autonomous motivation to achieve the budgetary targets. Hypothesis 
H1 tests for this positive relationship: 
 
H1. Higher levels of PSP increase managers’ autonomous budget motivation.  
2.4 The relationship between autonomous motivation and budgetary slack 
Managers can engage in similar behaviors for different underlying reasons (Grant et al., 
2011). They may constrain their budgetary slack creation because of social pressure, 
accountability pressure, or pressure to reveal private information they otherwise would not 
(Covaleski et al., 2003). However, individuals who feel pressured fail to maintain their effort 
and performance over time (Grant, 2008). Conversely, autonomous motivation predicts greater 
goal-directed effort and goal attainment (Sheldon and Elliot, 1998). Managers having 
autonomous budget motivation understand the importance of budget attainment which is 
central to their decisions about how best to meet these budgetary targets. Prior research has 
illustrated autonomous motivation’s strong relationship with positive work outcomes, such as 
performance, creativity, persistence, and initiative (e.g., Ryan and Deci, 2000b; Wong-On-
Wing et al., 2010). This implies that autonomously motivated managers will put more effort in 
looking for creative solutions to attain the budgetary targets ‘as they are’ and will be less 
inclined to make the targets easier to attain (i.e., they will be less inclined to create budgetary 
slack). Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
H2. Higher levels of autonomous budget motivation decrease budgetary slack creation. 
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2.5 The relationship between participation in strategic planning and affective 
organizational commitment 
PSP spurs not only motivation but also affective commitment to the organization (Freeman, 
1989; Shields and Shields, 1998). Affective organizational commitment refers to employees’ 
emotional attachment to the organization and is characterized by (1) a strong belief in and 
acceptance of the organizational goals and values and (2) a willingness to exert substantial 
effort on the organization’s behalf (e.g., Mowday et al., 1979).  
Employees develop a deep sense of affective organizational commitment if they are in 
a business environment that provides them chances to participate in decision-making 
(Searfoss and Monczka, 1973). PSP, as a specific form of participative decision-making, is 
positively related to the satisfaction of the manager’s need for autonomy and competence  and 
satisfaction of those needs is identified as an antecedent of affective organizational 
commitment (e.g., Greguras and Dieffendorff, 2009). Applying these notions to a strategic 
management context, ample research illustrates that PSP leads to greater acceptance of 
organizational goals and hence fosters affective organizational commitment (e.g., Kim and 
Mauborgne, 1998; Korsgaard et al., 1995). Indeed, PSP enhances affective organizational 
commitment as it provides managers an opportunity to make organizational decisions and 
commits them to these decisions (Mathieu and Zajac, 1990). The following hypothesis tests 
for this positive relationship: 
 
H3. Higher levels of PSP increase managers’ affective organizational commitment.  
2.6 The relationship between affective organizational commitment and budgetary slack 
The possibility of creating budgetary slack can instill a conflict of interest, as slack creation 
may be beneficial for the manager but may run against the interests of the organization as a 
whole (Kramer and Hartmann, 2011). Managers with strong affective commitment will act in 
the interests of the organization just as they would in their own because they have come to 
perceive the interests as identical (Kim and Mauborgne, 1998). These managers align with the 
organizational goals and feel positive about them. Conversely, managers with low 
organizational commitment are primarily driven by satisfying their individual goals and 
ambitions.  
 Nouri (1994) and Nouri and Parker (1996) found that managers’ level of affective 
organizational commitment influences their attempt to create budgetary slack. Strongly 
affectively committed managers understand the potential dysfunctional effects of budgetary 
slack for their organization and will be inclined to act in the general interest of the organization. 
Therefore, the amount of budget slack they create will be low. Conversely, managers with a 
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low level of affective organizational commitment may exhibit a high degree of budgetary slack 
creation because as rational economic individuals, this is often in their best interest (Lowe and 
Shaw, 1968). Hypothesis 4 tests for this negative relationship: 
 
H4. Higher levels of affective organizational commitment decrease budgetary slack 
creation.  
2.7 The relationship between autonomous motivation and affective organizational 
commitment 
Motivation is one of the bases through which commitment develops. Researchers have 
argued that autonomous motivation and affective organizational commitment should be related 
to each other (e.g., Gagné et al., 2008). More specifically, Bono and Judge (2003) 
demonstrated a positive relationship between autonomous reasons for pursuing work goals 
and affective organizational commitment. They asked respondents to identify important job-
related goals, such as budget attainment, and found that autonomous reasons for pursuing 
those goals were positively related to affective organizational commitment. While Bono and 
Judge (2003) implicitly considered budget attainment as one possible work goal amongst 
others, we specifically tap into this issue and expand the idea that managers’ motivation for 
budget attainment may have implications for their overall organizational affective commitment. 
Indeed, in his hierarchical motivation model Vallerand (1997) recognizes that motivation exists 
at three levels of generality: the global, contextual, and situational levels. One of the 
motivational features concerns the bottom-up influence of situational on contextual motivation. 
Applying this to our setting, we know that all managers in our sample have budget 
responsibility23 (see 3.1 Data collection for more detailed information about our sampling 
approach). Given the importance of budget attainment within their work setting, we believe that 
managers experiencing autonomous budget motivation are more likely to experience affective 
organizational commitment. In other words, stretching Vallerand’s (1997) hierarchical model, 
we believe that managers’ situational autonomous budget motivation will relate to them feeling 
affectively committed at the contextual level of the organization. This positive expectation is 
tested through the following hypothesis: 
 
H5. Higher levels of autonomous budget motivation increase managers’ affective 
organizational commitment.  
 
                                                          
23 In particular, 65% of the managers reported having full P&L responsibility, whereas the other 35% 
had either expense or revenue responsibility.  
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3. Research Method 
3.1 Data collection 
To test our hypotheses, we conducted a survey study to increase our study’s comparability 
with previous research and because we wanted to study managerial behavior in a real-life 
business context. The target population of this research is managers with budget 
responsibilities, a key condition for examining the creation of budgetary slack (e.g.,  Merchant, 
1985; Onsi, 1973). Typically, general managers have these responsibilities, as do marketing, 
sales, R&D, supply chain and production managers24. Moreover, these managers are uniquely 
positioned to evaluate the value of information to the firm and should therefore occupy a central 
position in the strategic planning process (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992).  
For the random sample, we obtained contact information from a West-European 
commercial mailing list provider whose total number of e-mail addresses approximates 
300,00025. Given the above criteria of function, 2,301 invitations were mailed to managers in 
January 2013, of which 256 failed to reach the respondent due to an invalid e-mail addresses, 
the respondent left the firm for another job, or had retired. To increase the response rate, each 
participant was promised confidentiality and a follow-up was administered to non-respondents 
two weeks after the initial mail-out. Respondents were provided both material (i.e., a chance 
to win a gastronomic dinner for two) and non-material compensation (i.e., feedback about the 
study) (Moore and Tarnai, 2002). Of the 2,045 invitations that reached the respondents, 249 
responses were returned, yielding a response rate of 12.18%. This response rate is in line with 
other behavioral management accounting research (e.g., Chenhall et al., 2011; Moores and 
Yuen, 2001). We compared the demographics and mean responses on all constructs of early 
(i.e., the respondents who answered after the initial mail-out) and late (i.e., the respondents 
who answered after the reminder) respondents. The χ² and two-sample t-tests revealed no 
systematic differences (p>0.05). Therefore, non-response bias is unlikely to affect the results.  
As all data are self-reported, common method bias (CMB) may influence the observed 
correlations between the constructs (Podsakoff et al., 2003). A priori, we attempted to reduce 
the potential effects of CMB by safeguarding the respondents’ anonymity and by assuring them 
that there were no right or wrong answers. A posteriori, we conducted Harman’s one-factor 
test on the four conceptually crucial variables in our theoretical model (i.e., PSP, autonomous 
motivation, affective organizational commitment, and budgetary slack). A four-factor solution 
rather than a single factor occurred, and the first factor explained only 19% of the total variance. 
                                                          
24 Our sample also comprises 6% finance managers. We did an additional analysis (results not reported 
here) without these managers and our inferences remained unchanged.  
25 Although not all managers were represented in this commercial mailing list, it provided the advantage 
of targeting the right people to complete our survey. 
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These results indicate that CMB is unlikely to contaminate the research results (Podsakoff et 
al., 2003). Second, following the recommendations of Widaman (1985), we included a common 
method factor in the structural equation model. While the method factor did slightly improve 
the model fit (CMINDF = 2.57 and NNFI = 0.93), it was not significant. Given the small 
magnitude and insignificance of the common method factor, we contend that CMB is unlikely 
to be a serious concern for this study, implying that other factors account for the observed 
variance. Moreover, potential response bias was investigated by manually going through each 
individual filled-in questionnaire and by inspecting the variance across all items. For two 
respondents, an answer pattern was recorded26. Therefore, we decided to remove these 
respondents from further analyses, yielding 247 usable responses. The characteristics of the 
final sample are displayed in Table 1. 
3.2 Variable measurement 
For all variables in our study, the survey items were scored on a seven-point Likert-type 
scale ranging from one (strongly disagree) to seven (strongly agree) unless stated otherwise. 
We used previously validated scales whenever possible to ascertain construct validity. To 
check on the relevance of these measures, our questionnaire was submitted to the scrutiny of 
six faculty colleagues, three part-time MBA students, and 21 managers with budget 
responsibility27 for pre-testing. Final measures were then developed and refined. Furthermore, 
we conducted empirical tests (i.e., range of responses, Cronbach’s alpha, and factor analyses) 
as suggested by Nunnally (1978) to further establish content and construct validity. An 
overview of the survey items is provided in Appendix A. Appendix B depicts the factor analyses 
used to construct the variables in this study. Descriptive statistics of the constructs based on 
the equally weighted average scores of multi-item variables and the correlation matrix are 
presented in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
26 They chose the neutral option for almost every item.  
27 The target respondents for the pretest phase were excluded from the actual hypothesis testing 
sample. 
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Table 1: Respondents by tenure, age, gender, education, role, and company size 
Characteristics of sample n Mean % 
Panel A: Respondent profile    
Tenure    
     Years in organization 244 13.10  
     Years in current function 247 6.17  
Age 245 46.92  
Gender    
     Male 214  87% 
     Female 31  13% 
Education    
     Secondary education or less 15  6% 
     Bachelor 65  26% 
     Master 156  63% 
     PhD 11  5% 
Role    
     Finance 16  6% 
     General management 50  20% 
     Manufacturing 37  14% 
     Marketing 26  11% 
     R&D 26  11% 
     Sales 49  20% 
     Supply chain 41  17% 
     Other 2  1% 
 
Panel B: Company profile   
 
Number of employees    
     0 to 250 72  30% 
     251 to 500 38  15% 
     501 to 1000 22  9% 
     1,001 to 5000 34  14% 
     5,001 to 10,000 19  8% 
     10,001+ 58  24% 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics, correlation matrix, and discriminant validity coefficients (n = 247) for participation in strategic planning, 
autonomous budget motivation, affective organizational commitment, the creation of budgetary slack, and the control variables.  
 
Variable Mean s.d. Min Max Cronbach α (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PSP (1) 5.56 0.95 1.90 7 0.93     0.75      
AM (2) 5.38 0.99 1 7 0.85  0.23**     0.71     
AOC (3) 5.63 0.98 1 7 0.87  0.42**  0.25**      0.74    
SLACK (4) 3.06 1.11 1 6.33 0.70 -0.27** -0.32** -0.29**      0.66   
BP (5) 5.57 1.04 1 7 0.89  0.45**  0.18**  0.26** -0.26**    0.77  
DETECT (6) 5.32 1.11 1.67 7 0.81  0.28**  0.17**  0.28** -0.18** 0.24** 0.77 
 
**,* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level, 0.05 level (two-tailed test), respectively. Correlations between the different constructs are below 
the diagonal. The square root of the AVE value for each of the constructs is along the diagonal (in bold). 
PSP = participation in strategic planning; AM = autonomous motivation; AOC = affective organizational commitment; SLACK = the creation of 
budgetary slack; BP = budget participation; and DETECT = slack detection
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3.2.1 Participation in strategic planning (PSP) 
Given the novelty of PSP in management accounting survey research, we designed a new 
instrument specifically for this study. Special attention has been paid to the conceptual 
specification of the construct. PSP, as a practice-informed construct, is given meaning by 
listing its theoretical properties found in practice (Bisbe et al., 2007). The process of specifying 
this construct’s exact meaning consists of a twofold approach. First, we elaborate on the 
definition of ‘participation’ and ‘strategic planning’. Participation refers to both the ‘involvement 
of employees in and their influence over’ certain organizational decisions (Anthony and 
Govindarajan, 2007, p. 10, emphasis added). Strategic planning focuses on ‘the determination 
of the basic long-term goals and objectives of an enterprise’ (Chandler, 1962, p. 13). Allowing 
managers PSP thus implies involving them in and allowing them to influence the long-term 
goals and objectives of the organization (Freeman, 1989). As such, we recognize both the 
quantity and quality aspect of management participation in the strategy process, as 
recommended by Gerbing et al. (1994). Second, we engaged in a thorough examination of the 
strategic management literature and conducted in-depth interviews with three senior managers 
and one middle manager28 to fully grasp the process of strategic planning in both theory and 
practice. Further support was provided for the validity of the theoretical definition, as illustrated 
by the following quote given by one of the interviewees: 
‘Strategic planning is looking for an answer to the “what” question: what do we want to 
achieve? Strategy implementation, conversely, focuses on the “how” question: once we 
have decided what we want to do, we need to decide upon how to achieve these goals.’ 
We used thematic analysis procedures to systematically identify patterns that organize 
both the published and oral information on the strategic planning process in a meaningful way. 
Appendix C provides a non-exhaustive overview of the analyzed quotations from published 
work. Different themes referring to different PSP properties were developed and clustered into 
one code when the themes had similar contents or were closely conceptually related (Boyatzis, 
1998). The output of this procedure are two codes representing the building blocks of the 
strategic planning process, namely, the visioning process and the strategic positioning 
process, which is in line with research by Merchant and Van der Stede (2011). The visioning 
process entails answering abstract questions of existence. In particular, the interviewees 
mentioned such questions as ‘What type of organization are we?’, ‘What type of organization 
do we want to be?’; and ‘What type of business do we want to be in?’, reflecting Johnson and 
                                                          
28 Senior manager A (54 year, male) has been the CEO of a playing card company for 18 years. Senior 
manager B (60 year, male) has been in his function of general manager in a civic and social organization 
for 15 years. Senior manager C (51 year, male) is since five years responsible for the strategy process 
in the same organization as senior manager B. Middle manager D (51 year, female) works already 21 
years for a telecommunication company and is since two years after sales manager.  
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Scholes’ (1989) definition of corporate strategy. The strategic positioning process refers to 
preparing analyses and making decisions about the strategic position of the firm, as reflected 
in Porter’s (1985, p. 1) notion of competitive strategy: strategy is ‘the search for a favourable 
competitive position in an industry’. Interviewees cited external and internal analyses, and 
decisions about products, markets, product-market combinations, and the firm’s/business 
unit’s competitive advantage. To measure participation in the two sub strategy processes 
identified in the interviews, we adapted the BP measure29, which was developed by Milani 
(1975) and tested extensively in prior research (e.g., Chenhall, 2003; Dunk, 1993a; Leach-
López et al., 2007). The item pool included 12 items: six items measuring participation in the 
visioning process and six items measuring participation in the strategic positioning process 
(see Appendix A). More specifically, we asked respondents to indicate their extent of 
involvement in and influence over (a) the determination of the basic long-term goals, 
objectives, and future opportunities of their organizational entity30 (i.e., the visioning process), 
and (b) the identification, preparation, and evaluation of options (i.e., the strategic positioning 
process). Although the measurement properties of this 12-item PSP scale are good, scale 
items two and eight could be viewed as rather communication by the superior instead of 
subordinate participation and thus we recalculated the measure without these items. The 
exploratory factor analysis reveals that the ten remaining questions used to measure PSP load 
on one factor with an explained variance of 61%. The reliability of the 10-item construct is 
strong (α = 0.93). Since this is a new measure, we correlated it to an established measure of 
participation in strategic decision making (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992) (nine-item scale, 43% 
variance explained, α = 0.83) and found, as expected, a significant positive correlation (r = 
0.40, p < 0.01). As the measurement properties of the specific measurement instrument were 
better than those of the Floyd and Wooldridge (1992) instrument, we decided to use the former 
as input for the statistical analyses. 
3.2.2 Autonomous budget motivation (AM) 
The adapted Motivation At Work Scale by Gagné et al. (2013) was used to measure the 
manager’s autonomous budget motivation. However, a change was made specifically for the 
purpose of this study. The original stem of the question reading ‘Why do you or would you put 
effort into your current job?’ was changed to ‘Why do you or would you put effort into attaining 
your organizational entity’s budget?’ The exploratory factor analysis reveals that AM is uni-
dimensional with an explained variance of 58% and a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of 0.85.  
                                                          
29 The original phrase referring to the budgeting process was replaced by ‘vision’ or ‘long-term goals 
and objectives’ to refer to the visioning process and was replaced by ‘strategic position’ when measuring 
the amount of participation in the strategic positioning process. 
30 We used the phrase ‘organisational entity’ to refer to the specific unit the respondents is working in. 
For example, an organisational entity can be a business unit, a department…  
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3.2.3 Affective organizational commitment (AOC)  
To assess AOC, the eight-item Affective Commitment Scale (ACS) developed by Allen and 
Meyer (1990) was employed31. This questionnaire has been widely used in research and has 
been shown to have acceptable levels of reliability and validity (Meyer and Allen, 1991). 
Exploratory factor analysis reveals that two items (‘I would be very happy to spend the rest of 
my career with this organization’32 and ‘I think that I could easily become as attached to another 
organization as I am to this one’) did not load significantly on the factor and were dropped from 
the measurement model. The final exploratory analysis indicates that the six retained items 
are uni-dimensional and explain 60% of the variance. In the current study, the Cronbach’s 
alpha coefficient for the revised six-item construct is 0.87. 
3.2.4 Budgetary slack (SLACK) 
In line with Dunk (1993a), Van der Stede (2000), and Indjejikian and Matejka (2006), the 
definition of budgetary slack used in this study focuses on the ease with which budgetary 
targets can be achieved. Budgetary slack occurs when managers ‘negotiate highly achievable 
targets’ (Van der Stede, 2000, p. 609), i.e., targets that are deliberately lower than their best-
guess forecast about the future. Managers can create budgetary slack by intentionally 
overstating future costs or understating future revenues (Merchant and Van der Stede, 2011; 
Onsi, 1973). This lowers the budgetary targets set and makes it easier for the manager to 
attain the required targets. Conversely, a budget contains little slack if it requires considerable 
effort and a high degree of efficiency (Simons, 1987). To reflect budgetary slack creation, we 
used the measurement instrument developed by Dunk (1993a). Considerable evidence of the 
validity and reliability of this scale has been compiled (e.g., Van der Stede, 2000). It is clear 
from the exploratory factor analysis that the item ‘Budgets set for my organizational entity are 
safely attainable’ does not load adequately on the factor. Therefore, we deleted this item for 
further analyses. The remaining three items load on the same factor, which explains 62% of 
the variance. The reliability of the three-item construct is acceptable (α = 0.70). The construct 
is correlated to two alternative measures for the creation of budgetary slack (Van der Stede’s 
(2000) and Onsi’s (1973) measure, respectively) to ensure that the Dunk (1993a) measure is 
working plausibly in our sample. As expected, the results show positive and significant 
correlations (r = 0.79, p < 0.01 and r = 0.23, p < 0.01, respectively). Dunk’s (1993a) measure 
                                                          
31 In some items, the original word ‘organization’ was replaced by the word ‘organizational entity’. Similar 
changes were made to the original commitment measurement scale by Aranya and Ferris (1984) and 
Wong-on-Wing et al. (2010), who replaced the word ‘organization’ with ‘profession’ and ‘bank’, 
respectively. 
32 This item was also deleted in the study of Viator and Pasewark (2005) due to significant cross-
loadings.  
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is retained for further empirical analyses as it has better measurement properties than Van der 
Stede’s (2000) and Onsi’s (1973) measure in this specific sample.  
3.2.5 Control variables 
We used two control variables in this study33. First, we controlled for BP. Although results 
are mixed, the large amount of research on the relationship between BP and budgetary slack 
indicates the importance of controlling for it. BP was measured using the six-item measurement 
instrument developed by Milani (1975). Second, prior research revealed that a superior’s ability 
to detect slack (DETECT) is negatively related to a manager’s creation of budgetary slack 
(Merchant, 1985; Onsi, 1973), as ‘slack cannot be created where it is easily detected’ 
(Merchant, 1985, p. 203). DETECT was measured by the three-item measure developed by 
Onsi (1973). The exploratory factor analyses reveal that BP and DETECT are uni-dimensional 
with explained variances of 65% and 72%, respectively, and their Cronbach’s alphas are 0.89 
and 0.81, respectively.  
 
4. Research results and discussion 
4.1 Statistical method 
We used structural equation modeling (SEM) to examine the role of autonomous budget 
motivation and affective organizational commitment in the relationship between PSP and 
SLACK34. An advantage of SEM is that it can simultaneously evaluate the proposed 
hypotheses and test the measurement reliability (Smith and Langfield-Smith, 2004). We 
conducted our analyses in LISREL 9.1 according to the two-step approach recommended by 
Anderson and Gerbing (1988). This approach has been employed in a number of recent 
accounting studies (e.g., Hartmann and Slapničar, 2009; Wong-On-Wing et al., 2010). A 
structural equation model using the maximum likelihood (ML) method35 in which AM and AOC 
                                                          
33 We also controlled for perceived environmental uncertainty, organizational strategy, and some 
background variables (i.e., number of years working in the organization/current function, age, and 
gender). As our analyses (results not reported here) indicated that none of these control variables were 
correlated with the dependent variable, we decided to omit them from further analyses (Becker, 2005).  
34 As we reviewed the tolerance and variance inflation factors for each construct, no evidence of 
multicollinearity was found. Furthermore, we plotted the residuals and performed White’s test, but no 
signs of heteroscedasticity were apparent.  
35 In preliminary tests, we discovered that our data are not multivariate normally distributed, as is the 
case with most data of perceptual nature (Hunton and Gibson, 1999). We tested normality by 
investigating the skewness and kurtosis indexes associated with each of the survey items and 
conducted Shapiro-Wilk’s test. Although results indicated that the measures were not normally 
distributed, we used the maximum likelihood (ML) method, as it performs well even under conditions of 
non-normality (Boomsma and Hoogland, 2001).  
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mediate the relation between PSP and SLACK was estimated, controlling for the effects of BP 
and DETECT on both the dependent and mediating variables.  
4.1.1 Analysis of the measurement model 
The first step in the analysis was to develop a measurement model. This model aims to 
specify the relationships between observed and latent variables (Hair et al., 2010). Our 
measurement model consists of four theoretical latent factors (PSP, AM, AOC, and SLACK) 
and two control variables (DETECT and BP). The standardized factor loadings and statistics 
from the measurement analysis are reported in Appendix B.  
Model fit is determined by the degree of correspondence between the observed and the 
estimated covariance matrix. Despite a significant χ² (χ² [513] = 1,398.6, p < 0.01), which is to 
be expected with a sample size as large as ours (Bentler and Bonett, 1980), the measurement 
model fits well according to other goodness-of-fit (CMINDF = 2.73 < 3; CFI = 0.93 > 0.90; and 
NNFI = 0.92 > 0.90) and badness-of-fit indices (RMSEA = 0.08 < 0.10; SRMR = 0.07 < 0.09) 
(e.g., Arbuckle and Wothke, 1999; Bentler and Bonett, 1980; Browne and Cudeck, 1993; Hair 
et al., 2010). Regarding item reliability, Hair et al. (2010) suggest that significant item loadings 
greater than 0.50 are sufficient to establish reliability. All items suggest good reliability with all 
loadings being significant (p < 0.05) and above 0.50. Next, convergent validity was assessed 
by examining the composite reliability (CR) and average variance extracted (AVE). As 
Appendix B confirms, the CR index of all constructs is good as all scores equal or exceed the 
threshold value of 0.70 (Hair et al., 2010). Moreover, most AVE scores are close to, or higher 
than, the threshold value of 0.50 which indicates that at least 50% of the indicator variance is 
accounted for by construct variance rather than noise (Fornell and Larcker, 1981)36. 
Discriminant validity of the constructs was assessed by comparing the square roots of the 
AVEs with the correlations between the constructs. As observed from Table 2, the square roots 
of the AVEs are larger than the off-diagonal reported correlations, which demonstrates strong 
evidence of discriminant validity (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). Overall, the results from the 
measurement model indicate adequate construct validity for all constructs in the model.  
In addition, the correlation analysis in Table 2 indicates a strong relationship between PSP 
and AM (r = 0.23), AOC (r = 0.42), and SLACK (r = -0.27). Moreover, we find a significant 
positive correlation between AM and AOC (r = 0.25). Examination of the relationships between 
SLACK and both mediating effects reveals that both more AM (r = -0.32) and AOC (r = -0.29) 
significantly decrease SLACK. Both control variables (i.e., BP and DETECT) are significantly 
                                                          
36 The only exception was SLACK with an AVE value (0.44) slightly below 0.50. However, we refrained 
from deleting items measuring SLACK to enhance its AVE to maintain the content validity of our 
measure. 
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positively correlated with AM (r = 0.18 and r = 0.17, respectively) and AOC (r = 0.26 and r = 
0.28, respectively) but significantly decrease SLACK (r = -0.26 and r = -0.18, respectively).  
4.1.2 Analysis of the structural model 
4.1.2.1 Theoretical model fit 
Second, the structural model with relationships between the latent variables was analyzed 
using the measurement error variances specified in the first step of the analysis (Smith and 
Langfield-Smith, 2004). To determine the optimal model, we used Anderson and Gerbing’s 
(1988) decision-tree framework for the set of sequential SCDTs. The results of these SCDTs 
are shown in Table 3.  
First, we performed a SCDT between the saturated and the theoretical model (see Figure 
1). The results of this test show a significant difference (p < 0.01). The next step was to 
compare the theoretical model with the next most likely constrained model. More specifically, 
the theoretical model was compared with a constrained model in which the link between PSP 
and AM was constrained to zero. The SCDT between the two models was not significant (p = 
0.22). The third step was to compare the constrained model and saturated model. Although 
the result of the SCDT was significant (p < 0.01), the constrained model provides an adequate 
fit (χ² [514] = 1,400.1, p < 0.01; CMINDF = 2.72; CFI = 0.93; NNFI = 0.92; RMSEA = 0.08; 
SRMR = 0.07). Therefore, our hypotheses were tested based on the constrained model where 
the path coefficient between PSP and AM was constrained to zero37.  
4.1.2.2 Testing the hypotheses 
We used completely standardized parameter estimates for the constrained model to test 
our hypotheses. The results are shown in Table 4 and Figure 2 illustrates the significant 
associations in our path model.  
                                                          
37 We refrained from testing an unconstrained model as suggested by Anderson and Gerbing’s (1988) 
decision-tree framework as no additional meaningful paths could be identified in our model.  
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Table 3: Sequential chi-square difference tests 
 Model Χ² Δχ² df Δdf Significance 
level 
Step 1 Theoretical model 1,398.6  513   
 Saturated model 0 1,398.6 0 513 p < 0.01 
 
Step 2 Theoretical model 1,398.6  513   
 Constrained model 1,400.1 1.5 514 1 ns 
 
Step 3 Constrained model 1,400.1  514   
 Saturated model 0 1,400.1 0 514 p < 0.01 
       
 
Table 4: Path coefficients 
Dependent variable   Independent Variable  Coefficient (p-value)  Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 
supported? 
SLACK  AM     -0.26** (0.00)  H3 Y 
SLACK  AOC     -0.25** (0.00)  H5 Y 
SLACK  BP  -0.12 (0.15)  -  
SLACK  DETECT  -0.09 (0.29)  -  
AOC  AM    0.18* (0.01)  H6 Y 
AOC  PSP     0.35** (0.00)  H4 Y 
AOC  BP   0.02 (0.82)  - - 
AOC  DETECT    0.15* (0.05)  - - 
AM  BP      0.34** (0.00)  - - 
AM  DETECT   0.05 (0.15)  - - 
Note: **, * indicate significance at < 1 per cent, and 5 per cent, respectively.  
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Figure 2: Structural model with significant path estimates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
**,* Statistically significant at 0.01 level and 0.05 level, respectively 
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As noted earlier, the path between PSP and AM (β = 0.10, p > 0.05) was constrained 
to zero due to its insignificance. Consequently, our data failed to support hypothesis H1 (linking 
higher levels of PSP to higher levels of AM)A. Consistent with our theoretical expectations, the 
path estimate between AM and SLACK is negative and significant (β = -0.26, p < 0.01). 
Hypothesis H2, linking higher levels of autonomous budget motivation to lower levels of 
budgetary slack creation, is thus supported. As predicted in hypothesis H3, higher levels of 
PSP are positively associated with a managers’ affective commitment toward the organization 
(β = 0.35, p < 0.01). Furthermore, in support of hypotheses H4, the results indicate that higher 
levels of affective organizational commitment are associated with lower levels of budgetary 
slack creation (β = -0.25, p < 0.01). In support of hypothesis H5, we found a statistically 
significant positive association between a manager’s AM and his/her AOC (β = 0.18, p < 0.05).  
Together, the results regarding the association of PSP with SLACK through AOC hint 
toward a pattern of full mediation. To establish the mediating relationship, we multiplied the 
statistically significant indirect effects on and from AOC: PSP-AOC (0.35) and AOC-SLACK (-
0.25), which equals an indirect total effect of -0.09. As shown in Table 4, the coefficients 
making up the mediation path are significantly different from zero. Moreover, all effects are in 
the predicted direction: letting managers participate in strategic planning is positively 
associated with affective organizational commitment, and affective organizational commitment 
is negatively associated with the creation of budgetary slack. The significance of these effects 
means that the joint significance test rejects the null hypothesis of no mediation. Furthermore, 
following the Preacher and Hayes procedure (2004), we multiplied the direct paths of each of 
the 1,000 bootstraps to obtain an estimated coefficient for the indirect effect. The bootstrapped 
95% confidence interval ([-0.134; -0.022]) for the AOC mediation path did not include zero, 
indicating a significant indirect effect. 
4.2 Validity tests for statistical robustness 
To ensure that the results are robust and given the multivariate non-normality of the data 
in this study, additional analyses were conducted. First, the analysis was redone using the 
robust ML method, a distribution-free method robust against small sample sizes. The use of 
robust ML slightly improved the fit of the measurement model (NNFI = 0.95, CFI = 0.95) and 
qualitatively similar path estimates were obtained. Second, the robustness of the model was 
investigated by incorporating a path between PSP and controlled budget motivation (CM) and 
between CM and SLACK. This model revealed that PSP not significantly increases CM (β = 
0.08, p = 0.33) and that CM not significantly decreases SLACK (β = -0.03, p = 0.27). The 
probability level and direction of all of the hypothesized relationships remained unaltered. 
These investigations suggest an acceptable robustness of the model depicted in Figure 2.  
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5. Conclusions 
The purpose of our study was to provide empirical evidence on whether and how PSP 
relates to managers’ creation of budgetary slack through affective organizational commitment 
and autonomous budget motivation. Our analysis shows that PSP indirectly decreases the 
creation of budgetary slack through the mediating effect of affective organizational 
commitment. PSP aligns managers’ behaviors and decisions with the organization’s goals and 
as such instills affective commitment on the managers’ part. Affectively committed managers 
will undertake actions in line with their organization’s goals and create less budgetary slack.  
This study provides several contributions to both management accounting research 
and practice. First, our study extends the budgetary slack literature by recognizing an important 
influencing factor: PSP. Prior research mainly focused on generic strategies but overlooked 
the effect of PSP although the strategic management literature pinpointed its importance. In 
particular, this research shows that PSP decreases managers’ budgetary slack creation 
through affective commitment. The significant proportion of variance explained for the creation 
of budgetary slack (R² = 0.25 for our model, R² = 0.13 for the traditional explanation) indicates 
the importance of PSP, autonomous budget motivation, and affective organizational 
commitment in explaining budgetary slack in addition to the traditional explanatory variables. 
Second, we believe that this study contributes to the growing amount of research recognizing 
that the budgeting process cannot be studied in isolation, as budgeting and strategic planning 
are both part of the organizational planning process (e.g., Covaleski et al., 2003; Kramer and 
Hartmann, 2011). Based on our study, it appears that BP is not directly related with managers’ 
creation of budgetary slack, but that it only indirectly decreases budgetary slack through the 
mediating effect of autonomous budget motivation. PSP, on the other hand, lowers the creation 
of budgetary slack through affective organizational commitment. It is therefore important to 
study the effect of both parts of the planning process simultaneously to understand what 
exactly drives budgetary slackB. Third, this study contributes to the growing research exploring 
the interface between accounting and strategy (Dent, 1990). Although strategy has gained 
significant importance in the management and organizational literature (Langfield-Smith, 
1997), according to the best of our knowledge, no accounting research has investigated the 
impact of PSP despite the growing amount of strategic management research on this topic. 
Fourth, this study also has some implications for the practice of management accounting. In 
particular, our results demonstrate the importance of personal variables such as affective 
organizational commitment and autonomous motivation to understand managers’ budgeting 
behavior. It are not the formal management control systems in itself but it are their effects on 
these personal variables that are important to understand managers’ budgetary slack creation. 
Top management should therefore not only focus on the design of a participatory system – 
being it either in the strategic planning or budgeting process – but they should also understand 
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and manage the psychological effects it evokes on the subordinate manager’s part. Moreover, 
our study gives practitioners an understanding of how budgeting and strategy can be related. 
Hence, it illustrates the importance and the benefits of managing the strategy and budgeting 
processes in an integrated way.  
The results of this study are subject to a number of limitations. First, the proposed 
model considers two mediating factors (i.e., autonomous budget motivation and affective 
organizational commitment) in the relationship between PSP and SLACK. There are 
doubtlessly alternative explanations that have not been captured in the model tested here to 
keep the scope of this work manageable. Other underlying mechanisms that have been 
examined in relation to the creation of budgetary slack include perceived fairness (e.g., 
Wentzel, 2004), trust (e.g.,  Langevin and Mendoza, 2013), and ethics (e.g.,  Stevens, 2002). 
The inclusion of these variables could have produced different results. Future research should 
explore possible other mediating mechanisms between PSP and SLACK. Second, the use of 
the PSP measurement instrument for the first time may impede the results of our study. 
Although the psychometric properties of our measurement instrument were satisfying, future 
research should further validate and refine it. Third, by choosing budgetary slack as a 
dependent variable, we are unable to determine whether slack is desirable or not (Van der 
Stede, 2001). As we cannot test whether the presence of budgetary slack is good or bad for 
performance, future research should attempt to test the good and bad conditions more 
explicitly. In addition to these study-specific limitations, there are some limitations associated 
with cross-sectional survey research in general. First, this study depends on participants’ self-
reported measures. Although steps were taken to ensure reliability and tests show that there 
is no reason to expect CMB or non-response bias, the possibility of noisy measures cannot be 
eliminated. Although there is support for the use of self-assessment (Venkatraman and 
Ramanujam, 1987) and its use allows us to compare our study with earlier budgetary slack 
research, a multi-method approach would improve the validity of the results by confirming self-
assessments with external measures. Second, a cross-sectional study can only provide 
presumptive evidence about causality. Alternative methods (e.g., experiment, longitudinal field 
research) may provide more information about the directional relationships.  
Notwithstanding these limitations, this study provides evidence on the relationship 
between PSP and the creation of budgetary slack. As the current study is the first to examine 
this relationship, many opportunities exist for further research in this area. One avenue for 
future research is to focus on other consequences of PSP. Involving managers in strategic 
planning can, for example, also impact managerial and organizational performance. 
Furthermore, the consequences as well as antecedents of PSP must be investigated. Possible 
antecedents, such as environmental complexity and the organization’s competitive strategy, 
should be studied (Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst, 2006). Another avenue to explore is 
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whether fostering autonomous budget motivation can offset the positive effects of lower 
information asymmetry (due to PSP) on job tension (Jaworski and Young, 1992). Future 
research could also investigate the impact of other characteristics of the strategy process (e.g., 
the degree of formality, the degree of openness of top management to subordinate managers’ 
PSP) on budgeting outcomes.  
While further research is needed before definitive conclusions can be drawn, the 
findings of our study suggest that studying the whole planning process (i.e., both budgeting 
and strategic planning) is useful for understanding the creation of budgetary slack. The 
antecedents of budgetary slack creation may be more complex and diverse than assumed 
since budgetary slack creation relates to the broader planning context than merely the direct 
budgeting setting.  
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8. Appendices 
Appendix A. Survey questions  
Main research variables 
Participation in strategic planning (PSP) 
1. I am involved in developing each aspect of my organizational entity’s vision. 
2. The reasoning provided by my supervisor when revisions are made regarding my 
organizational entity’s long-term goals and objectives is very logical. 
3. I very frequently state my requests, opinions or suggestions about my organizational 
entity’s long-term goals and objectives without being asked. 
4. I have a high amount of influence on the final decisions determining my organizations 
entity’s long-term goals and objectives. 
5. My contribution to my organizational entity’s long-term goals and objectives is very 
important. 
6. When decisions are made regarding my organizational entity’s long-term goals and 
objectives, my supervisor seeks my requests, opinions, or suggestions very frequently. 
7. I am involved in developing each aspect of my organizational entity’s strategic position. 
8. The reasoning provided by my supervisor when revisions are made regarding the 
strategic position of my organizational entity is very logical. 
9. I very frequently state my requests, opinions or suggestions about my organizational 
entity’s strategic position without being asked. 
10. I have a high amount of influence on the final decisions determining my organizations 
entity’s strategic position. 
11. My contribution to my organizational entity’s strategic position is very important. 
12. When decisions are made regarding my organizational entity’s strategic position, my 
supervisor seeks my requests, opinions, or suggestions very frequently. 
Autonomous budget motivation (AM) 
1. I put effort into attaining the budget because putting effort into attaining the budget 
aligns with my personal values. 
2. I put effort into attaining the budget because I enjoy it. 
3. I put effort into attaining the budget because I personally consider it important. 
4. I put effort into attaining the budget because attaining my organizational entity’s budget 
is exciting. 
5. I put effort into attaining the budget because putting effort into attaining the budget has 
personal significance to me. 
6. I put effort into attaining the budget because it is interesting.  
Affective organizational commitment (AOC) 
1. I would be very happy to spend the rest of my career with this organization. 
2. In enjoy discussing this organization with people outside of it. 
3. I really feel as if this organizational entity’s problems are my own. 
4. I think that I could become as easily attached to another organization as I am to this 
one. * 
5. I do not feel like ‘part of the family’ in my organizational entity. * 
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6. I do not feel ‘emotionally attached’ to my organizational entity. * 
7. This organization has a great deal of personal meaning for me. 
8. I do not feel a strong sense of belonging to my organizational entity. * 
Creation of budgetary slack (SLACK) 
1. Budgets set for my organizational entity are safely attainable. 
2. Budget targets have not caused me to be particularly concerned with improving 
efficiency in my organizational entity.  
3. Targets incorporated in my budget are difficult to achieve. * 
4. Budgets set for my organizational entity are not particularly demanding.  
Control variables 
Budget participation (BP) 
1. I am involved in setting all portions of my budget. 
2. The reasoning provided by my supervisor when budget revisions are made is very 
logical. 
3. I very frequently state my requests, opinions, or suggestions about the budget without 
being asked. 
4. I have a high amount of influence on the final budget. 
5. My contribution to the budget is very important. 
6. When the budget is being set, my supervisor seeks my requests, opinions and/or 
suggestions very frequently. 
Slack detection (DETECT) 
1. My superior has enough information to know if there is slack (i.e. excess resources; 
surplus) in my organizational entity’s budget. 
2. Top management receives detailed information on the activities by organizational entity 
and by product. 
3. Top management has a way to know if there is slack (i.e. excess resources; surplus) 
in an organizational entity’s budget. 
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Validity check 
Controlled budget motivation (CM) 
1. I put effort into attaining the budget because others (e.g. employer, supervisor) offer 
me greater job security if I put in enough effort. 
2. I put effort into attaining the budget because it makes me feel proud of myself. 
3. I put effort into attaining the budget because I risk losing my job if I don’t put enough 
effort into attaining it. 
4. I put effort into attaining the budget because others (e.g. employer, supervisor) will 
reward me financially based on my budgetary performance. 
5. I put effort into attaining the budget to get other’s (e.g. supervisor, colleagues) approval. 
6. I put effort into attaining the budget because I have to prove myself that I can. 
7. I put effort into attaining the budget because others (e.g. supervisor, colleagues) will 
respect me more. 
8. I put effort into attaining the budget because otherwise I will feel ashamed of myself. 
9. I put effort into attaining the budget to avoid being criticized by others (e.g. supervisor, 
colleagues). 
10. I put effort into attaining the budget because otherwise I will feel bad of myself. 
 
Strategic alignment of the budget (ALIGN) 
1. The budget is poorly linked to the strategy of my organizational entity. * 
2. My budget is the financial translation of the organizational entity’s strategy. 
3. Budgets add little value because they focus too heavily on short term financial 
performance targets at the expense of other strategically important initiatives.* 
4. My organizational entity’s budget goals are aligned with the strategic choices made in 
the organization. 
* Items are reverse-coded 
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Appendix B. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis 
Variable Factor Stand. 
loading 
AVE Reliability 
Participation in strategic planning (PSP)           α =  0.93  0.57 0.93 
I am involved in developing each aspect of my 
organizational entity's vision. 
 
0.72 0.65   
I very frequently state my requests, opinions 
or suggestions about my organizational 
entity's long-term goals and objectives 
without being asked. 
 
0.65 0.56   
I have a high amount of influence on the final 
decisions determining my organizational 
entity's long-term goals and objectives. 
 
0.78 0.74   
My contribution to my organizational entity's 
long-term goals and objectives is very 
important. 
 
0.78 0.72   
When decisions are made regarding my 
organizational entity's long-term goals and 
objectives, my supervisor seeks my requests, 
opinions or suggestions very frequently. 
 
0.72 0.65   
I am involved in developing each aspect of my 
organizational entity's strategic position. 
 
0.85 0.85   
I very frequently state my requests, opinions 
or suggestions about my organizational 
entity's strategic position without being asked. 
 
0.77 0.73   
I have a high amount of influence on the final 
decisions determining my organizational 
entity's strategic position. 
 
0.86 0.88   
My contribution to my organizational entity's 
strategic position is very important. 
 
0.86 0.87   
When decisions are made regarding my 
organizational entity's strategic position, my 
supervisor seeks my requests, opinions or 
suggestions very frequently. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.82 0.82   
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Variable Factor Stand. 
loading 
AVE Reliability 
Autonomous budget motivation (AM)                α = 0.85  0.50 0.88 
I put effort into attaining the budget because 
putting effort into attaining the budget aligns 
with my personal values. 
 
0.75 0.66   
I put effort into attaining the budget because I 
enjoy it. 
 
0.74 0.68   
I put effort into attaining the budget because I 
personally consider it important. 
 
0.72 0.71   
I put effort into attaining the budget because 
it is exciting. 
 
0.77 0.67   
I put effort into attaining the budget because 
putting effort into attaining the budget has 
personal significance to me. 
 
0.82 0.72   
I put effort into attaining the budget because it 
is interesting. 
0.78 0.80   
     
Affective organizational commitment 
(AOC) 
α = 0.87  0.54 0.86 
I enjoy discussing my organization with 
people outside of it. 
 
0.63 0.54   
I really feel as if this organizational entity's 
problems are my own. 
 
0.73 0.64   
I do not feel like 'part of the family' in my 
organizational entity. 
 
-0.83 0.81   
I do not feel 'emotionally attached' to my 
organizational entity. 
 
-0.81 0.79   
This organization has a great deal of 
personal meaning for me. 
 
0.77 0.69   
I do not feel a strong sense of belonging to my 
organizational entity. 
-0.87 0.87   
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Variable Factor Stand. 
loading 
AVE Reliability 
Budgetary slack (SLACK)                                    α = 0.70  0.44 0.70 
Budget targets have not caused me to be 
particularly concerned with improving 
efficiency in my organizational entity. 
 
 0.80 0.67   
Targets incorporated in my budget are difficult 
to achieve. 
 
-0.76 0.56   
Budgets set for my organizational entity are 
not particularly demanding. 
 0.81 0.75   
     
Budget participation (BP)  α = 0.89  0.59 0.89 
I am involved in setting all portions of my 
budget. 
 
0.84 0.82   
The reasoning provided by my supervisor 
when budget revisions are made is very 
logical. 
 
0.74 0.67   
I very frequently state my requests, opinions 
or suggestions about the budget without being 
asked. 
 
0.73 0.67   
I have a high amount of influence on the final 
budget. 
 
0.86 0.85   
My contribution to the budget is very 
important. 
 
0.86 0.83   
Slack detection (DETECT)   α = 0.81  0.60 0.82 
My superior has enough information to know 
if there is slack (i.e. excess resources; 
surplus) in my organizational entity's budget. 
 
0.83 0.71   
Top management receives detailed 
information on the activities by organizational 
entity and by product. 
 
0.83 0.73   
Top management has a way to know if there 
is slack (i.e. excess resources; surplus) in my 
organizational entity's budget. 
0.89 0.87   
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Appendix C. Instances of the characteristics of the strategic planning process taken 
from the strategic management literature 
Source Characteristic Theme 
Chandler (1962, p. 13) The determination of the basic 
long-term 
goals and objectives of an 
enterprise 
 
Visioning process 
Bourgeois and Brodwin (1984, 
p. 243) 
Identifying the objectives of 
the organization 
 
Visioning process 
Shrivastava and Grant (1985, 
p. 97) 
Problem formulation and 
objective setting 
Visioning process 
 Identification and generation 
of alternative solutions 
Strategic positioning 
process 
 Analysis and choice of a 
feasible alternative 
Strategic positioning 
process 
Reid (1989, p. 554) Identifying future opportunities Visioning process 
Wooldridge and Floyd (1990, 
p. 236) 
Identifying problems and 
proposing objectives 
Visioning/strategic 
positioning process 
 Generating options Strategic positioning 
process 
 Evaluating options Strategic positioning 
process 
 Developing details about 
options 
Strategic positioning 
process 
Marginson (2002, p. 1022) Detecting new ideas Visioning/strategic 
positioning process 
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9. Post publication notes 
A Contrary to our expectations, there is no evidence of a significant positive relationship 
between PSP and autonomous budget motivation. Inspection of the model reveals that 
autonomous budget motivation is fostered by letting managers participate in the budgeting 
process rather than letting them participate in the organization’s strategic planning process.   
B As we were inspired by self-determination and organizational commitment theory, this 
study has a predominantly motivational and psychological point of view. From these 
standpoints, more participation is always better. In particular, if managers are allowed more 
PSP, their affective commitment toward the organization will increase. Similarly, a higher level 
of budget participation increases managers’ autonomous budget motivation. Although more 
participation is desirable from the motivational viewpoint, it may not be desirable from a cost-
efficiency point of view. Indeed, increasing participation is costly for the organization as it 
requires more people, time, and resources. Given the reality of limited resources, organizations 
must make a choice and trade-off more PSP and budget participation.  
Combining insights from the studies in chapter 2 and chapter 3, we tentatively suggest 
the manager’s hierarchical level as the answer to the trade-off between more PSP and budget 
participation. Whereas both are important, organizations often have to make a choice and 
could base this choice on the hierarchical level of the manager in the organization. High and 
middle level managers are in direct contact with the organization’s broader environment and 
are thus perfectly positioned to capture information important for the strategy process. Allowing 
these managers PSP, can be realistically expected to increase their strategic alignment. As 
we know from chapter 2, strategic alignment can act as a substitute for high influence, true 
forms of budget participation. Lower level managers, however, are more concerned with the 
daily operations and implementation of the strategy. Involving them in the strategic planning 
process could be overwhelming so here I would recommend a higher level of budget 
participation (under the condition that the budget is the financial translation of the 
organization’s strategy). 
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CHAPTER 4 – AN ECONOMICS-BASED AND PSYCHOLOGY-BASED 
PERSPECTIVE ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
ENVIRONMENTAL UNCERTAINTY AND BUDGETARY SLACK 
 
 
KEYWORDS: ABSTRACT 
 
Budgetary slack 
 
Environmental 
uncertainty 
 
Information-
processing theory 
 
Agency theory 
 
Role theory 
 
The area of budgetary slack has been the focus of much research effort. 
Although it has been suggested for over more than 50 years that 
environmental uncertainty is one of its main antecedents, to date no 
research has empirically tested this relationship. In this paper, we fill this 
gap and provide an understanding of whether and how environmental 
uncertainty is related to budgetary slack. In particular, building on 
information-processing, agency, and role theory, we hypothesize that 
perceived environmental uncertainty is related to budgetary slack through 
the indirect effect of both the number of exceptions a manager is confronted 
with and the sequential indirect effect of role ambiguity and job-related 
tension. Using quantitative survey data, we find that budgetary slack is 
positively related to managers’ job-related tension caused by uncertainty-
driven role ambiguity. As the effect of sequential role ambiguity and job-
related tension on budgetary slack overrides the explanatory potential of 
the number of exceptions a manager is confronted with, our results 
highlight the importance of psychological variables to fully understand the 
budgetary slack process. 
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1. Introduction 
Budgetary slack – defined as the excess of resources beyond those strictly needed to 
complete a task (Cyert and March, 1963; Waller, 1988) – remains an important area of 
management accounting research (e.g., Derfuss, 2012; Lau and Eggleton, 2003). The 
empirical focus of prior budgetary slack research has mainly been on organizational level 
variables such as budget participation (e.g., Milani, 1975; Onsi, 1973), information asymmetry 
(e.g., Baiman, 1982; Chow et al., 1988), and superior’s ability to detect slack (e.g., Onsi, 1973) 
as explanations for the creation of budgetary slack.  
Theoretical research, however, has recognized that budgetary slack can also be 
created in response to environmental level factors such as environmental uncertainty (e.g., 
Bourgeois, 1981; Cyert and March, 1963; Davila and Wouters, 2005; Kren, 2003). Although 
environmental uncertainty was first raised more than 50 years ago by Cyert and March (1963) 
as one of the main contributors of slack and ample studies since then have conjectured a 
relationship between environmental uncertainty and budgetary slack (e.g., Bourgeois, 1981; 
Davila and Wouters, 2005; Merchant, 1985; Webb, 2001), we lack adequate theorization and 
empirical results. Our study is therefore designed to address this gap in the literature. In 
particular, we draw on both economics-based (i.e., information-processing and agency theory) 
and psychological-based (i.e., role theory) bodies of theory to theoretically underpin and 
empirically test whether and how environmental uncertainty is related to budgetary slack. In 
particular, we hypothesize that perceived environmental uncertainty is positively associated 
with budgetary slack, either through the economics-based effect of the number of exceptions 
a manager is confronted with or through the psychology-based two-step path of role ambiguity 
and job-related tension.  
We collected survey data from 218 managers to assess the hypothesized relationships. 
The results indicate that perceived environmental uncertainty is positively associated with 
budgetary slack through the sequential indirect path of role ambiguity and job-related tension. 
Although perceived environmental uncertainty is positively related with the number of 
exceptions a manager is confronted with, these exceptions do not seem to activate the 
precautionary motive as there is no significant relationship between these exceptions and 
budgetary slack.  
This study makes four broad contributions to the budgetary slack literature. First, 
following the recommendations of Covaleski et al. (2003), we used a multi-theoretical 
framework combining economics-based and psychology-based theories to theoretically 
underpin the relationship between perceived environmental uncertainty and budgetary slack. 
In particular, our study develops a composite path model integrating two perspectives that 
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have not been simultaneously examined before to shed light on the underlying mechanisms 
by which perceived environmental uncertainty is related to budgetary slack. Second, our study 
is the first of which we are aware that provides cross-sectional evidence that these two 
elements are related. Indeed, although ample research identified environmental uncertainty as 
a factor affecting budgetary slack (e.g., Bourgeois, 1981; Cyert and March, 1963; Davila and 
Wouters, 2005; Merchant, 1985; Webb, 2001) – to the best of our knowledge – none had 
empirically tested this relationship before. Third, by filling this gap, our study proposes a more 
complete model of the antecedents of budgetary slack. In particular, we recognize that three 
types of factors may influence budgetary slack: environmental (i.e., environmental 
uncertainty), organizational (i.e., budget participation, slack detection, and information 
asymmetry), and individual (i.e., the number of exceptions a manager is confronted with, role 
ambiguity and job-related tension) factors. As our results show that the variance explained by 
the psychology-based model is higher than the variance explained by the economics-based 
model, we highlight the importance of psychological variables such as role ambiguity and job-
related tension to fully understand the budgetary slack process. Fourth, we contribute to the 
literature using role theory in an accounting context. Prior research mainly used role theory to 
explain stress and tension in an auditing (e.g., Jones et al., 2010; Viator, 2001) or performance 
evaluation context (e.g., Choo and Tan, 1997; Hall, 2008). Very little research, however, 
recognized the theory’s potential in budgeting research (e.g., Dunk, 1993b; Marginson and 
Ogden, 2005) and – to the best of our knowledge – none has used role theory in budgetary 
slack research. By extending role theory’s knowledge to a budgetary slack context, we were 
able to shed light on the psychological mechanisms underlying the relationship between 
perceived environmental uncertainty and budgetary slack. In particular, our study is the first of 
which we are aware to show that sequential role ambiguity and job-related tension can 
positively affect budgetary slack. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we review the theory 
and existing empirical evidence that lead to our hypotheses. In subsequent sections, we 
describe the research method, present the empirical results, and discuss the implications and 
limitations of our study. 
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2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1 Budgetary slack 
Budgetary slack plays an important role in the functioning of budgets (Davila and Wouters, 
2005, p. 587). Not only does evidence indicate that there is considerable budgetary slack in 
organizations, it also remains one of the primary unsolved issues38 in budgetary control (e.g., 
Lau and Eggleton, 2003; Schoute and Wiersma, 2007). Given its importance, much research 
effort has been devoted to possible antecedents of budgetary slack (for an overview, see 
Derfuss, 2012; Dunk and Nouri, 1998). The majority of these prior studies has focused on the 
effect of organizational level explanatory variables such as budget participation (e.g., Brownell 
and McInnes, 1986; Leach-López et al., 2007; Lukka, 1988; Milani, 1975; Onsi, 1973), 
information asymmetry (e.g., Baiman, 1982; Chow et al., 1988; Dunk, 1993a; Waller, 1988; 
Young, 1985), and superior’s ability to detect slack (e.g., Merchant, 1985; Onsi, 1973).    
Budgetary slack, however, can also be influenced by environmental level variables. 
Indeed, one of the main suggestions in the slack literature is that the organization’s 
environment can influence the level of slack (e.g., Bourgeois, 1981; Cyert and March, 1963). 
In particular, environmental uncertainty has been proposed as one of the main budgetary slack 
antecedents. For example, in an early study Onsi (1973) argued that budgetary slack serves 
as a hedge against environmental uncertainty. Lukka (1988, p.290) subsequently conjectured 
that environmental uncertainty is one of the main contributors to budgetary slack as it leads to 
‘a need to prepare oneself for it, just to be on the safe side’. Church, Hannan and Kuang (2012) 
concluded that budgetary slack may be necessary in some settings, so as to increase agility 
in the face of environmental uncertainty.  
Despite all this research enthusiasm, no study – to the best of our knowledge – has 
empirically investigated whether and how environmental uncertainty relates to budgetary 
slack. This article aims to fill this gap in the literature by combining insights from economics-
based and psychology-based theories to shed light on whether and the mechanisms by which 
environmental uncertainty may affect budgetary slack. Figure 1 presents a graphical overview 
of the hypotheses we develop subsequently.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
38 We recognize that the creation of budgetary slack in itself is not undesirable per se (Davila and 
Wouters, 2005; Marginson and Ogden, 2005; Van der Stede, 2000) and that it is only detrimental to the 
organization to the extent that it results in the expropriation of resources (Church et al., 2012). Judging 
the (un)desirability of budgetary slack, however, goes beyond the scope of this paper.  
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2.2 Environmental uncertainty 
The environment represents the ‘totality of physical and social factors directly taken into 
consideration in the decision-making behavior of individuals in the organization’ (Duncan, 
1972, p. 314). Under the current dynamics, this environment is likely to be fraught with 
uncertainty. Environmental uncertainty refers to a lack of information concerning the factors 
that need to be taken into account when making a decision and these factors' rate of change 
(Chapman, 1997; Galbraith, 1973). More formally, environmental uncertainty can be described 
as having three characteristics: (1) not knowing which environmental factors are associated 
with a given decision-making situation, (2) not knowing the outcome of a specific decision in 
terms of how much the organization would lose if the decision were incorrect, and (3) the 
inability to assign any probabilities with any degree of confidence with regard to how 
environmental factors are going to affect the success or failure of the decision unit in 
performing its function (Duncan, 1972, p. 318).  
In this paper, we focus on the relationship between budgetary slack and perceived 
environmental uncertainty as it is widely recognized that managers’ (budgeting) behavior is 
influenced by the perceived rather than the actual reality. In particular, Weick (1969) asserted 
that an organization’s environment is a perceptual rather than objective phenomenon. Several 
authors (e.g., Duncan, 1972; Fisher, 1996) have argued that if the organization’s environment 
is a perceptual phenomenon, environmental uncertainty must also be perceptual in nature. For 
example, Downey et al. (1975) recognized that uncertainty must be thought of as an attribute 
of an individual’s behavioral environment rather than an attribute of the objective, physical 
environment. As a consequence, managers do not create budgetary slack in response to 
objective environmental uncertainty but create it as a reaction to their perception of this 
environmental uncertainty.  
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Figure 1. Diagrammatical representation of the research hypotheses 
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2.3 The economics-based relationship between environmental uncertainty and 
budgetary slack 
We combine two bodies of economics-based theories to explain how environmental 
uncertainty may increase budgetary slack. The first body of theory is related to information-
processing. Galbraith (1973, p.16) substantiated that as environmental uncertainty increases, 
the number of exceptions a company is confronted with increases as well. As a consequence, 
a higher amount of information must be processed39 by the decision-makers in the organization 
to attain a certain performance level. The primary effect of environmental uncertainty is that it 
becomes more difficult to plan ahead or take decisions before actions are executed. As a 
reaction, organizations will implement strategies to (1) increase their ability to plan, (2) be able 
to adapt flexibly, or (3) lower the performance level of the organization.  
Second, we stretch Galbraith’s (1973) information-processing theory to the individual 
level40 by combining it with insights from agency theory. The budgeting process and the 
creation of budgetary slack can be described in terms of an agency relationship. In particular, 
the superior manager (the principal) engages a subordinate manager (the agent) to perform 
some services within the budgeting process on her behalf, which involves delegating some 
decision-making authority – and hence the possibility to create budgetary slack41 – to the 
agent42 (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). One of the main assumptions underlying agency theory 
is that the agent is a risk-averse43 individual who makes utility maximizing decisions (Baiman, 
1982). The agent’s net utility (U) depends on the organization’s wage offer (w) and the cost of 
his effort (c(e)). As the level of w is mainly within the organization’s span of control, the 
                                                          
39 Information processing in organizations is generally defined as including the gathering of data, the 
transformation of data into information, and the communication and storage of information in the 
organization (e.g., Galbraith, 1973).  
40 We feel confident to stretch information-processing theory from the organizational to the individual 
level as our measure of perceived environmental uncertainty at the individual level is positively 
correlated with a measure of environmental uncertainty at the organizational level. In particular, 
Duncan’s (1972) measure of individual perceived environmental uncertainty was significantly positively 
correlated (r = 0.18, p < 0.01) with Govindarajan’s (1984) measure asking respondents how 
(un)predictable the manufacturing technology, competitor’s actions, market demand, product attributes, 
raw material availability, raw material price, government regulation, and labor union actions are in the 
context of their organizational business unit.  
41 Lukka (1988) suggested that budget participation – as a proxy for budgetary decision rights – provides 
subordinate managers with the opportunity to take part directly in the creation of budgetary slack.  
42 The assumption of budgeting decision rights being delegated to the managers in our sample was 
deemed appropriate as the average reported level of budget participation – considered as a proxy for 
budgetary responsibility – was 5.22 out of seven.  
43 We tested the assumption of risk-averseness by using the 11-item proxy measurement instrument of 
tolerance for ambiguity (TFA) (MacDonald, 1970) (see Appendix A). The average mean value of TFA 
was 3.86 out of seven for this specific sample. Moreover, only 17 respondents (7.8%) had a TFA-score 
higher than five out of seven. As a check, we ran the model without these 17 managers (results not 
reported here) but the inferences remain unchanged. In general, we can conclude that our respondents 
are relatively risk-averse. 
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subordinate manager can only directly influence his net utility through c(e), which is a function 
of his effort level (e) and a random state factor beyond his control (θ). In other words, the 
agent’s pay-off is largely determined by his effort (e) in combination with the realization of some 
exogenous event (θ): 
U = w – c(e) 
c(e)= f(e,θ) 
                            
The more the agent perceives his environment as uncertain (e.g., the broader the range of 
possible θ values, the less the agent knows this range, the more difficult it is for the agent to 
know the θ value upfront…), the larger the uncontrollable part of his cost of effort c(e) (Eq. 2). 
More noise and randomness are added to the subordinate manager’s net utility function due 
to the larger number of exceptions the manager is confronted with (Eq. 1).  Therefore, we 
hypothesize the following: 
 
H1. Perceived environmental uncertainty is positively associated with the number of 
exceptions a manager is confronted with. 
 
Building on information-processing theory, we suggest three potential strategies for 
managers to deal with this increased randomness caused by exceptions; i.e., managers can 
implement a strategy to (1) extend their abilities and skills to plan forward, (2) be able to 
respond flexibly to the uncertain environment, or (3) decrease their required performance level. 
Referring back to agency theory’s assumptions, we discard the first strategy. Indeed, the 
manager will not increase his information-processing capacity and skills as this would require 
an additional investment in e, which would yield disutility to the manager as e is interpreted as 
a cost incurred by the subordinate manager on behalf of the principal (see Eq. 1 and Eq. 2). 
Subordinate managers hence prefer strategies that increase their flexibility or lower their 
required performance level as these strategies can maximize their total net utility (Kroll et al., 
1990). Prior research has proposed budgetary slack as fulfilling both the increased flexibility 
and decreased performance aim. First, budgetary slack can increase managers’ flexibility as 
it enables them to continually adjust their activities in response to changes in the environment 
(Chong and Johnson, 2007; Merchant and Manzoni, 1989), it provides them more options to 
react under the condition of high perceived environmental uncertainty (Bourgeois, 1981), and 
it hedges against a lack of predictability (Brownell and Dunk, 1991; Lukka, 1988; Merchant, 
1985). In particular, in uncertain environments, it is more difficult to know upfront the amount 
of resources that will be needed as unexpected opportunities may pop up. A shortfall of 
budgetary resources might prevent managers from investing in these unanticipated yet 
profitable opportunities. Hence, under these conditions, managers may find it more interesting 
Eq. 1 
Eq. 2 
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to create budgetary slack to mitigate the opportunity cost of missing out on a profitable project. 
This motivation of creating budgetary slack to avoid running short of critical resources and 
guaranteeing flexibility, is called the precautionary motive (Opler et al., 1999). As such, 
budgetary slack can absorb some of the uncertainty concerning the θ value and hence 
maximize the managers’ net utility by decreasing c(e). Second, budgetary slack can serve as 
a protection against missing the budgetary target while increasing the likelihood of budget 
achievability to gain rewards as it makes targets easier to attain (Merchant and Van der Stede, 
2011; Onsi, 1973). Those budgetary rewards can maximize U by indirectly increasing w44 and 
lowering c(e).  
We can conclude that as perceived environmental uncertainty and the associated 
exceptions increase, the cost-benefit analysis for budgetary slack changes such that its 
benefits (e.g., increased flexibility and decreased performance) become larger than its costs 
(e.g., lower credibility for the subordinate manager in budget negotiations (Pope, 1984), but 
also organizational performance norms (Lowe and Shaw, 1968) and inter-manager 
competition (Fama, 1980) can act as constraining influences and impose costs on managers 
who create relatively slack budgets). As budgetary slack, through increased flexibility (lower 
c(e)) and reduced performance levels (higher w and lower c(e)), can maximize the subordinate 
manager’s net utility function, we hypothesize the following:  
 
H2. The number of exceptions a manager is confronted with is positively associated with 
budgetary slack. 
 
2.4 The psychology-based relationship between environmental uncertainty and 
budgetary slack 
As we believe that a true understanding of budgetary slack requires both economics-based 
and psychology-based theories (Covaleski et al., 2003), we use role theory as the 
complementary theoretical framework to analyze the psychology-based relationship between 
environmental uncertainty and budgetary slack. Indeed, the dependency between an 
organization, its environment and its employees has important psychological implications. 
More specifically, perceived environmental uncertainty has been linked to role ambiguity (e.g., 
Kahn et al., 1964; Rebele and Michaels, 1990). Role ambiguity refers to a lack of information 
regarding (1) the job expectations (goal clarity), (2) the behavior necessary for attaining known 
                                                          
44 Although the wage offer (w) is mainly within the span of control of the organization, subordinate 
managers can indirectly influence w by the output they realize. In particular, agency theory generally 
ascribes two wage offers, depending on the output the subordinate manager realizes. For the type of 
managers in our study (see Section 3.1) is it rather common that their budgetary performance is part of 
their subsequent performance evaluation and hence indirectly influences w.  
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goals (process clarity), and (3) the consequences of role performance (Kahn et al., 1964). In 
particular, it results from a lack of role information as this information is either non-existent, or 
simply not communicated. Therefore, role ambiguity has been perceived as the ‘discrepancy 
between the amount of information a person has and the amount of information s/he requires 
to perform his or her role adequately’ (Kahn, 1974, p. 426). Prior research has addressed role 
difficulties during decision-making in uncertain environments. Kahn et al. (1964), Rizzo et al. 
(1970), and House and Rizzo (1972), for example, argued that role ambiguity results from the 
inability of individuals to fully comprehend the organizational complexities of their firm. 
Lysonski (1985) and Rebele and Michaels (1990) indeed found a significant positive effect of 
perceived environmental uncertainty on role ambiguity. Following these results, we argue that 
uncertainty about which factors to take into account when making a decision and a lack of 
information concerning these factors’ rate of change may blur the duties and responsibilities 
of managers. Moreover, the perception of environmental uncertainty may leave managers 
unsure about what actions to take to fulfill their responsibilities as the consequences of these 
actions may be unknown (Marginson and Ogden, 2005, p. 441). Consequently, we argue that 
perceived environmental uncertainty is positively related to role ambiguity:  
 
H3. Perceived environmental uncertainty is positively associated with role ambiguity.  
 
Job-related tension, defined as ‘tension arising from psychologically stressful 
circumstances in the job environment’ (Kenis, 1979, p. 712), occurs in response to a stressor, 
such as role ambiguity. Indeed, role ambiguity increases the probability that an individual will 
experience job-related tension (e.g., Jackson and Schuler, 1985; Rebele and Michaels, 1990). 
Wispe and Thayer (1957), for example, interviewed three levels of managers in a life-insurance 
company and found that managers experiencing role ambiguity were more stressed. Also, in 
the auditing context, ample studies have illustrated the detrimental consequences of role 
ambiguity on job-related tension (e.g., Bamber et al., 1989; Jones et al., 2010). Accordingly, 
we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H4. Role ambiguity is positively associated with job-related tension.  
 
Managers experience job-related tension as stress in the job because they experience 
either of a lack of control or having an excessive workload. In other words, job-related tension 
manifests itself as lacking control over decisions or by having to do too many tasks without 
sufficient resources for those tasks. Even though this job-related tension in itself does not have 
to be harmful to the manager, Hopwood (1973, pp. 23-6) claims that as job-related tension 
increases, individuals will seek for relief. In this paper, we posit that managers create 
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budgetary slack expecting such relief and comfort. Hopwood (1972) and Hirst (1981), for 
example, argue that managers may engage in budgeting behaviors such as padding their 
budgets with extra resources in response to job-related tension. Indeed, budgetary slack 
provides managers a degree of freedom from short-term commitment so they can deal better 
with the lack of control and predictability (Merchant, 1985; Nohria and Gulati, 1996). Budgetary 
slack gives managers a leeway in managing their response so they can regain a feeling of 
control (Cyert and March, 1963). Further support for our assertion that job-related tension is 
positively associated with budgetary slack is drawn from the job stress literature on excessive 
workload. This excessive workload can either be demands that the manager cannot meet or a 
shortage of resources to complete his/her tasks (Dunk, 1993b). Budgetary slack, however, can 
play a stabilizing role by providing a pool of ‘emergency resources’. Managers can use these 
extra resources to meet multiple demands simultaneously (Davila and Wouters, 2005) or to 
avoid running short of resources when unexpected demands pop up (Lukka, 1988). Managers 
confronted with job-related tension caused by uncertainty-driven role ambiguity may thus 
respond by creating more budgetary slack as they expect it shields them from resource 
shortage and a loss of control. We formally test our expectation with the following hypothesis: 
 
H5. Job-related tension is positively associated with budgetary slack. 
 
3. Research method 
3.1 Sample selection and data collection 
To test the predicted hypotheses, data were collected in Belgium through an on-line survey 
questionnaire which was administered to a random sample of 2,500 managers from 
organizations identified in the Trends Top 10,000 (2014) register of firms45 and having more 
than 100 employees46. The criterion for sample inclusion was that all respondents are at least 
middle-level managers47 and have budget responsibilities, a key condition when examining 
budgetary slack (e.g., Merchant, 1985; Onsi, 1973). Sales, marketing, manufacturing, R&D, 
supply chain, IT, and general managers were selected because they typically have these 
responsibilities and are extensively involved in the budgeting process48. Of the 2,500 
                                                          
45 Trends Top 10,000 is a database that contains detailed financial and administrative information on 
the 10,000 largest companies in Belgium. 
46 It was expected that companies with fewer employees were unlikely to have formally defined 
budgetary targets. 
47 Trends Top 10,000 contains only contact information of middle-level and top-level managers.  
48 Our sample also comprises 1% finance and 1% HR managers. We did an additional analysis (results 
not reported here) without these managers and our inferences remained unchanged.  
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invitations sent, 489 failed to reach the respondent due to an invalid e-mail address (440), the 
respondent’s firm leave (42) or retirement (7).   
To improve the response rate, Dillman’s (2009) Tailored Design Method was adopted 
to design and administer our questionnaire. More specifically, respondents were promised 
confidentiality and could obtain a summary report of the survey results. Respondents also had 
the chance to win a gastronomic dinner or wellness session for two. In addition, a follow-up 
was administered to non-respondents two weeks after the initial mail-out. Two weeks after the 
follow-up, we contacted non-respondents to learn about the reasons for their non-response 
and to try to persuade them to finish the questionnaire. Reasons for non-response included a 
lack of time, company policy, and a lack of interest in the study. Of the 2,011 invitations that 
reached the respondent, 220 responses were returned, yielding a response rate of 11% which 
is in line with other recent behavioral management accounting research (e.g., Chenhall et al., 
2011; Chong and Mahama, 2014; De Baerdemaeker and Bruggeman, 2015; Moores and 
Yuen, 2001). The total response rate includes a 6% response rate (125 responses) from the 
initial distribution of the questionnaire and a 5% response rate (95 responses) from the 
reminder mail-out.  
The sample is quite broad and diverse. Observations include data from construction 
(16%), automotive and electronics (11%), food and beverages (11%), energy (7%), 
transportation and storage (6%), and many other industries (e.g., health care, retail, textiles 
and clothing, et cetera; 37%). Moreover, the organizations differ widely in terms of size49. The 
majority of the respondents were male (86%), on average 49 years old, working for 16 years 
in the organization, employed in the current function for 7 years, and taking up a variety of 
functions in their respective organizations. Table 1 summarizes the information on respondents 
and their organizations.  
Non-response bias was tested, drawing on the familiar assumption that late responses 
(i.e., questionnaires received after the reminder e-mail) are more likely to resemble non-
responses than early responses (i.e., questionnaires received prior to the reminder e-mail) do 
(Moore and Tarnai, 2002). Two-sample t-tests (for the mean responses of all constructs in our 
model) and χ²-tests (for the demographics) revealed no significant differences (p > 0.05), 
indicating that non-response bias is unlikely to affect our results. Moreover, we manually went 
through all questionnaires and investigated the standard deviation over all responses for each 
respondent to detect possible response bias. For one respondent, an answer pattern was 
recorded implying that this response could not be used for further analyses50. Moreover, we 
                                                          
49 Size was measured as the number of employees working for the organization.  
50 The respondent indicated the neutral option for almost all items. As a robustness check, we reran the 
analysis with this respondent. Our conclusions did not change as all results were qualitatively similar to 
the results without this respondent.    
Chapter 4 
119 
 
removed one respondent from further analyses as s/he indicated working in an organization 
having less than 100 employees.  
Given that the dependent and independent variables in our study are all perceptual 
self-reported measures, common method bias (CMB) may exist in our data (Podsakoff et al., 
2003). A priori, we attempted to reduce the potential effects of CMB by using different scale 
anchor points, by safeguarding the respondent’s anonymity, and by assuring respondents that 
there were no right or wrong answers (Hinkin, 1995). A posteriori, we conducted Harman’s 
single factor test on all items measuring the constructs in our theoretical model. A four-factor 
rather than a single-factor solution occurred. Moreover, the first factor explained only 18% of 
the total variance. Following the recommendations of Widaman (1985), we also included a 
common method factor in the structural equation model. While the method factor slightly 
improved the model fit (CMINDF = 1.51 and SRMR = 0.06), it was not significant. Given the 
multiple-factor solution and the common factor’s insignificance, CMB is no serious concern for 
this study.  
Prior to launching it online, the questionnaire was comprehensively pretested and 
piloted to curtail response error (Van der Stede et al., 2005). Five academics, who were not 
involved in developing the questionnaire, assessed the questionnaire’s length, wording, and 
question ordering. Moreover, an interview was conducted with one manager to ensure clarity 
and avoid misunderstandings of the survey questions (Diamond, 2000). Some problems 
signaling ambiguous word choice were identified. A revised version of the questionnaire was 
distributed to ten managers in a business consulting firm. Seven completed questionnaires 
were returned. No additional comments were made. The final version of the research 
instrument is described below. 
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Table 1. Sample background 
 
 n % Min Max Mean Std. dev. 
Respondent profile       
Gender       
     Male 187 86%     
     Female 30 14%     
Function       
     Finance 3 1%     
     General 45 21%     
     HR 3 1%     
     Manufacturing 35 16%     
     Marketing 14 6%     
     R&D 12 6%     
     Sales 50 23%     
     Supply chain 22 10%     
     IT 21 10%     
     Other 13 6%     
Tenure       
     Organization 217  1 45 15.68 10.14 
     Function 217  1 33 7.30 6.27 
Age 171  26 67 49.23 8.09 
       
Company profile       
     Size (number   
     of employees) 
214  100 4,500,000 58,237.22 315,895.72 
 
3.2 Variable measurement 
Variables were operationalized through multi-item constructs and all scale items were 
scored on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’ unless 
stated otherwise. Where necessary, items were reverse coded so that higher scores reflect 
higher levels of perceived environmental uncertainty, exceptions, role ambiguity, job-related 
tension, and budgetary slack. Established and reliable scales, with some small modifications 
to fit the present research context, were used whenever possible. Our measurement 
instrument is provided in Appendix A.  
3.2.1 Perceived environmental uncertainty 
We measured perceived environmental uncertainty (PEU) using 11 items from 
Duncan's (1972) scale, which is widely used in accounting (e.g., Fisher, 1996; Govindarajan, 
1986; Gregson et al., 1994) and has proved the most useful to date to measure PEU (see 
items 1-11, Appendix A). In particular, Duncan’s (1972) instrument measures the frequency 
with which certain events and situations occur in the respondent’s job. Response categories 
ranged from (1) never, (2) rarely, in less than 10% of the time, (3) occasionally, in about 30% 
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of the time, (4) sometimes, in about 50% of the time, (5) frequently, in about 70% of the time, 
(6) usually, in about 90% of the time, to (7) every time. Thus, higher scores indicate a higher 
degree of perceived environmental uncertainty.  
A decision was made in favor of the deletion of four items (PEU3, PEU4, PEU5, and 
PEU8), given their too low communality51 (less than 0.50). Single factor analysis results 
indicate that the remaining seven items loaded on a single factor which supports the uni-
dimensionality of the research instrument. In the current study, the Cronbach α for the revised 
seven-item construct is 0.83 which indicates a high internal consistency for the PEU scale.  
3.2.2 Exceptions 
We assessed the number of exceptions (EXCEP) a manager is confronted with using 
a single-item measure based on prior work of Duncan (1972). Respondents were asked to 
rate, on a seven-point scale ranging from (1) never to (7) every time, how frequent they 
encountered new or unusual problems at their business unit (see item 12, Appendix A).  
3.2.3 Role ambiguity  
Measurement of role ambiguity (RA) was based on the six-item scale developed by 
Rizzo, House and Lirtzman (1970) (see items 13-18, Appendix A)52. These items have been 
widely used in prior accounting research (e.g., Burney and Widener, 2007; Jones et al., 2010; 
Maas and Matejka, 2009; Marginson et al., 2014; Viator, 2001).  
As the possibility of some overlap exists between the PEU and RA constructs (Gregson 
et al., 1994), we conducted a principal component factor analysis with varimax rotation to 
ensure that it are two separate constructs (see Appendix B). Empirical results revealed a two-
factor solution with the six items for RA loading onto the first factor and the seven items for 
PEU loading onto the second factor. The managers in our sample were able to distinguish 
between their responsibilities in a role (RA) and the degree of uncertainty they have regarding 
their environment (PEU) which provides evidence for the integrity of our research model. The 
Cronbach α in this study is 0.82 for RA, indicating acceptable reliability (Nunnally, 1978).  
 
 
                                                          
51 An item’s communality reflects how much of the variance in the original item is reflected by the 
extracted factor. 
52 Although we focus on role ambiguity, all 14 items that were developed by Rizzo et al. (1970) to 
measure both role ambiguity and role conflict were included in the questionnaire. We did this in order to 
check the validity of the role ambiguity instrument. A principal component analysis with varimax rotation 
on the 14-item measure reveals a three-factor solution. The six items for role ambiguity load onto a 
single factor, the eight items for role conflict cross-load on two factors. For the sake of brevity, only the 
items relating to role ambiguity are reported in Appendix A. 
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3.2.4 Job-related tension 
The 15-item measure of job-related tension (JRT) developed by the Institute for Social 
Research at the University of Michigan (Kahn et al., 1964) was employed in this study as it has 
established levels of validity and reliability (MacKinnon, 1978) and it provides consistency with 
prior research in the accounting literature studying JRT (e.g., Choo and Tan, 1997; Dunk, 
1993b; Emsley, 2001) (see items 19-33, Appendix A). Response categories ranged from (1) 
never, (2) rarely, in less than 10% of the time, (3) occasionally, in about 30% of the time, (4) 
sometimes, in about 50% of the time, (5) frequently, in about 70% of the time, (6) usually, in 
about 90% of the time, to (7) every time. A factor analysis comprising all items from our 
research model indicated significant cross-loadings for JRT2 with the RA construct so we 
decided to remove this item from further analyses. Moreover, results from a single factor 
analysis indicated that four items (i.e., JRT3, JRT4, JRT9, and JRT15) had a factor loading 
lower than 0.50 and a too low communality. After dropping these items, the remaining ten items 
loaded on one factor. We cross-checked the integrity of our JRT measure by conducting a 
factor analysis with varimax rotation for the remaining JRT and RA-items. The results revealed 
a two-factor solution with the six RA-items loading on one factor and the ten JRT-items loading 
on the second factor, hence corroborating the validity of our measurement instrument (see 
Appendix C). The Cronbach α of the remaining ten JRT-items was 0.86 which provides 
evidence for the construct’s internal consistency.  
3.2.5 Budgetary slack 
In line with Dunk (1993a), Van der Stede (2000), and Indjejikian and Matejka (2006), 
the definition of budgetary slack we use in this study, focuses on the ease with which budgetary 
targets can be achieved. Budgetary slack occurs when managers ‘negotiate highly achievable 
targets’ (Van der Stede, 2000, p. 609), i.e., targets that are lower than their best-guess forecast 
about the future. Conversely, a budget contains little slack if it requires considerable effort and 
a high degree of efficiency (Simons, 1987). To measure budgetary slack (SLACK), we used 
the six-item instrument developed by Dunk (1993a) (see items 34-39, Appendix A). 
Considerable evidence of the reliability and validity of this scale has been compiled (e.g., Van 
der Stede, 2000). Single factor analysis reveals that three items (SLACK1, SLACK3, and 
SLACK5) should be dropped from further analyses as their communality value is lower than 
0.50. The remaining three items load on one factor. Cronbach α for the three-item instrument 
was 0.66, which exceeded the acceptable 0.60 threshold. The construct is correlated to Onsi’s 
(1973) and Van der Stede’s (2000) alternative measure for budgetary slack. As expected, the 
results show a significantly positive correlation (r = 0.29, p < 0.01; r = 0.69, p < 0.01, 
respectively). Dunk’s (1993a) measure is, however, retained for further analyses as it has 
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better measurement properties than both the Onsi (1973) and Van der Stede (2000) 
measurement instrument in this specific sample (α = 0.50 and α = 0.55, respectively).  
3.2.6 Control variables53 
Budget participation (BP). Although results are mixed, the large amount of research on 
the relationship between BP and SLACK indicates the importance of controlling for the 
influence of BP on SLACK. BP was measured with the well-established six-item measure 
developed by Milani (1975) (see items 40-45, Appendix A). Single factor analysis reveals that 
BP3 does not load adequately on the factor (i.e., factor loading of 0.38). After deleting this 
item, the remaining five items are uni-dimensional. The Cronbach α of 0.84 provides evidence 
for the construct’s internal consistency. 
Slack detection (DETECT). Prior research illustrated the negative relationship between 
DETECT and SLACK (Merchant, 1985; Onsi, 1973). Indeed, ‘slack cannot be created where 
it is easily detected’ (Merchant, 1985, p. 203). We measured DETECT with the three-item 
instrument developed by Onsi (1973) (see items 46-48, Appendix A). The single factor analysis 
reveals that DETECT is uni-dimensional with a Cronbach α of 0.85. 
Information asymmetry (IA). IA exists when subordinates’ information exceeds that of 
their superiors. SLACK may be created by employees biasing the upward communication of 
this private information (e.g., Chow et al., 1988; Waller, 1988; Young, 1985). Therefore, we 
control for a positive relationship between IA and SLACK. IA was measured with Dunk’s 
(1993a) three-item measure (see items 49-51, Appendix A). The response categories were 
different depending on the specific question and can be consulted in Appendix A. Results of a 
single factor analysis indicate that all items load onto one factor with a Cronbach α value of 
0.79. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
53 We also controlled for background variables such as the respondents’ tenure in their organization and 
respective functions, age, gender, and size of the organization. As our analyses (results not reported 
here) indicated that none of these control variables were correlated with the dependent variable, we 
decided to omit them from further analyses (Becker, 2005).  
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4. Analysis and results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics and correlations among the variables in this study. 
First, the relationship between PEU and SLACK is insignificant (r = 0.01, p = 0.96). Second, 
PEU is significantly positively correlated with EXCEP (r = 0.23, p < 0.01, H1) but EXCEP is 
only marginally significantly correlated with SLACK (r = 0.13, p = 0.06, H2). Third, we observe 
a significant positive relationship between PEU and RA (r = 0.39, p < 0.01, H3). In turn, RA is 
significantly positively correlated with JRT (r = 0.36, p < 0.01, H4) and JRT significantly 
positively relates to SLACK (r = 0.16, p < 0.05, H5). These correlations suggest that PEU is 
related to SLACK through the psychological two-step indirect path of RA and JRT. None of the 
control variables correlated significantly with SLACK54 (r = 0.03, p = 0.69 for BP; r = -0.11, p = 
0.09 for DETECT; and r = -0.08, p = 0.23 for IA, respectively).  
4.2 Statistical method 
The economics-based and psychology-based explanation of the relationship between 
perceived environmental uncertainty and budgetary slack is further examined by using 
LISREL55 structural equation modeling (SEM)56. An advantage of SEM is that it can evaluate 
the proposed hypotheses while accounting for measurement reliability. All analyses use the 
maximum likelihood (ML) method57 and follow procedures recommended by Hair et al. (2010) 
for evaluating model fit and interpreting the SEM model. In particular, we follow the 
recommended two-step approach (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988) which is in line with recent 
accounting studies (e.g., Chong and Chong, 2002; Hartmann and Slapničar, 2009; Sweeney 
and Quirin, 2009; Wong-On-Wing et al., 2010).  
                                                          
54 The results from a multiple regression analysis, however, show a significant β-coefficient for both 
DETECT (β = -0.15, p < 0.05) and IA (β = -0.14, p < 0.10). Therefore, we decided to retain the control 
variables for further analyses.   
55 We obtained the SEM results using LISREL 9.1.  
56 We reviewed the variance inflation factors and tolerance levels and found no indication of 
multicollinearity. Moreover, we plotted the residuals and performed White’s test and no signs of 
heteroscedasticity were apparent (Hair et al., 2010). 
57 In preliminary tests, we discovered that our data are not multivariate normally distributed, as is the 
case with most perceptual data (Hunton and Gibson, 1999). We tested normality by investigating the 
skewness and kurtosis indexes associated with each of the survey items and conducted Shapiro-Wilk’s 
test (Kline, 2005). Although results indicated that the measures were not normally distributed, we used 
the ML method as it performs well, even under conditions of non-normality (Boomsma and Hoogland, 
2001). In section ‘4.3 Validity tests for statistical robustness’ we report the results from the robust ML-
model. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics, correlation matrix, and discriminant validity coefficients (n = 218) for perceived environmental 
uncertainty, the number of exceptions, role ambiguity, job-related tension, budgetary slack, and the control variables.  
 
Variable Mean s.d. Min Max Cronbach α (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
PEU (1) 2.69 0.63 1.14 5.00 0.83   0.66        
EXCEP (2) 3.68 1.22 1.00 7.00 -   0.23** -       
RA (3) 2.32 0.74 1.00 5.33 0.82   0.39**    0.08    0.68      
JRT (4) 2.55 0.72 1.09 6.09 0.83   0.34**    0.31**  0.36**   0.63     
SLACK (5) 3.02 1.17 1.00 6.00 0.66   0.01    0.13* 0.14*   0.16* 0.69    
BP (6) 5.22 1.04 1.67 7.00 0.84  -0.33**    0.08 -0.26**  -0.26**     0.03  0.73   
DETECT (7) 5.30 1.09 1.67 7.00 0.85  -0.24**   -0.01 -0.38**  -0.06    -0.11  0.14*  0.81  
IA (8) 5.18 1.33 1.00 7.00 0.79  -0.21**    0.01   -0.04  -0.17*    -0.08  0.16*  -0.07 0.75 
 
**,* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level, 0.05 level (two-tailed test), respectively. Correlations between the constructs are below the diagonal. 
The square root of the AVE value for each of the constructs is along the diagonal (in bold).  
PEU = perceived environmental uncertainty, EXCEP = number of exceptions, RA = role ambiguity, JRT = job-related tension, SLACK = budgetary 
slack, BP = budget participation, DETECT = slack detection, and IA = information asymmetry.  
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4.2.1 Measurement model 
The first step in our analysis was developing the measurement model, consisting of five 
theoretical latent constructs (PEU, EXCEP, RA, JRT, and SLACK) and three control variables 
(BP, DETECT, and IA). This model specifies the relationships between the observed items 
and latent constructs. In other words, the measurement model assesses the reliability and 
validity of the observed items relating to our specific latent constructs. Table 3 reports the 
standardized factor loadings and statistics from the measurement analysis. 
The measurement model provides a good fit, although the χ²-value is significant (χ² 
[637] = 1,001.55, p < 0.01), which is typical for a sample size as large as ours (Bentler and 
Bonett, 1980). Specifically, the ratio of χ² over degrees of freedom  (CMINDF = 1.57) is lower 
than the recommended cut-off value of 3, both the comparative fit index (CFI = 0.95) and the 
non-normed fit index (NNFI = 0.94) are larger than 0.90, the root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA = 0.05) is lower than 0.10 and the standardized root mean square 
residual (SRMR = 0.07) is lower than the recommended 0.09 cut-off value (e.g., Arbuckle and 
Wothke, 1999; Bentler, 1990; Hair et al., 2010). As shown in Table 3, all item loadings are 
greater than 0.5058 and significant (p < 0.05), indicating that the items share more variance 
with their respective constructs than with the error variance. Next, the reliability of each latent 
construct was assessed by calculating its composite reliability (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). As 
illustrated in Table 3, the composite reliability index of all constructs is good and meets or 
exceeds the threshold value of 0.70 (Hair et al., 2010).  
Construct validity is assessed in terms of both convergent and discriminant validity. 
First, the constructs’ convergent validity was assessed by investigating the average variance 
extracted (AVE) (see Table 3). All but one59 AVE scores are close to or higher than the 
threshold value of 0.50. Second, we assessed discriminant validity of the constructs by using 
the three-step procedure suggested by Hair et al. (2010). In a first phase, we conducted a 
series of χ² difference tests (SCDTs) (Joreskog, 1971). We fixed the correlation between two 
constructs to one and reran the model. We then compared the fits of the constrained models 
with the fit of the original model to assess discriminant validity. For every pair of constructs we 
tested, the unconstrained model provided evidence of superior fit (p < 0.01). In a second 
phase, we tested a model in which all observed items were indicators of only one latent 
construct. The SCDT comparing this model with the original model was significant (p < 0.01), 
again providing support for discriminant validity. In the third phase, we conducted a further test 
                                                          
58 Only SLACK4 has an item loading slightly lower than 0.50 (i.e., 0.44). We refrained from deleting this 
item as the results of an exploratory factor analysis clearly indicate that SLACK is a uni-dimensional 
variable. 
59 The only exception was JRT with an AVE value of 0.40. However, we refrained from deleting items 
measuring JRT to enhance its AVE to maintain the content validity of our measure.  
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of discriminant validity by comparing the correlations between the latent constructs with the 
square root of the AVEs (see Table 3). As the square roots of the AVE are larger than the off-
diagonal correlations, discriminant validity is supported. Moreover, it is clear from Table 3 that 
the internal reliability of each latent construct exceeds its inter-construct reliabilities, providing 
strong evidence of discriminant validity (Churchill, 1979). Overall, the analyses indicate 
adequate construct validity for all latent constructs in the model. 
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Table 3. Standardized factor loadings from the LISREL measurement model 
 
Variable Stand. 
loading 
AVE Reliability 
Perceived environmental uncertainty (PEU)  0.43 0.84 
PEU1  0.64   
PEU2 0.71   
PEU6 0.53   
PEU7 0.70   
PEU9 0.71   
PEU10 0.64   
PEU11 0.62   
    
Number of exceptions (EXCEP)    
EXCEP1 1.00    -    - 
    
Role ambiguity (RA)  0.46 0.83 
RA1 0.60   
RA2 0.69   
RA3 0.61   
RA4 0.61   
RA5 0.79   
RA6 0.71   
    
Budgetary slack (SLACK)  0.47 0.70 
SLACK2 0.53   
SLACK4 0.44   
SLACK6 0.97   
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Variable Stand. 
loading 
AVE Reliability 
Job-related tension (JRT)  0.40 0.87 
JRT1 0.65   
JRT5 0.69   
JRT6 0.58   
JRT7 0.64   
JRT8 0.63   
JRT10 0.56   
JRT11 0.67   
JRT12 0.68   
JRT13 0.57   
JRT14 0.60   
    
Budget participation  0.54 0.85 
BP1 0.79   
BP2 0.59   
BP4 0.83   
BP5 0.78   
BP6 0.64   
    
Slack detection (DETECT)  0.66 0.85 
DETECT1 0.91   
DETECT2 0.70   
DETECT3 0.81   
    
Information asymmetry (IA)  0.56 0.79 
IA1 0.80   
IA2 0.73   
IA3 0.72   
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4.2.2 Structural model 
Second, we analyzed the structural model which represents the relationships between 
the latent constructs while taking into account the measurement error variances identified in 
the measurement model. In particular, a SEM model was estimated in which PEU relates to 
SLACK, via (1) the psychology-based sequential indirect path of RA and JRT and (2) the 
economics-based indirect path of EXCEP, controlling for the effects of BP, DETECT, and IA 
on SLACK. Table 4 lists each hypothesis and its corresponding path coefficients while Figure 
2 illustrates the path coefficients graphically in our theoretical model.  
Consistent with the univariate results, the path estimate between PEU and EXCEP is 
positively significant (β = 0.50, p < 0.01). Hypothesis H1, proposing a positive association 
between PEU and EXCEP is thus supported by the results. Our results, however, provide no 
support for hypothesis H2, predicting a positive relationship between EXCEP and SLACK (β = 
-0.01, p = 0.12). Conversely, as predicted in hypothesis H3, PEU is significantly positively 
related to RA (β = 0.57, p < 0.01). Furthermore, the empirical results indicate a significant 
positive association between RA and JRT (β = 0.71, p < 0.01) which provides support for 
hypothesis H4, linking higher levels of RA to higher levels of JRT. In support of hypothesis H5, 
we found a statistically significant positive path estimate between JRT and SLACK (β = 0.30, 
p < 0.01).  
We performed an additional analysis to test the relative explanatory power of the 
economics-based and psychology-based perspective in predicting the creation of budgetary 
slack. The proportion of variance explained for budgetary slack amounted to 25% for the 
economics-based model, while the psychology-based model explained 28% of the variance. 
The variance explained by the integrative model amounted to 31%, demonstrating a marginal 
improvement of the integrative model’s explanatory power compared to the two separate 
models. Following recent research by Perego and Hartmann (2009), we conducted pairwise 
F-tests comparing the R² values of the integrated model with those of the separate economics-
based and psychology-based models. Although the difference in R² values is not substantive, 
it is statistically significant at p < 0.05 for the economics-based versus integrative model. The 
variance explained by the psychology-based model, however, does not differ significantly from 
the variance explained by the integrative model. Having compared each of the separate 
models to the integrative model, we next compared the two separate models to each other 
using Steiger’s (1980) Z-formula. The correlation between the two separate models was r = 
0.67 (p < 0.01) and Z equaled 5.84 (p < 0.01), indicating that the psychology-based model with 
RA and JRT accounts for significantly more variance in budgetary slack than the economics-
based model with EXCEP.  
Finally, these results hint toward an indirect relationship between PEU and SLACK 
through the psychology-based sequential effect of RA and JRT. In line with recent research 
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(e.g., Ylinen and Gullkvist, 2014), we calculated the total indirect effect as the multiplication of 
the statistically significant effects on and from the RA-JRT combination: PEU-RA (0.57), RA-
JRT (0.71), and JRT-SLACK (0.30), which equals a total indirect effect of 0.12. The statistical 
significance of this three-path effect was tested using the joint significance test and the 
procedure of Hayes, Preacher, and Myers (2011) based on a bootstrap procedure with 1,000 
bootstraps. We observe from Table 4 that all coefficients making up the three-path indirect 
effect are significantly different from zero. Moreover, all effects are in the predicted, positive 
direction: the more managers perceive the environment to be uncertain, the more role 
ambiguity they will experience, this heightened role ambiguity is associated with an increase 
in job-related tension, and job-related tension is positively related to budgetary slack. Taken 
together, the joint significance test rejects the null hypothesis of no indirect effect. Furthermore, 
following the Hayes, Preacher and Myers (2011) procedure, we multiplied the direct path of 
each of the 1,000 bootstraps to obtain an estimated coefficient for the indirect effect. Those 
1,000 direct effect coefficients were sorted from smallest to largest to obtain the 95% bootstrap 
confidence interval. As this interval did not include zero ([0.05; 0.14]), we can conclude that 
the three-path indirect effect is significant.  
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Table 4. Path coefficients from the LISREL structural model 
 
Dependent variable Independent 
variables 
Associated 
hypothesis 
Path 
coefficient 
Z-value p-value 
EXCEP PEU H1  0.498  3.336 0.001 
RA PEU H3  0.572  6.700 0.000 
JRT RA H4  0.712  6.626 0.000 
SLACK EXCEP H2 -0.008 -1.568 0.117 
 JRT H5  0.304  3.568 0.000 
 BP -  0.097  1.694 0.090 
 DETECT - -0.127 -2.445 0.015 
 IA - -0.067 -1.245 0.213 
n = 218.  
PEU = perceived environmental uncertainty, EXCEP = number of exceptions, RA = role 
ambiguity, JRT = job-related tension, SLACK = budgetary slack.  
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Figure 2. Structural model with significant path estimates 
 
psychology-based 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
economics-based 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Role ambiguity Job-related tension 
0.50** 
0.57** 
0.71** 
0.30** 
Exceptions 
Slack detection 
-0.13* 
Perceived environmental                               
uncertainty 
Budgetary slack 
 
**, * Statistically significant at 0.01 level and 0.05 level, respectively 
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4.2.3 Validity tests for statistical robustness 
To ensure that the results are robust and given the multivariate non-normality of the data 
in this study, we conducted some additional analyses.  
First, we redid the analysis using the robust ML method, which is a distribution-free 
method robust against small sample sizes. This method requires both the covariance matrix 
and the asymptotic covariance matrix as input factors (Lomax and Schumacker, 2012). The 
use of robust ML slightly improved the fit of the measurement model (NNFI = 0.98, and CFI = 
0.98) but qualitatively similar structural paths were obtained.  
Second, as the definitions of PEU and JRT might suggest that PEU is a three-
dimensional and JRT is a two-dimensional construct, we ran a second-order SEM. A SCDT 
confirmed that the best model fit results when both PEU and JRT are treated as a single order 
construct. Moreover, even if we force the second-order structures upon the model, no 
qualitatively different relationships are found than for the single-order model. For the sake of 
simplicity, we decided to only report the results of the single-order model as this has the best 
fit.  
Third, as managers’ reaction to RA may depend on specific personality traits such as 
their tolerance for ambiguity (TFA), we included the effect of this variable in our model. More 
specifically, a manager’s need for unambiguous information in uncertain situations may 
influence the amount of JRT this manager experiences as a result of RA (MacDonald, 1970). 
Managers scoring high on TFA like ambiguous and complex situations whereas people scoring 
low on TFA dislike them. It is therefore possible that the relationship between RA and JRT will 
be stronger for managers with low TFA than for managers with high TFA. TFA was measured 
by the shortened 11-item version of the MacDonald (1970) instrument (see items 52-62, 
Appendix A).  Splitting at the median of TFA, two subsamples were created. Managers scoring 
higher (lower) than the median value on TFA were labeled highly (little) tolerant. Multi-sample 
SEM ( χ²/df = 1.69, CFI = 0.91, NNFI = 0.91, RMSEA = 0.08, SRMR = 0.14) was conducted 
and a SCDT (p < 0.01) revealed that the relationship between RA and JRT was stronger for 
managers scoring low on TFA (β = 0.94, p < 0.01) than for managers scoring high on TFA (β 
= 0.50, p < 0.01). The other path coefficients remained qualitatively the same. These additional 
investigations suggest an acceptable robustness of the model depicted in Figure 2. 
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5. Conclusions, limitations, and suggestions for future research 
Previous empirical work has mainly focused on organizational level variables as 
explanations for budgetary slack (e.g., Dunk, 1993a; Milani, 1975). Prior theoretical work, 
however, advanced the notion that budgetary slack can also be affected by environmental level 
factors such as environmental uncertainty (e.g., Bourgeois, 1981; Cyert and March, 1963). The 
aim of this study was to empirically examine whether and how environmental uncertainty and 
budgetary slack are related. We investigated the underlying mechanisms of the environmental 
uncertainty-budgetary slack relationship by integrating an economics-based and psychology-
based perspective. In particular, building on information-processing and agency theory (for the 
economics-based relationship) and role theory (for the psychology-based relationship), 
hypotheses have been developed in this paper, predicting that (1) perceived environmental 
uncertainty is positively associated with budgetary slack through the number of exceptions a 
manager is confronted with, and that (2) perceived environmental uncertainty is positively 
associated with budgetary slack through the sequential indirect effect of role ambiguity and 
job-related tension.  
Relying on survey data obtained from 218 respondents, we find that perceived 
environmental uncertainty increases budgetary slack through the job-related tension that 
arises from uncertainty-driven role ambiguity. As the mean values of budget participation and 
information asymmetry are rather high in our sample, we can expect that our respondents had 
the opportunity and an incentive to create budgetary slack to bias their performance 
evaluation60 (Waller, 1988). As the mean value of slack detection, however, is also high we 
expect their creation of budgetary slack to be lowered. Our results illustrate that despite the 
detection level being high, the level of budgetary slack is high when job-related tension is high. 
Therefore, we tentatively conclude that managers create budgetary slack expecting security 
and comfort in situations where job-related tension caused by uncertainty-driven role ambiguity 
is present, rather than because they have the mere opportunity to do so61.  
By integrating two perspectives that have not been simultaneously studied before in 
the budgetary slack literature, we provide four contributions. First, this study contributes to the 
existing literature by relying on both economics-based and psychology-based theories to 
theoretically underpin the often suggested relationship between environmental uncertainty and 
budgetary slack. Second, we provide empirical evidence for the ill-tested suggestion that 
                                                          
60 For the type of managers we selected, it is common that the budget is used for their performance 
evaluation.  
61 This tentative conclusion is corroborated by the results of an additional analysis (results not reported 
here) in which we constrained the sample to those respondents reporting higher than median budget 
participation, information asymmetry, and slack detection (n = 64). In this subsample, the psychology-
based relationship between perceived environmental uncertainty and budgetary slack remains 
significant and explains a higher proportion of the variance in budgetary slack than the economics-based 
relationship.  
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environmental uncertainty is one of the main antecedents of budgetary slack. Third, by 
providing both an economics-based and a psychology-based path suggesting how perceived 
environmental uncertainty could be related to budgetary slack, we provide a more complete 
understanding of the budgetary slack creation process. The integration of environmental (i.e., 
environmental uncertainty), organizational (i.e., budget participation, slack detection, and 
information asymmetry), and individual (i.e., the number of exceptions a manager is confronted 
with, role ambiguity and job-related tension) factors as antecedents of budgetary slack within 
a single model can facilitate the development of a more coherent and integrated model to 
explain the occurrence of budgetary slack. In particular, our results highlight the importance of 
individual psychological variables such as role ambiguity and job-related tension as these 
explain a significantly larger proportion of the variance in budgetary slack than the individual 
economic variable of the number of exceptions a manager is confronted with. Indeed, we find 
that the psychological explanation is the most significant one suggesting that budgetary slack 
can function as a tool that can help managers to cope with uncertainty rather than being solely 
dysfunctional to the organization. We tentatively conclude that in uncertain environments, 
managers create budgetary slack with its uncertainty-buffering effect in mind rather than to 
ease their work or obtain personal rents. The notion that budgetary slack may be created in 
response to role ambiguity and job-related tension adds to our understanding of why budgetary 
slack may be created. Fourth, we contribute to the literature using role theory in an accounting 
context by building on role theory’s knowledge to advance budgetary slack research. This 
study also has the potential to inform practitioners as the contemporary workplace is 
experiencing change at a more dramatic pace than ever before. In such an environment, top 
management must be aware of the potential of budgetary slack, rather than focusing one-
sidedly on budgetary slack’s dysfunctional economic effects. Rather than focusing on a pure 
cost minimization model that would eliminate any ‘excess’ resources, our results imply that 
superior managers must balance the costs of slack and its potential protective psychological 
abilities. We therefore underline the importance of choosing a budgetary strategy that suits the 
organizational environment. This understanding of the budgetary slack process may also 
assist superiors in the management of budgetary slack, which can be augmented or diminished 
by trying to influence the manager’s psychological state. It is not sufficient to install formal 
control systems. Indeed, our results highlight that the effect of these formal systems on 
individual psychological variables should be closely monitored to understand why budgetary 
slack is created. As it seems from our results that managers may create budgetary slack as a 
reaction to psychological rather than economic effects, both academics and practitioners 
should ask themselves the question how far the relationship between job-related tension and 
budgetary slack can be stretched. Is the creation of budgetary slack a short-term reaction to 
an increase in job-related tension? What if this job-related tension keeps on growing due to 
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increased role ambiguity and highly uncertain environments? Prior research hints toward 
employees leaving the firm in favor of another job if they experience too high job-related 
tension (e.g., Bamber et al., 1989; Rebele and Michaels, 1990). The current economic 
situation, however, is characterized by relatively high unemployment levels and job scarcity. 
What can happen under these conditions given that we can realistically assume an upper 
bound to the potential of budgetary slack creation? 
The results of this study are subject to a number of limitations. First, there are some 
limitations associated with cross-sectional survey research in general. For example, our study 
relies on self-reported data. Although steps were taken to ensure reliability of the data and the 
diagnostic tests indicate no reason to expect bias, the possibility of noisy measures cannot be 
eliminated. In addition, this study relies on cross-sectional data so we cannot make statements 
about the direction of causation in our research model62. Future studies could use alternative 
methods and obtain more objective measures to obtain further insights. For example, 
experimental studies could manipulate role ambiguity at different levels and measure job-
related tension and the creation of budgetary slack subsequently. Similarly, future research 
could use an experimental design to explicitly test for budgetary slack’s buffering effect by 
setting up a 2x2-between subjects design in which both the level of environmental uncertainty 
and budgetary slack can be high or low. In addition to these general limitations, this study is 
also limited by the fact that the proposed model only considers environmental uncertainty, the 
number of exceptions a manager is confronted with, role ambiguity, job-related tension, budget 
participation, slack detection, and information asymmetry as antecedents for budgetary slack. 
There are doubtlessly alternative antecedents for budgetary slack that were not examined here 
to keep the scope of the work manageable. Moreover, we only focus on slack in operational 
budgets hence neglecting slack in capital budgets and non-financial targets. Future research 
could broaden the slack-construct to capture the additional resources built into those types of 
targets as well. The construct of uncertainty could be enlarged as well to reflect multiple types 
of uncertainty (e.g., task uncertainty) and multiple dimensions (e.g., dynamism, complexity, 
and munificence (Dess and Beard, 1984)). Future research using this broader uncertainty-
construct could examine whether all types and dimensions of uncertainty relate similarly to 
budgetary slack or not. Finally, by looking at the antecedents of budgetary slack we were 
unable to determine whether slack is desirable or not (Van der Stede, 2001). Related to this is 
that we not explicitly tap into managers’ reasons for creating budgetary slack. Future research 
should attempt to test these ‘good’ and ‘bad’ conditions more explicitly to unravel whether slack 
is good or bad for performance.     
                                                          
62 The causal direction in our model reflects the general assumption about the longitudinal stability of 
the various factors in our model (Luft and Shields, 2003, pp. 193-4).  
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Notwithstanding these limitations and the need for more research, this study deepens 
our insight into the antecedents of budgetary slack by empirically testing a more complete 
model of budgetary slack, an important and complex area of management accounting 
research. Whereas traditional empirical budgetary slack research considered mainly 
organizational level variables, we provide evidence that budgetary slack can be created as it 
provides managers with an expected coping mechanism for the tension caused by uncertainty-
driven role ambiguity. Additionally, by introducing psychological variables as mediating 
mechanisms, we provide a better understanding of the behavioral issues relating to the 
development of budgetary targets.  
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8. Appendices 
Appendix A. Survey questions 
Perceived environmental uncertainty  
Rubric on the questionnaire: Please indicate the frequency with which the following items 
occur. There are no right or wrong answers. 
Scale: 1 (Never) - 7 (Every time) 
1. PEU1: I am certain about what approaches would be best for dealing with job-related 
problems that arise during my job fulfillment.* 
2. PEU2: I have all the necessary information to make job-related decisions at my firm.* 
3. PEU3: When doing my job, it is difficult to determine if a job-related decision is a correct 
one. 
4. PEU4: Environmental changes that I have no control over (e.g., changes in social, 
economic, political or technical conditions outside of the firm) affect the decisions I 
make at my firm. 
5. PEU5: I am uncertain about how to act to fulfill the requirements of my job. 
6. PEU6: I am certain about the job adjustments I have to make to handle the 
environmental changes that occur at my firm.* 
7. PEU7: I can tell if my actions will accomplish my job related objectives.* 
8. PEU8: It is difficult for me to determine if the methods I used accomplished my job-
related objectives at my firm. 
9. PEU9: I know how to obtain the information necessary for job-related decision-making.* 
10. PEU10: I can tell if I have met the expectations of others at my firm.* 
11. PEU11: I am certain about how my job should be done.* 
 
Number of exceptions  
Rubric on the questionnaire: Please indicate the frequency with which the following items 
occur. There are no right or wrong answers. 
Scale: 1 (Never) - 7 (Every time) 
12. EXCEP1: I encounter new or unusual problems at my business unit. 
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Role ambiguity 
Rubric on the questionnaire: The following questions address issues that affect your job. 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following 
statements. There are no right or wrong answers. 
Scale: 1 (Strongly disagree) - 7 (Strongly agree) 
13. RA1: I feel certain about how much authority I have in my job.* 
14. RA2: Clear, planned goals and objectives exist for my job.* 
15. RA3: I know that I have allocated my time properly in my job.* 
16. RA4: I know what my responsibilities are in my job.* 
17. RA5: I know exactly what is expected of me in my job.* 
18. RA6: I have been provided clear explanations of what has to be done in my job.* 
 
Job-related tension 
Rubric on the questionnaire: I would like you to indicate how frequently you feel bothered by 
each of the items listed below. There are no right or wrong answers. 
Scale: 1 (Never) - 7 (Every time) 
19. JRT1: Feeling that you have too little authority to carry out the responsibilities assigned 
to you. 
20. JRT2: Being unclear about just what the scope and responsibilities of your job are. 
21. JRT3: Not knowing what opportunities for advancement or promotion exist for you. 
22. JRT4: Feeling that you have too heavy a work load, one that you cannot possibly finish 
during an ordinary work day.  
23. JRT5: Thinking that you will not be able to satisfy the conflicting demands of various 
people over you. 
24. JRT6: Feeling that you are not fully qualified to handle your job. 
25. JRT7: Not knowing what your supervisor thinks of you, how s/he evaluates your 
performance. 
26. JRT8: The fact that you cannot get information needed to carry out your job. 
27. JRT9: Having to decide things that affect the lives of individuals, people that you know. 
28. JRT10: Feeling that you may not be liked and accepted by the people you work with. 
29. JRT11: Feeling unable to influence your immediate supervisor’s decisions and actions 
that affect you. 
30. JRT12: Not knowing what the people you work with expect of you. 
31. JRT13: Thinking that the amount of work you have to do may interfere with how well it 
gets done. 
32. JRT14: Feeling that you have to do things on the job that are against your better 
judgment. 
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33. JRT15: Feeling that your job tends to interfere with your family life. 
 
Budgetary slack 
Rubric on the questionnaire: The following questions are about the budgetary targets 
encompassed in your business unit’s operating budget. Please indicate to what extent you 
agree or disagree with each of the following statements. There are no right or wrong answers.  
Scale: 1 (Strongly disagree) - 7 (Strongly agree) 
34. SLACK1: Budget targets demand high productivity in my business unit.* 
35. SLACK2: Budget targets set for my business unit are safely attainable. 
36. SLACK3: I have to carefully monitor costs/revenues in my business unit because of 
budgetary constraints.* 
37. SLACK4: Budget targets have not caused me to be particularly concerned with 
improving efficiency in my business unit. 
38. SLACK5: Targets incorporated in the budget are difficult to reach.* 
39. SLACK6: Budget targets for my business unit are not particularly demanding.  
 
Budget participation 
Rubric on the questionnaire: Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with each 
of the following statements. No right or wrong answers exist.  
Scale: 1 (Strongly disagree) - 7 (Strongly agree) 
40. BP1: I am involved in setting all portions of my budget. 
41. BP2: The reasoning provided by my supervisor when budget revisions are made is 
logical. 
42. BP3: I state my requests, opinions, or suggestions about the budget to my supervisor 
without being asked. 
43. BP4: I have a high amount of influence on the final budget. 
44. BP5: My contribution to the budget is important. 
45. BP6: When the budget is being set, my supervisor seeks my requests, opinions, or 
suggestions.  
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Slack detection 
Rubric on the questionnaire: Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with each 
of the following statements. No right or wrong answers exist.  
Scale: 1 (Strongly disagree) - 7 (Strongly agree) 
46. DETECT1: Top management has enough information to know if there is slack in my 
business unit’s operating budget. 
47. DETECT2: Top management receives detailed information on the activities by 
business unit and product. 
48. DETECT3: Top management has a way to know if there is slack in my business unit’s 
operating budget.  
Information asymmetry 
Rubric on the questionnaire: In comparison with your superior, 
49. IA1: Who is in possession of better information regarding the activities undertaken in 
your business unit? 
Scale: 1 (My superior has much better information) – 7 (I have much better information) 
50. IA2: Who is more familiar with the input-output relationships of the operations in your 
business unit? 
Scale: 1 (My superior is much more familiar) – 7 (I am much more familiar) 
51. IA3: Who is more certain of the performance potential of your business unit?  
Scale: 1 (My superior is much more certain) – 7 (I am much more certain) 
 
Tolerance for ambiguity 
Rubric on the questionnaire: There are no right or wrong answers and therefore your first 
response is important.   
52. TFA1: There is a right and wrong way to do almost everything.* 
53. TFA2: Practically every problem has a solution.* 
54. TFA3: I have always felt that there is a clear difference between right and wrong.* 
55. TFA4: Nothing gets accomplished in this world unless you stick to some basic rules.* 
56. TFA5: If I were a doctor, I would prefer the uncertainties of a psychiatrist to the clear 
and definite work of someone like a surgeon or X-ray specialist. 
57. TFA6: Vague and impressionistic pictures have little appeal for me.* 
58. TFA7: Before an examination, I felt much less anxious if I knew how many questions 
there would be. 
59. TFA8: The best part of working a jigsaw puzzle is putting in that last piece.* 
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60. TFA9: I do not like to work on a problem unless there is a possibility of coming out with 
a clear-cut and unambiguous answer. 
61. TFA10: I like to fool around with new ideas, even if they turn out later to be a total waste 
of time. 
62. TFA11: Perfect balance is the essence of all good composition.* 
 
* Items are reverse-coded 
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Appendix B. Principal component factor analysis with varimax rotation for role 
ambiguity and perceived environmental uncertainty 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 
A. I feel certain about how much authority I have in my job. 0.13 0.67 
A. Clear, planned goals and objectives exist for my job. 0.14 0.75 
A. I know that I have allocated my time properly in my job. 0.24 0.65 
A. I know what my responsibilities are in my job.  0.21 0.65 
A. I know exactly what is expected of me in my job. 0.20 0.79 
A. I have been provided clear explanations of what has to be done 
in my job. 
0.06 0.77 
U. I am certain about what approaches would be best for dealing 
with job-related problems. 
0.72 0.09 
U. I have all the necessary information to make job-related 
decisions. 
0.70 0.24 
U. I am certain about the job adjustments I have to make to handle 
the environmental changes that occur at my business unit. 
0.66 0.01 
U. I can tell if my actions will accomplish my job-related objectives. 0.71 0.22 
U. I know how to obtain the information necessary for job-related 
decision-making. 
0.74 0.16 
U. I can tell if I have met the expectations of others at my business 
unit. 
0.67 0.20 
U. I am certain about how my job should be done. 0.61 0.30 
Eigen values 1.90 4.93 
Explained variance 25.67% 26.88% 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy: 0.87. 
A = Measures for role ambiguity. 
U = Measures for perceived environmental uncertainty. 
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Appendix C. Principal component factor analysis with varimax rotation for role 
ambiguity and job-related tension 
 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 
A. I feel certain about how much authority I have in my job. 0.30 0.59 
A. Clear, planned goals and objectives exist for my job. 0.02 0.81 
A. I know that I have allocated my time properly in my job. 0.21 0.65 
A. I know what my responsibilities are in my job.  0.22 0.63 
A. I know exactly what is expected of me in my job. 0.19 0.80 
A. I have been provided clear explanations of what has to be done 
in my job. 
0.09 0.77 
T. Feeling that you have too little authority to carry out the 
responsibilities assigned to you. 
0.69 0.13 
T. Thinking that you will not be able to satisfy the conflicting 
demands of various people over you. 
0.74 0.13 
T. Feeling that you are not fully qualified to handle your job. 0.62 0.15 
T. Not knowing what your supervisor thinks of you, how s/he 
evaluates your performance. 
0.60 0.29 
T. The fact that you cannot get information needed to carry out 
your job. 
0.65 0.15 
T. Feeling that you may not be liked and accepted by the people 
you work with. 
0.60 0.14 
T. Feeling unable to influence your immediate supervisor’s 
decisions and actions that affect you. 
0.68 0.19 
T. Not knowing what the people you work with expect of you. 0.60 0.40 
T. Thinking that the amount of work you have to do may interfere 
with how well it gets done. 
0.65 0.07 
T. Feeling that you have to do things on the job that are against 
your better judgment.  
0.67 0.07 
Eigen values 5.79 2.12 
Explained variance 27.86% 21.52% 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy: 0.89. 
A = Measures for role ambiguity. 
T = Measures for job-related tension. 
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CHAPTER 5 - CONCLUSION 
 
The goal of this dissertation was to shed light on the ‘black box of budgeting’ by 
clarifying the psychological mechanisms underlying two of the most important budgeting 
concepts: budget participation and budgetary slack. In particular, our first study focused on 
how and when diverse forms of budget participation relate to different types of budget 
motivation. The second and third study examined the effect of participation in strategic planning 
(PSP) and environmental uncertainty on budgetary slack, respectively.  
This last chapter summarizes the main findings of each study and brings them together 
to provide a general overview of how budgeting works. Meanwhile, I also illustrate this 
dissertation’s contributions to current budgeting research. Next, I summarize the limitations 
and suggest fruitful opportunities for future research. Finally, I conclude with the practical 
implications of this dissertation.  
 
1. Main findings 
1.1 Study 1 – Budget participation and budget motivation 
Relying on participative decision-making (PDM) and self-determination theory (SDT), 
we were able to enrich current budgeting studies that have largely neglected the richness of 
budget participation and budget motivation. By engaging in an in-depth field study, we found 
evidence of multiple types of budget motivation and diverse forms of budget participation. In 
particular, managers can put effort into attaining their budget goals either because they like 
this (intrinsic motivation), because they have internalized the importance of the budget goals 
to themselves (autonomous integrated regulation) or to their organization (autonomous 
identified regulation), or because they feel pressured to do so by an external (controlled 
external regulation) or internal (controlled introjected regulation) controlling imperative. 
Moreover, our results also suggest a budget participation continuum ranging from ‘no 
influence’ to ‘joint decision-making’.  
Understanding how and when diverse forms of budget participation relate to these 
different types of motivation, was the main focus of this first study. Regarding how participation 
and motivation are related, we elaborate on the needs for autonomy, competence, and 
relatedness as important underlying mechanisms. Regarding the when-question, true 
participation (for the ‘consultation’ type) and participation congruence (for the ‘no influence’ 
types), in combination with strategic alignment (for the needs for autonomy, competence, and 
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relatedness), are identified as important factors determining whether a certain form of budget 
participation will stir autonomous or controlled budget motivation.  
1.2 Study 2 – Participation in strategic planning and budgetary slack 
The results of the second study underline the importance of taking into account the broader 
organizational context in which budgeting is taking place to understand the budgetary slack 
process. In particular, we focused on the internal organizational context by studying the effect 
of the whole planning process (i.e., both the strategic planning and budgeting process) on 
budgetary slack. This study provided evidence of both elements of the planning process being 
related to budgetary slack, although through a different path. More specifically, the relationship 
between PSP and budgetary slack is mediated by affective organizational commitment 
whereas the relationship between budget participation and budgetary slack is mediated by 
autonomous budget motivation. Taken together, the results suggest that to understand the 
budgetary slack process, both elements of the organizational planning process should be 
taken into account.  
1.3 Study 3 – Environmental uncertainty and budgetary slack 
Not only the internal but also the external organizational context is important when studying 
budgetary slack, as evidenced by the third study of this dissertation. This study focused on the 
relationship between environmental uncertainty and budgetary slack. Drawing on both 
economics-based (i.e., agency theory and the information processing framework) and 
psychology-based theories (i.e., role theory), we empirically examined whether and how 
perceived environmental uncertainty related to budgetary slack. Our results demonstrated the 
importance of individual psychological variables. Indeed, perceived environmental uncertainty 
relates indirectly to more slack through the two-step indirect effect of role ambiguity and job-
related tension. Although increased uncertainty confronts the manager with more exceptions, 
these exceptions do not increase the creation of budgetary slack, which illustrates the relative 
importance of the psychological over the economic explanation for budgetary slack. This study 
provides tentative evidence for budgetary slack’s uncertainty-buffering role as we cautiously 
assume that managers create budgetary slack in a reaction to role ambiguity and the 
associated job-related tension rather than because they have the mere opportunity to do so.  
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2. General conclusion and contributions 
2.1 General conclusion 
Each study has its own conclusions and contributions but together, these studies shed light 
into ‘the black box of budgeting’ (see Figure 1 for a graphical overview of the results of this 
dissertation).  
The general conclusion of this dissertation is that budgeting, its characteristics and 
outcomes are no uniform processes but are deeply embedded in human complexities.   These 
human complexities are illustrated in detail throughout the three studies. The first study shows 
that although the decision to let subordinate managers participate in the budgeting process or 
not is a decision taken at the organizational level, its consequences should be examined at the 
individual level. In particular, whether the ‘consultation’ form of budget participation results in 
the satisfaction of the basic psychological needs, depends on the individual manager’s 
perception of whether this consultation is true or pseudo-participative. Moreover, for some 
managers, a ‘no influence’ form of budget participation does not frustrate their needs for 
autonomy, competence, or relatedness; which seems to depend on their level of participation 
congruence. Similarly, it is not because managers work in the same organization that they feel 
equally strategically aligned. The second and third study pinpoint the importance of individual 
psychological variables for understanding the budgetary slack process. Whereas study 2 
shows that the individual variables fully mediate the effect of formal mechanisms on budgetary 
slack (i.e., autonomous budget motivation mediates the relationship between budget 
participation and budgetary slack, and affective organizational commitment mediates the 
relationship between PSP and budgetary slack), study 3 provides evidence of the psychology-
based path explaining more variance in budgetary slack than the economics-based path. 
Together, these results reinforce the notion that budgeting is inspired by people and made for 
people so the ‘people’ factor is primordial to understand its working.  
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2.2 Contributions 
This dissertation contributes to the existing budgeting literature in five broad ways.  
First, this dissertation advances our understanding of budget participation. The results of 
study 1 highlight the importance of distinguishing between diverse forms of budget participation 
to unravel its motivational effects.  Budget participation, however, may not only function as a 
motivational tool, it may also be used as a tool to manage the amount of budgetary slack 
created. In particular, the results in study 2 show how budget participation indirectly decreases 
budgetary slack through the mediating effect of autonomous budget motivation. Combining the 
results from study 1 and study 2 suggests that true forms of high influence budget participation 
can, in combination with strategic alignment, decrease budgetary slack through the full 
mediation effect of autonomous budget motivation. 
Second, we extend research on budgetary slack by testing an integrated model of 
antecedents. Whereas previous slack research focused largely on the narrow budget setting, 
we enlarged the scope of potential antecedents. In particular, study 2 introduced the strategy 
process and study 3 examined budgetary slack’s relationship with perceived environmental 
uncertainty.  
Third, this dissertation illustrates the importance of strategy in the budgeting process in two 
ways. (1) In our first study, we find that strategic alignment can act as a substitute for high 
influence, true forms of budget participation. Moreover, our results also show that strategic 
alignment is a necessary condition for budget participation to be an autonomous motivation 
tool. If managers do not know nor embrace their organization’s strategy, providing them the 
opportunity to participate in the budgeting process will not reap autonomous motivational 
benefits. Only when budget participation is accompanied by strategic alignment, participation 
can autonomously motivate managers to attain their budget goals. (2) In our second study, we 
followed up on the fact that budgeting and strategy are part of an integrated organizational 
planning process by studying the effect of PSP on budgetary slack. We learned that allowing 
managers PSP, decreases budgetary slack through the mediating effect of affective 
organizational commitment. 
Fourth, by studying the effect of both the external (i.e., perceived environmental uncertainty 
in study 3) and internal (i.e., PSP in study 2) broader organizational context, we contribute to 
the research idea that budgeting does not operate in isolation (e.g., Malmi and Brown, 2008). 
To understand the budgetary slack process, we should look further than the characteristics of 
the budgeting process. Indeed, budgetary slack can be influenced by environmental, 
organizational and individual level variables.  
Fifth, we contribute to the second and third stage of psychological budgeting research 
(Covaleski et al., 2003). In particular, by relying on SDT we were able to identify different types 
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of budget motivation and gain insight into how and when a certain form of budget participation 
can autonomously motivate managers to attain the budget. Moreover, combining SDT and 
organizational commitment theory provided insight into how both PSP and budget participation 
relate to budgetary slack whereas role theory helped us gain an understanding of the 
relationship between perceived environmental uncertainty and budgetary slack. Hence, by 
combining already known theories in budgeting research (e.g.,  organizational commitment 
and role theory) with new developments in psychology (e.g.,  SDT), we gained a more 
complete understanding of two important budgeting concepts: budget participation and 
budgetary slack.  
 
3. Limitations and suggestions for future research 
3.1 Contextual and methodological limitations 
Like all research, this dissertation has both contextual and methodological limitations. First, 
in this dissertation we focused on budgeting’s motivational function and hence excluded other 
functions, such as for example the planning function. Notwithstanding the importance of 
budgeting as a motivational device, recent research increasingly recognizes that budgeting 
can simultaneously serve different purposes (e.g., Arnold and Artz, 2015; Ekholm and Wallin, 
2000; Hansen and Van der Stede, 2004). Therefore, future research should study the 
simultaneous use of budgeting for different purposes and the tension and conflicts that may 
arise from these interactions. Second, we mainly relied on psychological theories to open 
budgeting’s ‘black box’. Although psychology theory has been used to study management 
accounting practice in general and budgeting in particular for over 60 years (Birnberg et al., 
2007), budgeting research could benefit from an active integration of psychological, social, and 
economic theories (Covaleski et al., 2003). Research choosing between competing theories 
or combining compatible theories from different perspectives would create a more valid and 
complete understanding of budgeting practices and outcomes. We took a first step in this 
direction in our third study, where we relied on both economics-based and psychology-based 
theories to hypothesize on the relationship between environmental uncertainty and budgetary 
slack. Further integration steps, however, should be taken in future research. Third, some 
methodological limitations are present. To provide a deeper understanding of budget 
participation and budget motivation, we engaged in field research for our first study. Despite 
the richness that a field study can provide, it does not allow to make broad generalizations. 
Our results should thus be interpreted with care. Study 2 and 3 relied on self-reported survey 
data which may create a concern for common method bias. Although steps were undertaken 
to ensure reliable data and the tests indicate no signs of bias, the possibility of noisy measures 
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cannot be fully eliminated. Moreover, self-reported measures reflect perceptions instead of 
actual reality. Rather than seeing this as a limitation of our research, we strongly value the 
importance of perceptions. Indeed, managers react to their perceived rather than the actual 
reality (Link and Oldendick, 2000; Van der Stede et al., 2005) implying that budget motivation 
is linked to perceived rather than actual budget participation (study 1). Moreover, managers 
create budgetary slack in response to their perceived rather than actual level of PSP (study 2) 
and environmental uncertainty (study 3). Finally, relying on cross-sectional data, we cannot 
make statements about causality. Future studies, therefore, could use alternative methods 
(e.g., experimental research or longitudinal research) and obtain more objective measures to 
alleviate these methodological limitations.  
3.2 Suggestions for future research 
Despite the radical changes in today’s highly competitive environment, budgeting remains 
relevant to contemporary organizations (e.g., Bjornenak, 2014; Libby and Lindsay, 2010). I 
therefore believe that further research into its characteristics and outcomes remains interesting 
from both a theoretical and practical perspective. In this section, I suggest four fruitful avenues 
for future research.   
First, future research could further expand the definition of budget participation. Although 
study 1 takes an important first step in recognizing that different forms of budget participation 
exist, we approached participation from the typical superior-subordinate dimension. The 
organizational behavior literature (e.g., Barki and Hartwick, 1994; Cotton et al., 1988; Doll and 
Torkzadeh, 1989; Ives and Olson, 1984), however, has identified several other dimensions of 
participation, such as its degree of formality, the level of group dynamics, vertical (i.e., between 
superior and subordinate) versus horizontal (i.e., between managers at the same hierarchical 
level) participation, which have been largely denied in budgeting research. It can be logically 
expected that the consequences of budget participation will vary along each of these 
dimensions. I therefore recommend that future budgeting research aims to disentangle the 
different dimensions of budget participation, adapts Milani’s (1975) traditional measure to 
reflect this multi-dimensionality, and assesses these dimensions’ differential effects on budget 
motivation and budgetary slack.   
Second, although recent budgeting research recognizes that budgetary slack can be 
beneficial for the organization (e.g., Davila and Wouters, 2005; Marginson and Ogden, 2005), 
little research has explicitly tested these potential positive effects. I would recommend future 
research to examine the relationship between budgetary slack, and innovation, efficiency, and 
uncertainty-buffering, respectively. Moreover, when assessing these consequences, I suggest 
that future research distinguishes between budgetary slack’s long-term versus short-term and 
economic versus psychological consequences. Whereas budgetary slack represents an 
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opportunity cost reflecting waste and inefficiency from a short-term, economic perspective, it 
may resolve goal-conflict, buffer managers from environmental uncertainty, and enable 
managers to balance multiple goals at the same time which may increase these managers’ 
competence feeling from a long-term, psychological perspective.  
Third, management accounting has typically focused on slack in operational budgeting, 
neglecting the potential for slack in non-financial objectives and capital budgeting.  Due to the 
presence of asymmetric information, subordinate managers may introduce slack into their 
capital budgeting cash flow forecasts. I found only five empirical studies that have examined 
this issue (i.e., Guilding, 2003; Guilding and Lamminmaki, 2007; Lazaridis, 2006; Pruitt and 
Gitman, 1987; Turner and Guilding, 2012), with only one of these studies examining 
antecedents of capital slack (Turner and Guilding, 2012). Moreover, organizations rely 
increasingly on non-financial objectives (e.g., Hall, 2008; Marginson et al., 2014). As 
subordinate managers are often involved in setting these objectives, they also main contain a 
form of slack. Struck by the scant attention directed to these types of slack, I suggest that 
future research looks into these issues.    
Fourth, future research should examine managers’ intentions behind the creation of 
budgetary slack. In line with prior research, we looked into the antecedents of budgetary slack’s 
existence but we did not specifically tap into (a) the reasons why managers created budgetary 
slack, and (b) what they actually do with these additional resources. As Hansen et al. (2004, 
p. 1280) noted: ‘What a firm does with its resources is at least as important as which resources 
it possesses’. Insight in both the reasons behind the creation of budgetary slack and its actual 
usage represent interesting avenues for future research and could help us in determining the 
conditions under which budgetary slack is good or bad.    
4. Practical implications 
This dissertation provides some interesting insights for practitioners which can inspire them 
to improve current budgeting practices. In particular, this dissertation provides guidance on 
how to avoid two main criticisms often voiced by practitioners toward the traditional budgeting 
process (e.g., Hansen et al., 2003; Hope and Fraser, 2003; Jensen, 2003): (1) budgeting 
makes people feel undervalued as it strengthens the vertical command-and-control structure, 
and (2) budgeting and strategy are unrelated to each other.  
First, in order to avoid that managers feel undervalued, budgeting should be structured in 
a way that it creates autonomous budget motivation. My dissertation shows that allowing 
managers budget participation is not sufficient in this regard. Top management should 
consciously design this participatory process by taking into account the following five 
guidelines. (1) Budget participation is more than soliciting subordinate manager’s input. 
Meaningful participation not only involves subordinate managers in setting their budgetary 
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targets, but it also allows them influence over the targets. It is hence important that top 
management recognizes this influence-dimension. (2) Once the decision on the form of budget 
participation is taken, top management must closely monitor its effect on the subordinate 
managers. Some organizations seem to think that developing a sound, formal budgeting 
system is most important for budgeting as a motivation-tool. Having such a thoughtfully 
designed formal system, however, is only the beginning of the story. More important is its effect 
on the managers’ mental states. (3) An important boundary condition in managing budget 
participation’s motivational effects is the existence of true participation. In particular, when 
organizations chose the ‘consultation’ form of participation, managers must perceive this 
consultation as true. If managers perceive their consultation to be pseudo-participative their 
basic psychological needs within the budgeting context will be frustrated. A typical situation in 
which managers may perceive their consultation as pseudo-participative is when the decision 
on the budgetary targets has been taken upfront by top management. As top management, 
however, feel they should consult subordinate managers as the empowerment movement is 
gaining importance, they solicit these subordinates managers input without really taking it into 
account. Budget participation is time-intensive and rather costly so we advise organizations to 
spend their limited resources wise. Do not ask subordinate managers input when the decision 
has already been taken at a higher level. (4) Another suggestion to make the most out of the 
budgeting process, is to take into account the aspiration level of managers. Some managers 
have no participatory aspirations: it would only cost the organization money and frustrate the 
manager when s/he is forced to participate in the budgeting process. Managers with no 
participatory aspirations should not be obliged to participate as a ‘no influence’ form of budget 
participation does not harm their basic psychological needs in the budgeting context. (5) Last 
but not least: organizations should recognize the importance of strategy in setting up their 
budgeting process. The strategy and budgeting process are still too often seen as separate 
processes. Our first and second study, however, illustrate the importance of an integrated 
approach. More specifically, the results of our first study show that strategic alignment can act 
as a substitute for high influence, true forms of budget participation. Resources could be spend 
efficiently by avoiding ‘overlap’: managers whom are strongly strategically aligned could, for 
example, be less intensively involved in the budgeting process. Indeed, as in an integrated 
approach the budget is the financial translation of the organizational strategy, strategically 
aligned managers will automatically embrace the means needed to realize the organization’s 
strategy. One possible way to make sure that managers are strategically aligned is by actively 
involving subordinate managers in the strategy process. As evidenced by our first and second 
study, this involvement can range from actively soliciting subordinate managers’ input in the 
strategic planning process to letting them participate in brainstorm sessions about how to best 
implement the strategy.  
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Second, these types of strategic involvement give practitioners an understanding of how 
budgeting and strategy can be related. They are both part of the broader organizational 
planning process. Organizations should thus aim at an integrated approach. A guide to such 
an integrated approach is provided in the ideas behind the ‘Strategy Focused Organization’ 
(SFO) (Kaplan and Norton, 2001, 2008). If organizations want to become a SFO, they should 
apply the following five principles (Kaplan and Norton, 2001, p. 9-17). (1)Translate the strategy 
to operational terms: an organization should translate its strategy into the logical architecture 
of a strategy map and Balanced Scorecard (BSC) (Kaplan and Norton, 2005). A strategy map 
is diagram that documents the primary strategic goals of the organization and how best to 
realize them. The critical success factors (CSF) from this strategy map can be transferred to a 
BSC and a key performance indicator will be defined for each CSF. The strategy map and 
associated BSC contain the key elements of the organization’s strategy and hence create a 
common and understandable point of reference for all its employees. (2) Align the organization 
to the strategy: for organizational performance to become more than the sum of its parts, 
individual departmental strategies should be linked and integrated for synergies to occur. To 
become successful, organizations should use the strategy map and BSC in a coordinated 
manner across their different units to ensure that the whole exceeds the sum of the parts. Such 
a coordination could be accomplished by cascading the corporate BSC down throughout the 
entire organization. (3) Make strategy everyone’s everyday job: strategy implementation 
requires the active contribution of everyone in the organization. This implies that all employees 
should understand the strategy and conduct their day-to-day activities in a way that contributes 
to a successful implementation. Executives can use the BSC to communicate and educate all 
employees about the organizational strategy and actively involve employees by letting them 
develop a personal scorecard with personal objectives linked to the organization’s objectives. 
(4) Make strategy a continual process: organizations should link their budgeting process to the 
strategy and regularly review the budget together with the BSC. In that way, organizations can 
track their strategy implementation and take corrective action when necessary. (5) Mobilize 
change through executive leadership: a necessary condition for a successful strategy 
implementation is commitment by top management and a broad involvement of middle 
management in the strategic planning process.  
Moreover, this dissertation also shows practitioners the importance of strategy when 
evaluating budgeting outcomes such as budgetary slack. First, top management can actively 
influence the amount of budgetary slack in their organization by adapting the level of PSP. 
Second, managers should not automatically want to avoid budgetary slack. As organizations 
have to cope with high levels of environmental uncertainty, our third study shows that 
budgetary slack may help managers as it can be created as an expected buffer against 
negative psychological consequences, such as role ambiguity and job-related tension, that 
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come with environmental uncertainty. This suggests that in situations in which reducing 
perceived uncertainty is not a possibility, the stress associated with this uncertainty may be 
reduced by providing additional resources. Practitioners should hence interpret budgetary 
slack as a neutral concept without a positive or negative tone that is only determined by its use 
(Davila and Wouters, 2005).   
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